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Abstract 
 
This thesis sets out to correlate—to hyphenate, even—the dual and historically disparate personae of Henry 
Corbin the first French translator of Heidegger, and Henry Corbin, Iranian Islamist and pioneering 
comparative philosopher. The thesis’ cynosure is a case for the philosophicohistorically contextual 
reconsideration of Corbin’s infamous translation of Heidegger’s term Dasein as “réalité-humaine”, as the 
result of the young Corbin’s own profound engagement with Heidegger as informed by the then 
philosophically avant-garde.  
 
A contextual reading of Corbin’s late “Biographical Post-Scriptum” is enriched by the introduction of a 
correspondence between Corbin and the Warburg Library (chiefly Gertrud Bing), discovered to lie in the 
Warburg Library Archive in London, but which to date does not appear in Corbinian literature.  
 
The self-proclaimed point, and cause of Corbin’s divergence from Heidegger is examined further. Traces of 
Corbin’s  own professed “debt” to Heidegger will be shown to have indeed persisted throughout Corbin’s  
oeuvre. Close readings of the ontological role accorded to the transcendental imagination by Heidegger 
(after Kant) in the Kant book, and Heidegger’s proofs of the finitude of both Being and Dasein, as set forth 
in (the majority of) those texts included in Corbin’s 1938 Gallimard translation of Heidegger, Qu’est-ce que 
la métaphysique? (including Part 4 of the Kant book) and Parts 1-3 of the Kant book are read against 
Corbin’s own philosophy of the imaginal.  
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Introduction  
 
Chapter One of this thesis considers Henry Corbin’s contribution to the communication of philosophical 
ideas between Germany and France in the 1920s and ‘30s.  Not only for his role as Heidegger’s translator, 
but also his reviews of German publications for various journals, his own sojourn at Marburg, his 
engagement with Warburg Institute and its scholars, most notably Gertrud Bing and Ernst Cassirer, as 
documented in the Corbin-Warburg correspondence, as both discussed and discovered here (to the extent 
that although it is known to, and has been archived with characteristic efficiency by the Warburg Institute 
Archive, I have come across no other reference to it in the Corbinian literature).  
 
Chapter Two offers a reading, and a strong and I hope self-evident case for a reconsideration of Corbin’s 
Gallimard translation of Heidegger in its philosophicohistorical context: which reading Ethan Kleinberg has 
called a ‘proudly revisionist’1 history. Of course, as Nigel Tubbs has remarked2, it is perfectly possible for 
Corbin to have got Heidegger “wrong” and still produced a rich interpretation, valuable in its own right: 
albeit those of a more utilitarian regard for the task of the translator may not greet this proposition with 
such sanguinity. I must concede to having become quite invested in Corbin’s having got Heidegger “right”, 
at least at the outset, and have taken an at times pedantic joy in exposing a number of errors—factual, 
historical and orthographic—which appear in the literature in relation to the translation. 
 
Doubtless, a motivating factor has been to clear Corbin’s name, as translator, of the odium and opprobrium 
heaped upon it. I have grown quite fond of him, after all, and I hope I have gone some way toward this. 
Ultimately, as the author of the statement that if he himself lays claim to phenomenology, ‘it is because 
philosophical hermeneutics is essentially the key that opens the hidden meaning (etymologically the 
esoteric) underlying the exoteric statement,’3 we may imagine Corbin to have remained quietly sanguine at 
the prospect of having produced a translation of Heidegger, and of Dasein in particular, whose full 
contemporary resonance was and is only available to a self-initiated elite, or group of adepts, as indicated 
by this reading.  
 
 This close reading of the translation also serves the purpose of characterising Corbin’s reading of 
Heidegger, in its precision, in order to situate most precisely the point and character of his divergence from 
Heidegger, which he himself pinpoints quite clearly in the late transcript “From Heidegger to Suhravardî”,4 
against what he kept with him. To wit, that while departing the Heideggerian Weltanschauung, the horizon 
of finitude, Corbin does not abandon Dasein, departing rather in such a way as potentiates, for Corbin, a 
restoration to Dasein of its vertical plane, its “verizons”, as we might say: which restorative potential arises 
precisely at the intersection of their relative accounts of the ontological role of the imagination. Their 
divergence at this point may be accounted for as broadly consequential upon their respective 
ontotheological preference for either the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo which so forms and informs the 
                                                           
1 Ethan Kleinberg, in his preliminary viva notes  
2 In his viva notes 
3 H.Corbin, “From Heidegger to Suhravardî, also cited in my chapter “Corbin’s Debt to Heidegger” 
4 Not for Corbin, the Deleuzian enculage; Corbin’s style as a reader is courteous, rather, chivalric, even at the moment of parting 
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paradigm of traditional western metaphysics (Heidegger), vs. a prophetic hermeneutics informed by the 
device of the significatio passiva (Corbin).  A further, highly consequential, “pre-existential” choice that 
characterises the Occidental/Oriental difference5 for Corbin, is that between an Averroean, or Avicennan 
cosmology,  as I have set out to show here in my chapter “Corbin’s Imaginal”.  Finally, the thesis segues 
into a close comparative reading of Heidegger’s treatment of the finitudes of Being and of Dasein, and the 
ontological role of the imagination as set out in Qu’est-ce que la métaphysique? and the Kant book, against 
Corbin’s own philosophy of the imaginal. 
 
For Heidegger, Kant’s “Copernican Revolution”, whereby ‘rather than utilising ‘the “old” concept of 
truth’—the adequatio, i.e., according to which knowledge must correspond to objects—we should assume 
instead ‘that objects must conform to our (a priori) knowledge’. far from doing away with the adequatio, 
not only presupposes but ‘indeed even grounds it for the first time’ in ontology, since the correspondence of 
ontic knowledge to beings as “objects” now depends on the knowledge of beings as beings, i.e. on ‘the 
unveiledness of the constitution of the Being of beings’.6  
 
Here we have the Kantian genesis of the old philosophical tussle between what Geroulanos has called a 
rationalism ‘allied to neocriticism and the claim that science proceeds from the reasoning human mind and 
encompasses the world as it may be understood’, opposed to a realism characterised by the claim ‘that 
science seeks to comprehend a grand world external to man and proceeds  from the real data provided by 
this world’, 7  both of which were challenged by the convergence of post-Newtonian physics, i.e., 
Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle, and the emerging post-humanist thought of the 1920s and ‘30s. As 
Heidegger observes in the Kant book, both of these models of truth are constituted of subject-object 
relations. Whether you proceed from reason to the object or vice versa, the one is required to correspond 
adequately to the other.  These are both thus truths of the  adequatio.  
 
What makes of Heideggerian ontology what Meillasoux has called a “correlationism”, the “truth of Dasein”  
a truth of correlation is not only that for Heidegger, as per the Kant book, ‘the “I propose” which 
“accompanies” all representing’ is the ‘“I think”’, as an “I propose”—and always an “I think [something]”, 
e.g., ‘“I think substance”, “I think causality”—or rather, ‘always already [an] “it means”’8—but also that 
which was so interesting for Corbin’s French philosophical peers of the early 1930s about the Uncertainty 
Principle e.g., which Kojève, e.g., is known to have  read both into, and through Heidegger, is that 
Geroulanos has referred to as ‘the interaction between observing and observed systems’.9 That which in 
both Heideggerian and Corbinian terms, we might describe as the (Being-, or) being-revealed in being’s 
being-revealing. The truth of correlation is always an ontic-ontological truth because it is ontological truth, 
i.e., the knowledge of beings as beings, which makes ontic truth, the knowledge of beings, possible.   For 
Heidegger, as for Corbin, it is always an experiential truth: a truth of Verstehen, “understanding” as which 
is experienced, undergone; and of aleitheia, revelation.  
                                                           
5 N.B., this is not an earthly geographic distinction; there are Orientals in the West (mystics) for Corbin, as he is quick to aver.  
6 M. Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, ibid. p.8 
7 S. Geroulanos, An Atheism That is Not a Humanism p.60 
8 M. Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, ibid. p.105 
9 S. Geroulanos, An Atheism That is Not a Humanism ... p.64 
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For Heidegger, the fundamental truth of being as Dasein, in its revelation of Being, is revealed as finitude.  
In Heidegger’s “What is Metaphysics?”, his proof of the finitude of Being in terms of Creative Being’s 
dependency on the Nothing, as that which being is created from, itself depends on the doctrine of creatio ex 
nihilo. A similar model of dependency (as a kind of relation-to) as a proof of finitude appears also in the 
Kant book, wherein Heidegger’s proof of Dasein’s finitude is established not on the basis of the finitude of 
human reason (which however is also established there) and not, as the unlearned might perhaps expect, on 
the grounds of Dasein’s plain old biological death—Dasein is not, after all identical to a biological 
human—but rather on the basis of Dasein’s dependency for it’s knowledge of Being, and thus for its being 
as Dasein, on the “already there encountered”. Thus Heidegger states in the Kant book that the innermost 
nature of the human being is finite; finitude ‘completely determines the human being from the ground up as 
the being that it is.’ 10 The -thrownness and -thereness, i.e., ‘the existence of human beings’ amongst other 
beings, some of which, the non-human, are evidently presumed not to have an awareness of Being as Being 
thus constitutes for Heidegger ‘an irruption into the totality of beings’ of such awareness; in human-being’s 
‘surrendering’ to which—i.e., in its letting ‘the being as such be’, and in so doing, itself being ‘delivered up 
as a being’—it is that ‘the being in itself first becomes manifest, i.e., as being’. Thus, for Heidegger, 
existence—as the “irruption”, the ‘thrown being’ of human-beings, necessarily ‘means dependency’, 
because precisely in order to ‘let the being as such be...what and as it is...the existing being must already 
have projected that it is a being on the strength of what has been encountered’. Thus it is by the dependency 
of human-being, as Dasein, on the “already encountered” for its being Dasein, definitively aware of Being 
as Being, etc; —by which Heidegger characterises human  “-sein’s”  intrinsic relation to the “Da-”,    “-
there”. And, as dependency is the mark of finitude for Heidegger, it follows that the being of Dasein, i.e., 
existence ‘as a mode of Being’, is now declared as ‘in itself finitude’. Heidegger further states that:  
Only because the understanding of Being is the most finitude in what is finite, 
can it also make possible the so-called “creative” capacities of the finite human 
creature. On the grounds of the understanding of Being, man is the there [das 
Da], with the Being of which occurs the opening irruption into the being so 
that it show itself as such for a self. More original than man is the finitude of 
the Dasein in him. 11 
Corbin is with Heidegger, so far as this “letting be” is concerned.  For Corbin, however, this “letting be” is 
precisely a creative be!ing, an unconcealment of Creative Be!ing in significatio passiva, according to each 
be!ing’s capacity, as per the epigraph and the leitmotif of this thesis: Talem eum vidi qualem capere potui.12 
Thus while the “horizontal” axis, the ontic-ontological truth of be!ing, for Corbin, is also a truth of being-
there, of correlation,  like to Dasein, ontological truth is what we might call the vertical axis or dimension 
of the truth of correlation, i.e.,  acc. to the gnoseology of the Ishrâqîyûn’, the Orient of Being.13 According 
to this theosophy, every “utterance”, every iteration of Be!ing as be!ing is a creative theophany. It is 
Corbin’s radical divergence at this point from Heidegger that this thesis seeks to discuss and document, 
from here on. 
                                                           
10 M. Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics p.154 
11 M. Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics p.160 
12 Roughly,“What I could see, I was able to capture” H. Corbin, Alone with the Alone p.75 
13 H.Corbin, “From Heidegger to Suhravardî ” 
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Chapter One: From Paris to Teheran 
To wit, a philosophical quest that does not end in personal spiritual realization 
is a vain waste of time, and the search for mystical experience without first 
going by way of a serious and extensive philosophical education, has every 
chance of ending with the seeker lost in aberrations, illusions and errancies. 
So says Henry Corbin, in his 1978 “Biographical Post-Scriptum” (from here on “Post-Scriptum”), 
appended to the transcript of “From Heidegger to Suhravardî”, a 1976 radio interview with Philippe Nemo, 
for publication in the dedicated volume Henry Corbin: Cahier de l’Herne (no. 39).14  As the name suggests,  
the interview itself is chiefly concerned with how it came to be that ‘the translator of Heidegger and the 
man who has introduced Iranian Islamic philosophy to the West are one and the same’;15 the “Post-
Scriptum” intended to add some essential “precisions”.  
 
In fact, however, the interview’s title, “From Heidegger to Suhravardî”,  is rather misleading since, he says, 
(having received his Diploma from the School of Oriental Languages in 1929), his ‘first publications on 
Suhravardî go back to 1933 and 1935’16 while his ‘translation of Heidegger  appears in 1938’. This is not, 
in fact, strictly accurate, as while the Gallimard Edition of What is Metaphysics? translated by Corbin was 
indeed published in 1938,  Corbin’s first translation of Heidegger’s essay, What is Metaphysics? appeared 
in the journal Bifur in 1931.17  
 
The interview transcript might thus more accurately have been entitled “From Suhravardî to Heidegger to 
Suhravardî”. Of the precise circumstances in which Corbin came to undertake his translations of Heidegger, 
whether the 1931 Bifur journal article in 1931, or the 1938 book for Gallimard, the “Post-Scriptum” has 
frustratingly little to tell us; save by inference, in that that he brings up the fact of his translation in the same 
breath as he recollects the philosophical circle around his friend Alexandre Koyré, including Bernard 
Groethuysen, without whose strenuous efforts Corbin says the Gallimard Edition may never have been 
commissioned at all.  
 
The fact that several major contemporary works on the period, including Ethan Kleinberg’s Generation 
Existential (2005), Stefanos Geroulanos’ An Atheism That is not Humanist Emerges in French Thought 
(2010), Peter Eli Gordon’s Continental Divide; Heidegger, Cassirer, Davos (2010), and Daryush 
Shayegan’s Henry Corbin – Penseur de L’Islam Spirituel (2011),  all source facts from the “Post-
Scriptum”, one might hope to stand as testament to its historical veracity; albeit, as I have discovered in the 
course of this research, Kleinberg (who is far from alone in this, cf. my chapter “Réalité-humaine”) e.g.,   
                                                           
14 “From Heidegger to Suhravardî”, recorded for Radio France-Culture, on Wednesday, the 2nd June 1976, and reproduced   
  (with revisions drawn from notes taken at the time) in Henry Corbin: Cahier de l’Herne (No. 39) Paris, l'Herne, 1981. Jambet, 
Christian, (Editor). Consacré à Henry Corbin, 1981, working here from the (anonymous) English translation published online by the 
Association des Amis de Henry et Stella Corbin. (http://www.amiscorbin.com/textes/propos.htm). As there are no page numbers to this 
online version in all footnotes to follow, throughout this thesis I simply reference the text, specifying either “From Heidegger to 
Suhravardî”, or “Post-Scriptum”. As both are fairly concise, I hope this should not prove too inconvenient for anyone wishing to 
consult the original.  
15 H. Corbin, “From Heidegger to Suhravardî”.  
16 The first of these appearing in Volume II of Recherches Philosophiques (1932-3).   
17 H.Corbin, “Pour l’anthropologie philosophique : Un traité persan inédit de Suhrawardi d’Alep”, Recherches Philosophiques Vol. II, 
1932-3, Boivin  & co. Paris, pp.371-424 
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confuses Corbin’s two quite different but identically named translations of Heidegger, one an essay, the 
other a book which includes a new translation of that same essay, both of which are named “What is 
Metaphysics?”, an error which may have been borne out of relying on the “Post-Scriptum” too much; 
whereas Shayegan blithely overlooks what is stated quite plainly in the “Post-Scriptum” to attribute the 
source of Ernst Cassirer’s influence upon Corbin otherwise than Corbin himself does—facts which might 
seem to tarnish their credibility as witnesses a little. Still, as noted Corbin himself also offers us some 
mildly erroneous dates in the “Post-Scriptum”; and perhaps none of this should concern us too gravely, 
here, at least, if we are to take him at his word, in “From Heidegger to Suhravardî” (though somewhat 
belied by his own meticulous scholarship) that for him: 
As Unamuno wrote, it is important to recognize “that the past is no more and 
that nothing exists in truth except that which acts. That a legend, as we call 
them, when it pushes human beings to veridical action, by firing their hearts or 
by consoling them with life, is a thousand times more real than the relation of 
some random act festering in the archives”18.    
In any case, largely lacking for other sources the first part of this chapter mainly consists of a gloss of the 
“Post-Scriptum”, until we come to such points as other, relevant sources intersect; whereupon our 
perspective widens to set Corbin’s narrative in historico-philosophical context.   
 
We begin, as does the “Post-Scriptum”, with Corbin’s first encounter with Islamic philosophy, via the 12th 
century Toledo School translations of Arabic texts into Latin taught by Etienne Gilson in his 1923-4 class 
on Medieval Philosophy at the École pratique des hautes études (EPHE) in Paris. Gilson’s  describes 
Gilson’s ‘incomparable’ teaching method, of “live” translation followed by ‘magisterial commentary that 
penetrated to the very heart of things’, as having made such a profound and ‘dazzling impression’ upon him 
that he resolved, there and then, to take Gilson as his model. Thus from the outset, the act of translation is 
integral to Corbin’s ideal of the scholar-philosopher.   
 
 In 1926-7, both enthused and encouraged by Gilson, Corbin decided against entering for the agrégation,  
instead reading Arabic at the École Nationale des Langues Orientale  that he might further explore what he 
then perceived as a certain ‘correspondence’ or ‘connivance’ between cosmology and angelology, ‘at 
greater length and from other angles’. 19   This was an unusual step for a would-be French scholar, since 
‘From its inception, the French academic system’  has been structured toward the top-down ‘dissemination 
of a specific canon, and the training of teachers to impose this canon’, with the national university  ‘tak[ing] 
charge of primary, secondary, and higher education’. Along with those other high-scoring baccalauréat  
student wishing to become academics, Corbin  would “normally” have entered the École Normale 
Supérieure,20  where in exchange for three fully-funded years of study, he would have been contractually 
bound to teach the national curriculum at one level or another for no less than ten years; a safe and steady 
route to professional academia, which, while being neither ‘in possession of a personal fortune’, nor of 
                                                           
18 Corbin, “Biographical Post-Scriptum” ( from here on “Post-Scriptum”)      
19 Corbin, “Post-Scriptum”       
20 Kleinberg, Generation Existential p.50.  
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‘time to waste’ either (as ‘a friendly Sorbonne professor’ enquired of him) Corbin yet chose to eschew in 
favour of his own path.  
 
Thus it was that Corbin and his friend Georges Vajda found themselves as ‘pretty much the only errant 
philosophers’ in the ‘venerable establishment’ of the École Nationale des Langues Orientales. Corbin states 
that he also studied with Emile Bréhier, then ‘ensconced in translating and establishing the critical edition 
of Plotinus’ Enneads’, and whose students, including Corbin, continued to enjoy ‘the windfalls’ of 
Bréhier’s 1922-1923 lecture series on Plotinus and the Upanishads.  Though we might imagine how this 
kind of comparative work might appeal to Corbin,  he states that it was difficult, coming out of a class ‘on 
Duns Scot, Doctor subtilis’, e.g., as taught by Etienne Gilson,  to accept Brehier’s contention ‘that there 
was no such thing as Christian philosophy’.21 Nonetheless ‘eager for metaphysical adventure’, Corbin was 
inspired by Bréhier’s classes  to undertake his own investigation of ‘the influence and trace elements of 
Indian philosophy to be found in the works of the founder of Neo-Platonism’. Corbin thus began to study 
Sanskrit as well as Arabic; and, as this went against the received wisdom of every philologist and linguist 
whom he cared to consult, he chose ‘heroically’, he says, to do so in secret. Heroic indeed, since finding 
himself ‘astray among the linguists’, Corbin recalls this period as one of great mental asceticism, during 
which, at times, ‘starved’ of philosophy, and faced instead with ‘nothing but grammar books and 
dictionaries’, he felt he must ‘surely perish’, more than once asking himself ‘What am I doing here?  What 
have I got myself into?’  
 
In 1928, however, Corbin at last found a welcome ‘refuge’ and intellectual sustenance in ‘the finest 
substance of Islamic Spirituality’, as taught by Louis Massignon. Massignon, who taught at the Collège de 
France from 1928, was also Director of Islamic Studies in the Religious Science Section of the EPHE—in 
which post Corbin was to succeed Massignon two decades later.  
 
Corbin qualifies his somewhat critical recollection of Massignon’s relentless pursuit of his own prodigious 
and ‘fulgurating intuitions’ which could sometimes leave the listener ‘exhausted and lost’, by claiming this 
teaching style of the ‘great mystic’ Massignon to be ‘simply a necessary aspect of the passion burning 
inside’ him. Thus, while recognising there were ‘certain vulnerable sides to [Massignon’s] thinking, certain 
breaches’ which, ‘over the course of the years it was impossible not to perceive’, Corbin yet evokes the 
name of Massignon with veneration. And how could he do otherwise, since it was Massignon,22 , who, in 
response to Corbin’s questions ‘regarding the connections between the philosophy and mysticism of a 
certain Suhravardî,  was “inspired by the Heavens” to present Corbin with ‘a lithographed edition of the 
principal work of Suhravardî, Hikmat al-Ishrâq: “The Oriental Theosophy”’, saying ‘Here…I believe that 
there is something in this book for you”’.  That “something”’, writes Corbin, ‘was the presence and 
company of the young Shaykh al-Ishraq’, henceforward Corbin’s lifelong companion. 
                                                           
21  In “From Heidegger to Suhravardî”, Corbin makes special mention of Heidegger’s own 1916 habiliation thesis on Duns Scotus’ 
Grammatica Speculativa. It is possible that Corbin may either have encountered Heidegger’s thesis while studying with Gilson or may 
have come upon the thesis some years later—who knows, but perhaps—to compare Heidegger’s Duns Scotus with Gilson’s. 
22 Massignon, whose ‘fiery soul’, whose ‘intrepid penetration into the arcane regions of mystical life in Islam, into hitherto unexplored 
regions and depths, the nobility of [whose] indignations before the shortcomings of this world….inevitably left its impression upon the 
spirit of his young auditors’ (H. Corbin, “Post-Scriptum”). 
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Here, according to his conviction that ‘one is born a Platonist, just as one can be born an atheist, a 
materialist, etc. It is a question of the impenetrable mystery of pre-existential choices’; Corbin states that he 
has ‘always been a Platonist (in the broadest sense of the term of course)’.  As such, ‘young Platonist’ that 
he was, says Corbin, he ‘could not help burn at the very contact of [Suhravardî], he who had been the 
“Imam of the Persian Platonists” (hence also, his “family feeling” for the Cambridge Platonists, upon being 
introduced to them by Ernst Cassirer).  For Corbin this Platonism of Suhravardî’s, which ‘expressed itself 
in terms belonging to the Zoroastrian angelology of Ancient Persia… illuminated the path’ Corbin says he 
‘had been searching for’, and upon discovering Persia as an ‘entire spiritual universe, a hearth and meeting 
place in the history of religions’,  he felt no more need ‘to remain torn between Sanskrit and Arabic.’ His  
‘great adventure’ had  begun. In 1928 Corbin was assigned to the Oriental Language Section of the 
Bibliothèque National de France; thus it was, says Corbin, that he passed, for a time, ‘into the rank and file 
of the Orientalists’, whereupon, it was only after a  ‘long [and highly instructive] period’ that Corbin came 
to see ‘that in future it would be the Philosophers and not the Orientalists who would be the only ones 
capable of assuming responsibility for the “oriental philosophy”’.  
 
Corbin’s ‘brief overview of the “career” of [Corbin] the Orientalist Philosopher, and his decisive encounter 
with that Iranian land said to be the “colour of sky” and “homeland to philosophers and poets”’, now 
segues into an account of his ‘complementary’ encounter ‘with the old Germany that was also once 
“homeland to philosophers and poets”’ in its own right, to which he was introduced via the ‘frequent 
meetings’ and seminars held in the home of the ‘inimitable’ and ‘immensely cultivated’ Baruzi brothers ‘on 
the Place Victor Hugo’, where ‘one met among the participants all kinds of unexpected European 
personalities’, including always ‘a strong German contingent’. It was the younger Baruzi23 brother, Jean,24 
whom Corbin characterizes, in part, by the ‘twenty years’ he took ‘to produce his enormous thesis on Saint 
John of the Cross [of Jerusalem]’25, that introduced the Baruzi ‘seminarians’, Corbin included, ‘to the 
theology of the young Luther’, then a ‘fashionable subject’ in contemporary German theology; and useful 
to Corbin, as he would later be “called upon” to ‘stand in’ for Alexandre Koyré at the Section of Religious 
Sciences of the EPHE26, ‘during the years 1937 through 39’ and ‘discourse upon Lutheran hermeneutics’,27 
(a task for which Corbin’s familiarity with Heidegger’s habiliation thesis on Duns Scotus’ Theory of the 
Categories would also come in handy). From Luther, on they went ‘to the great Protestant spirituals: 
Sebastian Franck, Caspar Schwenkfeld, Valentin Weigel, Johann Arndt, etc.’28 To set these seminars in 
context, S. Geroulanos e.g. cites the fact Jean Baruzi has an  essay ‘on the languages of mysticism’ 
included in the inaugural volume of Recherches Philosophiques as “speaking to” the then ‘contemporary 
resonance of the problem of mysticism’29. Of Koyré  himself, the founder of Recherches Philosophiques 
                                                           
23 H. Corbin, “Post-Scriptum”  
24 The elder Baruzi brother Joseph being ‘a musicologist whose articles, bearing the fruit of a profound musical thinking, appeared 
regularly in the review The Minstrel [Le Ménestrel]’, also the author of The Will or Drive to Metamorphosis (La Volonté de 
metamorphose) and Dream of a Century (Rêve d’un siècle)’ H. Corbin, “Post-Scriptum” 
25 and also by his having ‘assisted Alfred Loisy at the Collège de France, before becoming chair of Religious History there’ 
26 Later to become renowned as a historian of science,  
27 H. Corbin, “From Heidegger to Suhravardî” 
28 Corbin, “Post-Scriptum”  
29 Cf. S. Geroulanos, An Atheism That is Not a Humanism ... p.56 
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and later to gain great renown as a historian of science, S. Geroulanos notes that ‘until about 1935, Koyré  
continued to teach and publish mostly in the history of theology and mysticism’.30 In any case, it was ‘all 
new and captivating’ for Corbin, for whom ‘the circle of friends that had formed around the inseparable 
Baruzi brothers was already in itself an invitation to dare the adventures of the Spirit’. With hindsight, says 
Corbin, this “invitation” was 'none other than the hermeneutic path already unfurling in the morning fog’. 
Recalling the compulsion he had felt ‘upon hearing Etienne Gilson’s interpretation of Avicenna’ to learn 
Arabic in order that he might go to the original texts and “see for himself”, Corbin says ‘it was equally 
impossible to hear the call of the Spirituals interpreted by Jean Baruzi without taking the decision to enter 
into that world as well’. Thus Corbin was set upon ‘the path towards a Germany that was home to the 
philosophers and the “great individuals” of mystical spirituality’. His ‘first step’ on this path was to the 
‘“inspired hill”’ of Marburg University in July 1930, where he made  great many new and significant 
acquaintances and discoveries, amongst students who Corbin says in those days  ‘led a remarkably intense 
theological and philosophical life’. It happened that at the time of Corbin’s first visit, Olga Fröbe-Kapteyn 
was visiting with Rudolf Otto to discuss what from 1933 onward would be realised as the annual ‘Ascona 
Eranos circle’, in which Corbin would later become a regular and notable participant.31 ‘There was also 
Rudolf Bultmann, whose theology, says Corbin,  ‘was then beginning to provoke... agitation’; Friedrich 
Heiler, ‘then Professor in the Faculty of Theology’ (also a friend of Joseph Baruzi’s),  a ‘painful figure’, 
who was ‘the author of an important book on prayer, aspiring towards the development of a Christianity 
freed of confessional attachment’. It was also at Marburg that Corbin’s French friend Ambert-Marie 
Schmidt introduced Corbin to Swedenborg, whose  ‘immense oeuvre’ would become another of Corbin’s 
lifelong companions, by presenting him with ‘an edition of the French translation Du Ciel et de l’Enfer (Of 
Heaven and Hell)’. There too, Corbin was first introduced to the work of Karl Barth by Corbin by one 
Professor Theodor Siegfried, who had ‘passed his habiliation with Rudolf Otto’, whereupon despite 
Siegfried’s having ‘alerted [him] as to the pure formalism to which dialectical theology condemned itself’, 
Corbin nevertheless ‘plunged with passion into the reading of...Barth’s dense commentary upon the Epistle 
to the Romans’, which he says imparted to him ‘a first presentiment of a great number of things’ that he 
‘had yet to formulate’ for himself. Corbin’s encounter with Barth made such a strong impression on him 
that he says its consequences were ‘to play themselves out over several years’. 32 These included, back in 
Paris, Corbin’s joining a small group called the New Protestant Theologians, who came to cherish ‘every 
hope that Karl Barth might bring about a renewal of Protestant theology’. In the year 1931-1932,  along 
with Denis de Rougemont, Roland de Pury, Albert-Marie Schmidt, and Roger Jezequel,  Corbin  co-
founded ‘a small review entitled Hic et Nunc [Here and Now]’, 
and advanced with the kind of juvenile brutality that causes consternation not 
only among one’s elders, but ultimately in the young themselves; after life has 
                                                           
30‘[ctd] the core of his early corpus includes books on Saint Anselm and Jacob Boehme, an uncompleted manuscript on medieval 
Jewish thought, essays on (among others)’. S. Geroulanos, ibid., p.81 
31 Cf. e.g., H. Corbin, “The Time of Eranos”, in Campbell, Joseph, ed., Man and Time, Papers from the Eranos Yearbooks, Bollingen 
Series XXX, Vol. 3, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1957, p. xix. 
32 Of a trip to Bonn in the spring of 1932, Corbin writes that ‘Karl Barth was there at that time, of course, along with the powerful 
cohort of his students and adepts. The theological discussions went ahead full steam, all the more so as we shared a presentiment of 
the approaching catastrophe—. He recalls this ‘not without emotion’, as he thinks ‘of all those who have since disappeared (among 
whom Landsberg and so many others)’; though whether by old age, accident of war, or bellicose murder, he does not say.  
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taught them a thing or two and they in turn are elders. Alas! Our illusions were 
to come tumbling down from great heights. 33 
Their great hopes for Barth, raised by e.g., Barth’s commentary on Paul’s letter to the Romans, ‘with its 
prophetic sparks’, and other early writings were only to be dashed by later works, such as  ‘the heavy 
colossal Dogmatic’;  not what the New Protestant Theologians had been hoping for at all.  
 
Following their disappointment with Barth, the New Protestant Theologians subsequently ‘adopted 
Kierkegaard and Dostoïevsky’ as their ‘spiritual forefathers’;  which while being a good move,  in Corbin’s 
book, was not however ‘enough to jar philosophy’ in the way that the NPT had originally set out to;  
though not before Corbin had gone to the length of translating ‘one of Karl Barth’s opuscules’: Die Not der 
evangelischen Kirche, lit. “The Distress of the Protestant Church”, but which, ‘following the advice of  
Pierre Maury’34 (editor of the review Faith and Life (Foi et Vie), Issue 39,  in which it was published in 
1932)35, was given the French title of “Misère et Grandeur de l’Eglise évangélique”, (“Grandeur and 
Misery of the Evangelical Church”.) Here Corbin also recalls Barth’s own ‘memorable visit to Paris in 
1934’ during which Corbin spoke with Barth of his own (Corbin’s) interest in those Right-Hegelian 
speculative theologians of the early 19th century ‘who read Hegel in the same manner that they read 
Meister Eckhart’; Philipe Marheineke in particular, for whom Corbin discerned in Barth ‘a discrete [albeit 
inexplicable] sympathy’. Ultimately, however,  Corbin says that this sympathy was to remain ‘Karl Barth’s 
secret...creating a gulf between his “dialectical theology” and this Hegelian theology of the Right,’36 of 
which Corbin states 
 It is important to remember that this Hegelianism was vigorously opposed to 
rationalism, something easily forgotten when the grand majority of our 
translations mistakenly give “reason” as the equivalent of Vernunft, even 
though this word refers to the Greek word Noos. The entire Hegelian and Post-
Hegelian climate would change if we kept this reference in mind.  
 
Elsewhere, in “From Heidegger to Suhravardî”, Corbin suggests that, just as ‘the philosophy of Hegel has 
given birth to a Hegelian right and a Hegelian left, so ‘Heidegger’s philosophy’ may yet ‘volens 
nolens...give birth to a Heideggerian right and a Heideggerianism left.’ It is left to the reader to guess where 
Corbin might situate himself here. 37  
 
Corbin’s own eventual, ‘disastrous realization’ about Barthism was that, while ‘“Religious science” had 
been in large part the work of Protestant theologians’, Barth’s theology ‘professed the most profound 
disdain for both religious science and the study of religious history’, naively opposing ‘other religions as 
the products of human effort’ against Christianity as the ‘descent and initiative of God towards humanity’, 
and maintaining ‘that for this reason Christianity should not even be understood as a “religion”. This, of 
                                                           
33 H. Corbin, “Post-Scriptum”        
34 H. Corbin, “Post-Scriptum” 
35 http://www.amiscorbin.com/textes/bibliographie.htm 
36 H. Corbin, “Post-Scriptum”        
37 H. Corbin, “From Heidegger to Suhravardî” 
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course’ continues Corbin, ‘is nothing very original, indeed something along the same lines had been said in 
Islam, well before Karl Barth’. Hence Corbin offers the same response to this Barthian doctrine ‘as to the 
legal theologians of Islam’, i.e., ‘the answer provided by Ibn ‘Arabi and his school’; those masterless 
“disciples of Khidr” for whom there can never be ‘one theophany identical for all’. Rather, to each ‘his own 
theophany’, ‘correspond[ing] to his “ inner heaven, to the form of his own being, to his eternal individuality 
(ayn thabita)’. 38  
  
As for philosophy at Marburg, while Martin Heidegger had already returned to Freiburg in 1928 to take up 
his chair as Husserl’s successor, Corbin says ‘there were still two eminent privatdozent in the philosophy 
department there’: Karl Löwith, with whom Corbin had ‘wonderful conversations on the subject of [the 
pietist-Lutheran theologian-philosopher] Hamann and the currents connected to his work’, and Gerhard 
Kruger, ‘an expert phenomenologist’ whose seminars gave Corbin ‘a taste of all the problems then 
fashionable in Germany’, leading to the simultaneously ‘enthusing and... crushing revelation’  that he 
would surely have to ‘begin [his] philosophical education all over again’. In this realisation, despite his own 
singular path and progress, Corbin came to be quite in step with (if not ahead of most of) the philosophical 
avant-garde in France, as we shall now discover.  
 
In Corbin’s era, as from the outset of the Third Republic (1870-1940), French university professors were 
effectively charged with impressing upon their students, and so perpetuating, the legitimacy of ‘the new 
republican institutions’— of the state, i.e.,—via the dissemination of various canonical doctrines that 
agreed in general terms upon a teleological narrative according to which (thus presuming the primacy of 
reason amongst the human faculties), ‘humankind had never ceased to progress toward an agreement on 
specific reasonable principles’, the selfsame principles, i.e., upon which said institutions were founded.39 
Toward the end of the long nineteenth century (the period in Europe beginning with both the French 
Revolution and the Industrial Revolution in England, and ending with the First World War)  the 
rationalistic humanism dominating French philosophy was also complemented by the widespread 
popularity of Bergson, though come the cataclysmic birth of the 20th century proper, in the trenches of 
WWI, Bergson, in the eyes of the young at least, seemed rooted firmly in the century that had passed. 
 
By the time Henry Corbin came to make his own way through academe, Leon Brunschvicg was in place as 
‘the head of the jury d’agrégation’40, and thus empowered not only to preside over the jury’s deliberations 
and selection of candidates for examination, but also to determine the French national syllabus for 
university philosophy departments. Under Brunschvicg’s direction, this consisted of Plato, then Descartes, 
and then Kant; so chosen and ordered as to best describe what Brunschvicg saw as ‘the logical progression 
of philosophy’,41 according to his particular strain of ‘French neo-Kantian rationalism’.42  
 
                                                           
38 H. Corbin, Alone with the Alone p.61 
39 Kleinberg, Generation Existential p.5, citing Vincent Descombes, Modern French Philosophy, trans. L. Scott Fox and J.M. Harding 
(Cambridge University Press, 1980) p.6-7 
40 Kleinberg, Generation Existential p.5 
41 Kleinberg, Generation Existential p.5 
42 Having prevailed, according to Kleinberg, over its closest doctrinal competitor, namely the sociological positivism of Émile 
Durkheim. (Kleinberg, Generation Existential p.5) 
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There were, however, states of exception, notably the EPHE and the Collège de France, research institutes 
where original and extra-curricular research was encouraged.  To this day the Collège de France, (so called 
from 1870, with the birth of the Third Republic, formerly the Collège Impérial), motto Docet Omnia, offers 
free public access to its seminars and lectures for the nation’s edification, awarding prestigious research-
and-lecturing only posts to a limited number of eminent professors—who, whether lecturing ‘to 
consistently full halls’, or conducting their research ‘in relative obscurity’— are free to rove outside the 
national curriculum.   
 
As for the EPHE, Kleinberg writes that it was ‘Founded in 1868, largely in response to the perceived 
superiority of German research institutes (which was to become an abiding concern in France)’43. 
Following France’s defeat in the Franco-Prussian War (1870-71), the Third Republic was possessed of a 
patriotic drive to equal and then surpass the Germans in all fields, including academia, where a number of 
French studies had come to the uncomfortable conclusion that according to a variety of measures the 
Germans were well ahead of them. There was there was a ‘perception that the [French] educational system 
had become mired in the classics and consequently unable to look to the future. Henceforth, ‘the German 
University became the mark by which the French system would be measured’; although Kleinberg (after 
Smith, The ENS and the Third Republic),  stresses that the French were not ‘“uncritical imitators”’, and any 
‘changes made would be uniquely French.’44  Albeit ‘in practice an administrative superstructure designed 
to dispense funds for advanced research’, faculty were also expected to teach advanced research skills, 
teaching, as it were, by doing. These seminars thus further disseminated their findings and provided a 
permissive forum in which to explore dissenting and extracurricular views. The EPHE offered relatively 
modest salaries to its directeurs d’études—so called, rather than “professors”; the only degree the EPHE 
was entitled to award was ‘a “third cycle doctorate” which allowed émigrés...to teach in France without 
having taken the entire program of concours, agrégation, thèse de doctorat’; though only at ‘other small 
research institutes and not at the lycèe or university level’.45 The EPHE thus ‘became a magnet for 
intellectuals on the periphery of the national education system—foreigners, those who professed theories 
outside of the canon, and scholars more interested in ideas than in exams’,46 including our own Henry 
Corbin. By the early 1930s the EPHE was surely the most interesting institutional philosophical forum in 
Paris.  
 
Beyond strategic educational reform, the lived experience of WWI and its aftermath had a profound effect 
on French thought. For many, writes Kleinberg, the ‘optimistic view of progress and history embodied in 
French Philosophy and the Third Republic’ seemed hardly adequate to the thinking of such industrially 
wrought carnage, of a so-called “victory” in which so many were maimed and lost. Unwilling to abandon 
the idea of historical progress entirely, many began to search outside of the French canon for alternative 
‘methodologies’47, other systems of thought, i.e., in which it might be re-founded. Meanwhile, however 
much informal dissent might be permitted, the ENS curriculum was still determined by, and gauged 
                                                           
43 Kleinberg, Generation Existential p.51 
44 E. Kleinberg, Generation Existential p.52 
45 This actually sounds like a pretty good deal 
46 Kleinberg, Generation Existential p.51 
47 E. Kleinberg, Generation Existential p.55 
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towards, the national examination syllabus over which Leon Brunschvicg continued to preside, and there 
dissent ‘would not be tolerated’. Kleinberg e.g., cites Raymond Aron’s account of an ENS seminar given 
by Leon Brunschvicg on The Progress of Consciousness in Western Thought, in which Jean-Paul Sartre 
clashed with an immovable Brunschvicg over Nietzsche’s definition of truth, which, against Nietzsche, 
Brunschvicg held to be immanent, versus Sartre’s protestation that ‘truth claims were based entirely on the 
fickle and absurd meanings that individuals force on the objects that surround them’. 48 Kleinberg also 
notes that Sartre failed the agrégation at his first sitting.49 The quest for—something else—more 
appropriate to the post-war moment in which they found themselves—would have to be conducted 
elsewhere.  And where else but the EPHE, where the Alexandres Koyré and then Kojève were to give their 
famous Hegel seminars?  Outside the institution, there also sprang up more or less formal, but vitally 
important—nay, “seminal”—seminars and journals, such as e.g., Bifur, in which Sartre’s “Legend of the 
Truth” appeared alongside Corbin’s first attempt at translating Heidegger’s “What is Metaphysics?”50, the 
Revue de la France et de l’étranger, where one could find ‘commentary on German phenomenology and 
Lebensphilosophie’; and  Recherches philosophiques, where one ‘could read French translations of works 
by Husserl, Karl Jaspers, and Heidegger’, and to which up-and-coming French ‘thinkers such as Jean-Paul 
Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Raymond Aron, Henry Corbin, Jacques Lacan, Raymond Queneau, Jean 
Hyppolite...[and] Georges Bataille’ also contributed. 51  
 
Founded by Alexandre Koyré (a member of the original Göttingen circle of phenomenologists ) in 1931,  
a year after Husserl’s Jahrbuch ceased publication, the journal Recherches philosophiques was overseen by 
an editorial board to which Koyré had recruited a number of establishment figures including Brunschvicg 
himself (with whom, upon his return to Paris in 1912, Koyré became friends, despite Brunschvicg’s initial 
resistance to phenomenology), who thus, while continuing to beat the bounds of the national curriculum, at 
once lent his name and weight to the journal’s extracurricular, but nonetheless patriotically approved aim of 
‘exposing the French intellectual world to foreign (and specifically German) philosophy’.52 Kleinberg also 
notes that it was also ‘on the editorial boards of journals that émigrés such as Koyré, Kojève, Eric Weil, 
Georges Gurvitch, Bernard Groethuysen, and Jacob Gordin could interact with established French 
intellectuals.’53  The journal thus initially served as a kind of crucible, or no man’s land in which 
philosophical commerce might occur without, as yet, breaching the integrity of the national canon.   As 
noted by S. Geroulanos54, a number of more or less seismic philosophical events in the period immediately 
prior to the founding of Recherches Philosophiques also lent urgency and encouragement to this endeavour,  
as follows.  
 
In 1928, the Japanese philosopher Count Shuzo Kuki, a former student of Heidegger’s (to whose work, it is 
said, he was the first to  introduce Jean-Paul Sartre, with whom the Count is also said to have discussed 
                                                           
48 E. Kleinberg, citing Aron’s Memoire (Paris: Juillard, 1983) in Gen. Existential, p.55).  
49 E. Kleinberg, Generation Existential p.55 
50 J. P. Sartre, “Légende de la vérité” Bifur, Edition 8, 1931 pp.77-96 
51 E. Kleinberg, Generation Existential p.56 
52 E. Kleinberg, Generation Existential p.58 
53 E. Kleinberg, Generation Existential p.56 
54 S. Geroulanos, An Atheism that is Not a Humanism ... p.49 
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various ‘figureheads of French thought’)55 gave a number of public lectures in Paris.  In the last of these, 
entitled ‘General Characteristics of French Philosophy’ he set out his disdain for the present state of the 
French philosophical establishment, as represented by e.g., ‘Henri Bergson, Leon Brunschvicg, Celestin 
Bouglé, Emile Meyerson and others’,  in terms of what he summarily identified as the four main strains, or 
traits of its ‘distinctly national’ character, to wit: ‘(i) inner observation; (ii)an alliance with positivism; (iii) 
a fundamental metaphysical—essentially Cartesian-dualism; and (iv) a “striving to be social’56—in contrast 
with ‘the work of those German theologian-philosophers he himself was trained by—particularly Martin 
Heidegger and Karl Jaspers’. The  main finding of the Count’s final lecture, as identified by Geroulanos, is 
of establishment French thinking as so scientistic in both emphasis and origin that it is ‘limited to the 
concept of science it emerged from’, and consequently ‘at a loss when dealing with questions concerning 
the status of man in modernity’, which in order ‘to avoid existential and theological issues that exceeded its 
scientism,’ it attempted to answer by it ‘ imposing an antiquated, optimistic, and teleological conception of 
Man’ . Geroulanos continues:   
If there was something rude or coarse about Kuki’s caricature of “French 
philosophy”, it nevertheless resonated…among young philosophers ... . 
Alongside the powerful Kantian and rationalist glorification of Man, the issues 
presented by Kuki as limitations of French philosophy were seen in these years 
to be raising new demands in philosophical anthropology, that is, the 
thematization of man as a properly philosophical problem rather than merely a 
self-sufficient and self-evident ideal or ground of thought, knowledge, and 
existence. 57 
As explored further in my chapter “Réalité-humaine”, Geroulanos argues persuasively that what these 
demands would yield, after an initial proliferation of anthropologies, was ultimately a negative—i.e., an 
anti-humanist anthropology (such as Kojève’s, e.g.), set on stripping away the attributes that had made Man 
of man58. As evidence of Corbin’s own active, and it would appear, positive engagement with the prospect 
of a new “philosophical anthropology” (to which term Corbin says Bernard Groethuysen, ‘once a student of 
Dilthey’s’, himself the author of an unfinished work entitled “Philosophical Anthropology”, and a 
prominent member of Koyré’s circle was to ‘inaugurate’ for “them”) I note that his first publication on 
Suhravardî in 1933, included in Recherches philosophiques:  “Pour l’anthropologie philosophique : un 
traité persan inédit de Suhrawardî d’Alep” (“Toward a philosophical anthropology: an unpublished Persian 
treaty by Suhrawardi of Aleppo”).59”. We also find that in his letter of July 15th to Gertrud Bing of the 
Warburg Library, 1933 Corbin refers to  those ‘philosophemes’ which he says he is currently attempting to 
‘systematize via philosophical anthropology, i.e., the crisis of historicism and phenomenological 
ontology!’60 
                                                           
55 According to S. Geroulanos, this introduction preceded the event of Raymond Aron’s recommending to Sartre that he should read 
Emmanuel Levinas’ (Heideggerian) Theory of Intuition in Husserl’s Phenomenology, that he would thereafter be equipped to 
philosophize, for example, the very martini glass that Aron was holding up). S. Geroulanos, An Atheism that is Not a Humanism 
Emerges in French Thought p.49  
56 S. Geroulanos, An Atheism that is Not a Humanism ... p.49  
57 S. Geroulanos, An Atheism that is Not a Humanism ... p.50  
58 S. Geroulanos, An Atheism that is Not a Humanism ... pp.50, 98 
59 “Pour l’anthropologie philosophique : un traité persan inédit de Suhrawardî d’Alep” , Recherches philosophiques, Vol. II, 1932-3, 
pp. 371-423. 
60 in relation to which, he says, he finds the oeuvre of Aby Warburg of especial interest and relevance (Corbin-Warburg 
correspondence, Warburg Institute Archive, London). 
 19 
 
Then, in 1929, the year after Count Shuzo Kuki’s vigorous assault on French philosophy, there was Davos. 
Inaugurated in 1928, the Davos conference is said to have been intended to encourage warmer pan-
European, and especially ‘Franco-German relations’ on the ‘neutral soil of Switzerland,’61 via encounters 
between the nations’ thinkers in highly pleasant and conducive surroundings.a Although the conference, 
which only ran until 1932, was quite “starry”b for every one of those 5 years, the reputation of the 1929 
conference, with the timely theme of What is Man? is such that its memory has quite eclipsed that of the 
others, so that in philosophy, “Davos” is essentially synonymous with the disputation there between Martin 
Heidegger and Ernst Cassirer, as the culmination of their “shared” course of Kant lectures62. As Peter Eli 
Gordon states: 
It would be difficult to name another modern event of such pronounced 
symbolism, [or]...that seemed, even to the participants themselves, so closely 
bound to the fate of European culture.63 
The eminent Professor Cassirer, then chair of Philosophy at the University of Hamburg, and himself the 
recent editor of a ‘new scholarly edition of Kant’s collected works that became the standard apparatus for 
German philosophers’,64 devoted his four lectures to the ‘three problems’ of ‘space, language, and death’, 
formulated in terms of philosophical anthropology, ‘with a view to taking issue with Heidegger’s 
Existentialanalyse’65. There is no evidence to suggest that Henry Corbin was himself present at Davos, of 
which event, in his “From Heidegger to Suhravardî” and the accompanying “Biographical Post-Scriptum” 
Corbin entirely omits to make mention. As for Corbin’s compatriots, Ethan Kleinberg argues with 
conviction that with the notable exception of the young Emmanuel Levinas,66 most of the French 
contingent was apparently oblivious to the momentousness of the occasion, responding with at best ‘only 
mild curiosity’. Given, he says, ‘the agenda of [French] philosophy at the time’ and what he calls ‘the 
absence of phenomenology in France’, Kleinberg for one finds this hardly surprising. , adding that, seeing 
that lines were being drawn, the majority of the French present instinctively aligned themselves with 
Cassirer in light of ‘the perceived proximity’67 of e.g. the critical idealism of Léon Brunschvicg with the 
neo-Kantians of Marburg68, though if anything this tells us most about the constitution of the French 
delegation.   
 
As even Kleinberg has to concede, there were those amongst the French whose curiosity and perplexity 
                                                           
61 Ethan Kleinberg, Generation Existential, Heidegger’s Philosophy in France 1927-1961 p.39. See also Peter Eli Gordon, 
“Continental Divide: Ernst Cassirer and Martin Heidegger at Davos, 1929—an allegory of intellectual history”  Modern Intellectual 
History, 1, 2 2004) p.229 
a Journalists were to ‘dub it the “Locarno of the Intellectuals”’ Peter Eli Gordon, “Continental Divide:” p.229 
b Having boasted ‘such luminaries Albert Einstein, Paul Tillich, Eberhard Grisebach, Werner Sombart, and Alfred Weber’ Peter Eli 
Gordon, “Continental Divide...” p.229 
62 Which included some uncompromising swipes at the interpretation of the then prevailing Marburg School of neo-Kantianism, of 
which Ernst Cassirer was considered to be one of the heirs-apparent 
63 Peter Eli Gordon, “Continental Divide...” p.222 
64 ...’including Heidegger’, according to Peter Eli Gordon, in his “Continental Divide:...” p.226 
65 D.P. Verene, Symbol Myth and Culture, Essays & Lectures of Ernst Cassirer 1935-1945, Ed. Donald Philip Verene, Yale 
University Press (1979) p.37 
66 Lithuanian émigré, and “Parisian by choice”, Levinas, having graduated from Strasbourg, was studying phenomenology at Freiburg 
under Husserl, where he was also attending lectures by Heidegger, and was therefore understandably well informed 
67 Ethan Kleinberg, Generation Existential, p.41  
68 Perhaps for their placing of neo-Kantianism ‘on a decisively scientific ground’ (Martin Heidegger in Kant and the Problem of 
Metaphysics. p.213) 
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were piqued into a urgent desire to know what the “something” that they had just undeniably witnessed had 
been, exactly; why, we might imagine they may have wondered, had Heidegger—already marked as an odd 
man out, and not a little improper, by his regular attendance at evening events and conference sessions in 
either his ski-wear, fresh from the slopes,69 or his distinctly ‘unmodern’ Bavarian short-suit 70 —had so 
obstinately refused to “play nicely”, in the face of the elegant Cassirer’s conciliatory charm. Emmanuel 
Levinas, who at the time preferred Heidegger71 ( indeed, he is named by Kleinberg, citing a letter from Jean 
Cavaillé to his sister, sent from Davos, on March 23rd 1929, as the sole ‘defender’ of Heidegger amongst 
the French)72  recalls Heidegger’s “constant attacks” on Cassirer’s position73,  quite in keeping with the 
freely admitted “violence” of his interpretation whilst one Ernst Howald recalls of the disputation that ‘one 
enjoyed at most a theatrical performance, two spoken monologues, between a very nice man and a very 
violent man, who, however, made a terrible effort himself to be nice’.74  
 
For Levinas, Cassirer’s “defeat” by Heidegger —for so it was generally understood—heralded ‘the end of a 
particular type of humanism’. He adds that ‘A young student could have had the impression that he was 
witness to the creation and the end of the world.’75  
 
As Heidegger states in his preface to the fourth edition of Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, aka “The 
Kant book”: ‘The Kant book [was] written immediately after the conclusion of the second Davoser 
Hochschule  course (March 17-April 6, 1929)...based on the preparatory work’76 for his lectures there.77  
The fourth section of the Kant book, entitled “The Laying of the Ground of Metaphysics in a Retrieval”, 78  
is included in the collection of ‘opuscules and excerpts’79 translated by Henry Corbin, in consultation with 
Heidegger,  published in 1938 by Gallimard as Qu’est-ce que la Métaphysique?  In subsequent chapters of 
this thesis, I intend to show that Corbin the philosopher engaged with, and continued “in conversation” 
with those texts of Heidegger’s he translated for the 1938 Gallimard Edition,  including Part 4 of the Kant 
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74 In “Betrachtungen zu den Davoser Hochschulkursen”, Neue Zürcher Zeitung (April 10, 1929), both cited in P Eli Gordon, 
Continental Divide: Ernst Cassirer and Martin Heidegger At Davos, 1929—an allegory of intellectual history in Modern Intellectual 
History, 1, 2 (2004), Cambridge University Press p.228 
75 Levinas in Francois Poirié, Emmanuel Levinas: Qui êtes-vous? (Lyon: La Manufacture, 1987). p78. 
76 M. Heidegger, Preface to the Fourth Edition, reproduced in Kant and The Problem of Metaphysics pp. xvii-iii 
77 It is said that Heidegger began working on the Kant book immediately on his return from Davos, and that ‘after three weeks of 
uninterrupted work he had it set down in writing’ F.W von Hermann, in his Editor’s Afterword, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics 
p.220 
78 M. Heidegger, Kant and The Problem of Metaphysics p.143 
79 Henry Corbin in his Biographical Post-Scriptum to From Heidegger to Suhravardî: a Philosophical Interview with Philippe Nemo 
(1978) at www.amiscorbin.com/textes/anglais/interviewnemo.htm 
 21 
book (cf. my chapter “Corbin’s Debt to Heidegger”). I will also give a close reading of Parts 1-3 of the 
Kant book,  although not included in the Gallimard, in which Heidegger treats of the imagination; which 
treatment, as I will try to show in the chapter, entitled “The Imagination in the Kant book”,  “speaks” to  
“Corbin’s Imaginal”, though Corbin wholly rejected the Kant book’s “official” conclusion, as set out in 
Part 4. 
 
It is quite remarkable to find the names of Heidegger and Cassirer side by side in any European 
philosopher’s account of the 1920s and 1930s, with no mention of Davos, as we do in the “Post-Scriptum”;  
let alone that of Heidegger’s first French translator. This is testament, perhaps, to what Howard Caygill has 
called Corbin’s ecumenical view of philosophy. That Corbin maintains this position with no apparent sense 
of conflict or contradiction is perhaps aided by the acuity with which Corbin identifies which aspects of 
their respective works he acknowledges as having been influential upon him, and which, whether by overt 
identification (as in the case of Heidegger), or omission (Cassirer), he indicates as having not. 
 
Corbin’s stated intention in supplementing “From Heidegger to “Suhravardî ” with the “Post-Scriptum”  
was to add ‘certain more or less essential precisions...to the presentation of the stages of [his] spiritual 
itinerary’ as it is set forth there.80 One such  “precision”, which I would render more  precise still, is 
Corbin’s evocation of two of his stays in Hamburg, in which he refers firstly to his acquaintance there with 
Ernst Cassirer, who was then a Professor at Hamburg University; and secondly, to the fact that Hamburg 
‘as it happens, was also then home to the Warburg Institute with all the resources of its library’.81 The two 
points are of course closely related; Ernst Cassirer was also a “Warburgian scholar”, working closely with 
Aby Warburg, and continuing to work and publish with the Warburg Institute for some years after 
Warburg’s sudden death in 1929.  
 
Contrary to Daryush Shayegan’s barely substantiated claim, in his book Henry Corbin – Penseur de 
L’Islam Spirituel,82 that Corbin’s philosophy of the imaginal draws on Cassirer’s thinking of the symbolic, 
(citing p. 131 of Cassirer’s Philosophy of Symbolic Forms: Volume II, Mythical Thought, in which Cassirer 
explains that the law of paradox does not pertain to symbolic thought)83, Corbin himself tells us, in the 
“Post-Scriptum” that it was rather his ‘very thorough knowledge of the Cambridge Platonists’, by which 
Cassirer revealed to Corbin ‘yet another branch of [his] spiritual family thereby broadening my path as well 
as the scope of what [he] was ultimately searching for’, i.e., that which was to become Corbin’s 
‘philosophy of the mundus imaginalis’,84 albeit Corbin had ‘but an obscure presentiment’ of it at the time.  
It is therefore to Cassirer’s 1932 book, The Platonic Renaissance in England85 which I have turned here in 
                                                           
80 H. Corbin, “Post-Scriptum” 
81 H. Corbin, “Post-Scriptum” 
82 Daryush Shayegan, Henry Corbin – Penseur de L’Islam Spirituel (Editions Albin Michel), 2011 
83 Shayegan cites e.g., p.131 of the French edition of this volume. I note with interest that Heidegger reviewed this particular volume 
in 1925; the review is included as an appendix in the fifth English edition of Kant and The Problem of Metaphysics, (ibid., p.180) 
which also includes a transcript of Heidegger and Cassirer’s 1929 debate at Davos. 
84 H. Corbin, “Post-Scriptum” 
85 A very different, and it must be said far more delightful book than Die Philosophie der symbolischen Formen, Die Platonische 
Renaissance in England und die Schule von Cambridge Berlin & Leipzig, B.G. Teubner 1932, translated into English by J. Pettegrove 
as The Platonic Renaissance in England (1953) ‘as a contribution to the ‘Studies of the Warburg Library’ J. Pettegrove, “Translator’s 
Foreword”, The Platonic Renaissance in England Univ. Texas Press, Austin 1953, (v) 
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order to discover something of Corbin’s “debt” to Cassirer, in my chapter on “Corbin’s Imaginal.” 
Enquiring further into Corbin’s engagement with the Warburg Library itself, I was pleased to discover that 
a Corbin-Warburg Institute correspondence has been preserved in the Warburg’s archive. Running from 
September 1931 to June 1949, the bulk of it between 1931 and 1933, the correspondence reveals a close 
and friendly co-operation between Corbin, in his dual capacity as scholar-philosopher and Bibliothèque 
National de France librarian  and Gertrud Bing, his Warburg counterpart (also a notable scholar-
philosopher in her own right), and sheds further light on his engagement with Ernst Cassirer.  
 
Spanning the period 2nd September 1931 - 24th June 1949, the majority of the Corbin-Warburg 
correspondence occurs between 1931 and 1933, the year in which the Warburg Institute relocated to 
London. The correspondence, now stored in the Warburg Institute Archive, consists of letters between 
Henry Corbin and, most frequently if not exclusively, Gertrud Bing of the Warburg Institute. This 
uncertainty arises from the fact that while all the archived correspondence from Corbin is addressed to 
Bing, the archive holds only carbon copies of letters from the Warburg, which are thus unsigned. Thus 
while content identifies the majority of the Warburg letters as from Bing, a few are so very different in tone 
and content that at least one other Warburgian correspondent may be indicated. Corbin’s chief (if not sole) 
Warburgian correspondent in these letters, Gertrud Bing completed her dissertation on Lessing and Leibniz 
in 1921 under the supervision of Ernst Cassirer.  The online (DAH) lists her first Warburgian role  in 1922 
as librarian, followed in 1924 by that of personal research assistant to Aby Warburg; this role was more 
comprehensive and influential than the title might imply, as per the Dictionary of Art Historians86, which 
states e.g., that ‘Together with Fritz Saxl, the three [Bing, Saxl and Warburg himself]  became the Warburg 
Institute of those early years’. After Warburg’s death in 1929, Bing went on to edit Warburg publications, 
including Warburg’s own Gesammelten Schriften, and went on to become first Assistant Director in 1948, 
and then Director of the Institute itself, after the death of Fritz Saxl, also ‘lecturing at the University of 
London as the Professor of the History of the Classical Tradition’.87 
 
We learn from the correspondence that Corbin’s role as specialist librarian at the Bibliothèque National de 
France enabled him to assist the Warburg Institute in many practical matters while also pursuing a personal 
intellectual engagement with several of the most notable Warburgian scholars, including Fritz Saxl, Edgar 
Wind, Ernst Cassirer, and Gertrud Bing herself, as well as reviewing a number of Warburg Institute 
publications in French journals. As such, the Corbin-Warburg correspondence, previously unknown to 
Corbin scholarship, to the best of my knowledge,  not only adds precision to a reading of the “Post-
Scriptum”, but suggests new directions for future research regarding the “early Corbin”.  
 
Corbin’s practical assistance included e.g., the location and procurement (and sometimes photographing) of 
library items held in the French national collections for the Warburg’s collection and publishing 
requirements, often by exchange or by loan, as the Warburg Institute came under increasing financial 
pressure following the 1929 death of its founder.  
                                                           
86 A useful online resource recommended to me by the Warburg Institute archivist Veronika Kopecky in 2010 
87 Lee Sorensen, ed.; “Bing, Gertrud”, Dictionary of Art Historians, www.dictionaryofarthistorians.org 
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Most significantly, for our purposes we learn from Corbin’s letter to Bing on l6th September 1931 that in 
his capacity as librarian, Corbin is happy to facilitate Professor Cassirer’s access to the Bibliothèque 
National de France for essential preliminary research on ‘a general history of the ideas of the 18th Century’. 
Corbin looks forward to the beautiful (beaux) and fertile conversations he may hope to have with Cassirer 
in Paris. We learn in his next letter, of September 24th 1931 that he was not disappointed, and though sad 
that Cassirer will be leaving Paris on the 25th,  he looks forward to exchanging Cassirer for Fritz Saxl, “one 
for the other”, as the next Warburgian to arrive in Paris.  Then, making it clear that these are more than 
simply professional courtesies, so far as Corbin is concerned, he closes the letter by stating that  ‘it is truly 
the task of us philosophers to create a spiritual connection (lien) as our world is delivered over to demented 
forces’.  
 
Corbin next writes on April 1st 1932, stating how much he is looking forward to seeing Cassirer again in 
Hamburg, in anticipation of which meeting he is ‘plunging down the third boulevard’ of  Cassirer’s 
Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, meaning, presumably, the third volume. Nonetheless, as already noted, 
Corbin in the “Post-Scriptum” tells us quite clearly—albeit by omission, and thus not, per se that it was not 
this work of Cassirer’s that influenced the development of what was to become Corbin’s philosophy of the 
imaginal, but rather that it was Cassirer’s ‘very thorough knowledge of the Cambridge Platonists’. Here 
Corbin also enquires after details of Fritz Saxl’s soon-to-be published book on the microcosmos 
(Mikrokosmos), for which theme, Corbin says, he has a ‘strong passion’.  We duly find reference to ‘the 
macrocosm or Homo maximus (insan kabir) and the microcosm’. 88 in, e.g., a discussion of symbolic 
exegesis in the context of Ismaili gnosis in Corbin’s History of Islamic Philosophy. This enquiry into Saxl’s 
work therefore suggests an intriguing direction for future comparative research.  
 
The unknown author of the Warburg letter of 11th August 1932 offers to put Corbin up with a friend near 
the Warburg Library when he next visits, and concludes by declaring an interest in the first edition of 
Recherches Philosophiques. In 1933, as an expression of her ‘heartfelt gratitude for the personal interest 
and friendship’  which Corbin has ‘shown the library’, Bing offers  Corbin a copy of Aby Warburg’s newly 
published Collected Works along with the polite request that Corbin might consider making mention or 
even writing a review of them, in Paris; but primarily to share with him ‘an idea of the foundations upon 
which the library was built, since [he has] shown such interest in it in its completion.’ Corbin replies by 
saying he is very glad to receive the volumes, which he says it should certainly be possible for him 
review.89 Bing is aware, he says, of the great interest he has long held in the oeuvre of Warburg, 
particularly in connection with those ‘philosophemes’ which he is currently attempting to ‘systematize via 
philosophical anthropology’, i.e., the crisis of historicism and phenomenological ontology!’ Here, again, is 
as clear a signal as can be that comparative Corbin-Warburgian research may be worth pursuing, though it 
falls outside the scope of the thesis at hand.  
                                                           
88 H. Corbin History of Islamic Philosophy p.12-13 Cf. Corbin’s stated interest in Fritz Saxl’s work on the microcosm, as per the 
Corbin-Warburg correspondence (as per my chapter here “From Paris to Tehran”).  
89 ...in either the Parisian “Revue critique d’histoire et de Litterature”, or the “Revue d’Histoire et de le Philos.”, published by the  
Faculty of Protestant theology in Strasbourg. 
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After the Warburg’s relocation to London, Bing writes on 7th June 1935 to ask if Corbin, as a French 
national, will give a reference for a Jewish-GermanWarburgian scholar called Elspeth Jaffe, attesting to the 
purely academic intentions of her proposed trip to France on her way to China. The last exchange of the 
archived correspondence, after a lapse of 14 years, opens on 24th June 1949, with a typewritten letter from 
Corbin, signed in green ink90 on headed paper from the  Franco-Iranian Institute in Teheran, and enclosing 
the first of the Bibliothèque Iranienne series founded by Corbin, one of 22 published between 1949 and his 
death in 1978, being a Persian edition Abu Ya’qub Sejestâni’s The unveiling of that which is hidden [Kashf 
al-Mahjub], with an introduction in French by Henry Corbin91. Bing writes back with thanks, and after 
touching on the sad fact of her life-partner Fritz Saxl’s unexpected death on 22nd March 1948, concludes 
the archived correspondence in quite as cordial a manner as it began, by stating  that she  ‘should be glad to 
do anything for [Corbin] in London that [he] may want’, and hopes to hear from him again.  
 
Meanwhile, returning to the “Post-Scriptum”;  back in Paris, (no dates are given here),  it is no surprise that 
Corbin’s ‘Germanic experiences’ should have widened his circle of friends. Now, far from the philosopher-
in-exile that he had been amongst the Orientalists, e.g., Corbin found himself right at the very heart of 
things, including  Alexandre Koyré’s Hegel seminar, and “circle”. Corbin relates how they most often 
ended up at the Café d’Harcourt; an ‘historic, comfortable café [now long gone], on the corner of the Place 
de la Sorbonne and the Boulevard Saint Michel’, where ‘a significant part of the French philosophy of the 
time was elaborated.’  
 
Corbin also recalls the presence there of Alexandre Kojève (Kojevnikov), who took over and taught 
Koyré’s Hegel seminar at the EPHE from 1933 onward, and who, most pertinently with regards to 
Corbin—whose translation of Dasein as réalité-humaine was made, he says in “From Heidegger to 
Suhravardî”, “in agreement with friends”—S. Geroulanos credits with the first usage of the term réalité-
humaine for Dasein (see my chapter Réalité-humaine). For his part, Corbin makes little further mention of 
Kojève in the “Post-Scriptum besides the following: 
Discussion sometimes became very heated. Kojève and Heinemann were in 
complete disaccord upon the interpretation of the phenomenology of Spirit 
[Hegel]. There were frequent clashes between the phenomenology of Husserl 
and that of Heidegger. On other occasions we would provoke Queneau: “just 
how did he go about writing a novel? Did he draw up a plan? Did he just let 
things flow?” 92 
Amongst those who frequented the Harcourt, Corbin says he cannot omit to mention his ‘old friend Bernard 
Groethuysen’,93 thanks to whose tenacity it was that Corbin’s 1938 Gallimard translation of  Heidegger 
‘appeared on the shelves’ at all, ‘for at that time’, says Corbin,  ‘this ‘“unknown” philosopher was of only 
                                                           
90 to which colour an ‘extraordinary pre-eminence’ is accorded ... in Islam’. H. Corbin, Alone with the Alone (ibid.) p.57. Cf. also my 
chapter “Corbin’s Imaginal”.  
91 At the time of writing, a complete list of the series can be found here: http://www.ifriran.org/Publications/BI-complete.htm 
92 H. Corbin, “Post-Scriptum”        
93 Who it was, according to Corbin, that ‘inaugurated “philosophical anthropology” (although his great work carrying this title remains 
unfinished)’.  
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mediocre interest to the publishers’. Corbin names Groethuysen ‘our incomparable Socrates, a central and 
unforgettable figure in the soirées held by Alexandre Koyré and his wife in their little apartment on the rue 
de Navarre’, at which ‘the program for the next volume of the review Recherches Philosophiques… 
occupied a central position’. ‘Rarely’, says Corbin, ‘has such a pleiad of philosophers been assembled, nor 
such a number and variety of new subjects been addressed’ amongst which, ‘it goes without 
saying...phenomenology held a most significant place’. 94 For his own part, Corbin contributed two articles 
to Recherches Philosophiques: “Toward a philosophical anthropology: An unpublished Persian treatise by 
Suhravardî of Aleppo”95 in Vol.I, (1932-1933),  and “Dialectic Theology and History”96 in Vol.II (1933-
1934), which reflects his present engagement with Karl Barth. He also contributed numerous reviews, all of 
which are of German books—including a German translation from the Arabic by Herman Ritter,97 a 
Warburg Institute Picatrix publication, supplied directly to Corbin courtesy of Gertrud Bing, as per the 
Corbin- Warburg correspondence,98—with one exception, D. Draghicesco’s Truth and Revelation.99  
Thus, extra to his translations of Barth and his first translation of Heidegger in 1931 for the journal Bifur, 
Corbin can already be seen to be making a significant contribution to the communication of philosophical 
ideas between Germany and France, even prior to the 1938 Gallimard translation, which itself, I have 
argued, I hope persuasively in my chapter Réalité-humaine, constituted a philosophical engagement with 
Heidegger on the part of Corbin, imbued with the concerns of his contemporaries, as well as with Corbin’s 
own emerging philosophy of the imaginal. 
 
 
Also, in the “Post-Scriptum”—although it is not stated how this should have come to pass, or by whose 
introduction, etc—we learn that Corbin first visited Martin Heidegger in Freiburg in Spring 1934, where, 
together, they ‘drew up a plan for the collection of opuscules and excerpts’ that Corbin ‘was to translate 
under the title Qu’est-ce que la métaphysique?’. Corbin was granted a year’s sabbatical leave from his 
library post by the Bibliothèque National de France Administrator Julien Cain in 1935-6 which he spent at 
the Französiches Akademikerhaus in Berlin, working on the translation.  In 1936, Corbin returned to 
Freiburg, whereupon he ‘was able to submit to our author several of the translation difficulties’ he had been 
having. Here, too, Corbin states in no uncertain terms that Heidegger, having ‘every confidence’ in his 
translator, approved all of his ‘French neologisms’—including, i.e., his “réalité-humaine” for “Dasein”—
leaving Corbin, in his own words, with ‘a rather heavy responsibility’.  
 
On October 30th 1939, Henry Corbin departed Paris for Istanbul, on assignment to make photographic 
copies of ‘all the manuscripts of Suhravardî that could be found dispersed amongst the libraries of Istanbul, 
in view of a critical edition of his works in Arabic and Persian’. As Corbin describes going accompanied by 
his wife and all ‘the paternal anxieties of Julien Cain’, in light of  ‘all the unbridled events then taking 
place’—the outbreak of war, i.e.—we may assume it was as librarian he was assigned there. Expected to 
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95 “Pour l’anthropologie philosophiques: Un traite persan inédit de Suhravardî d’Alep” 
96 “La théologie dialectique et l’histoire” 
97 Pseudo-MAGRÎTÎ, Das Zeil des Weisen, I, Arabischer Text. Hrsgb.von Hellmut Ritter. Leipzig/Berlin, B.G. Teubner (coll. «Studien 
der Bibliothek Warburg», XII: Picatrix 1), 1933. in Vol 3, 1933-1934 of  RP 
98 Corbin’s letters of  1st April and 12th May, 1932 
99 D. Draghicesco, Vérité et Révélation. Paris , F. Alcan (coll. « Bibliothèque de philosophie contemporaine ») In Vol. 2, 1934.  
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last three months, the assignment kept Corbin in Istanbul throughout the whole of the war, returning to 
Paris in September 1945.  
 
Extra to his rather unsubstantiated claim regarding the source of Ernst Cassirer’s influence upon Corbin’s 
philosophy of the imaginal,100 which conflicts with what Corbin himself has to say,  Daryush Shayegan’s 
2011 Henry Corbin – Penseur de L’Islam Spirituel (self-described as the first synthesis of Corbin’s entire 
oeuvre, though with only fifteen pages devoted to Corbin’s work of the 1930s and ‘40s) does contain some 
significant discoveries pertaining to Corbin’s  time in Istanbul. Shayegan  reports, e.g., that according to 
Mme. Corbin, while otherwise deeply immersed in the work of Suhravardî , Henry Corbin also ‘profited 
from his presence in Constantinople’ and his relative isolation by  ‘deepen[ing] his knowledge of Russian 
and Greek Orthodox theology’101,  going so far as to attempt a translation of Boulgakov. This accords with 
the “Post-Scriptum”, in which Corbin makes a point of naming ‘the Sophiology of P. Serge Boulgakov’102 
amongst the diverse interests of Fritz Lieb, a colleague of Karl Barth’s at Bonn, with whom Corbin became 
acquainted during his visit of Spring 1932.103 Shayegan’s reference to Istanbul as Constantinople when 
describing Corbin’s work there on Russian and Greek Orthodoxy, and his “attempted” translation of the 
Sophiologist Serge Boulgakov echoes Corbin’s own highly deliberate invocation, below, of the city’s 
previous incarnations, and of its Orthodox significance: 
But Istanbul was Byzantium! It was Constantinople! In the same way that the 
Temple of Solomon was the centre of Jerusalem, the temple of Saint Sophia 
was the centre of the second Roman Empire. 104 
Shayegan’s revelation offers compelling grounds for future comparative research into the intermediary role 
of Corbin’s imaginal and the Orthodox icon as intermediary between the human and the divine.  
 
Of more direct relevance to this thesis is Shayegan’s further revelation, that  according to Mme. Corbin105, 
Corbin continued to work on his translation of Being and Time while in Istanbul, while he was there 
compiling a critical edition of Suhravardî  manuscripts in Arabic and Persian.106 That is to say, beyond the 
excerpt which he translated for the 1938 Gallimard Edition of What is Metaphysics?  Corbin may well have 
embarked upon a complete translation of Being and Time and though it remains uncertain as to whether it 
was ever completed, or if the manuscript, whether finished or unfinished still exists, it is nonetheless highly 
significant to learn that Corbin was at once working on Heidegger and Suhravardî  during this period.   
This revelation also makes for a fruitful comparison with Corbin’s recollection, also in “From Heidegger to 
Suhravardî ”, of Denis de Rougemont’s recollection of the fact that, when they were students together, 
Corbin’s ‘copy of Being and Time contained numerous Arabic glosses in the margins;’ after which 
revelation Corbin immediately states that, vice versa, ‘it would have been much more difficult to translate 
                                                           
100 as before, and as discussed in my chapter “Corbin’s Imaginal” 
101 Daryush Shayegan, Henry Corbin... p.24 
102 H. Corbin, “Post-Scriptum” 
103 Corbin characterizes Lieb (who, like Corbin, was also a friend of Nicolas Berdiaev),  as ‘a touching figure by dint of his mystical 
love for Orthodox Russia, a love so unlimited that he seemed never to have noticed that the Holy Orthodox Russia had for the 
moment… passed on Heavenwards.’ H. Corbin, “Post-Scriptum” 
104 H. Corbin, “Post-Scriptum” 
105 Here Shayegan cites Edition no. 33 of the Eranos Jahrbuch (1964) as his source 
106 Shayegan, Henry Corbin – Penseur de L’Islam Spirituel Editions Albin Michel, 2011 p.24 
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the vocabulary of a Suhravardî, an Ibn ‘Arabi, or a Mollâ Sadrâ Shîrâzî, etc… had [he] not already 
undergone a training in the acrobatics required to translate the extraordinary German vocabulary that one 
encounters in reading Heidegger.’ 107 Shayegan’s revelation thus has immediate ramifications for e.g., the 
misapprehension which Corbin is at pains to dispel in  “From Heidegger to Suhravardî ”, that he had gone 
on to work on Sufism because he was ‘disappointed’ with the philosophy of Heidegger.  It tells us, 
moreover there was no definitive break with Heidegger as such, which in turn encourages my conviction 
that Corbin continued “in conversation” with Heidegger, even into his time in Teheran, and even if with 
“just” those texts Heidegger had published up until the time of the Gallimard’s publication.  
 
It was while in Istanbul that ‘in August of 1944’ Corbin received ‘a mission order for Persia from what was 
then still the “Government of Algiers”’, but was unable to leave until September 1945, when someone 
finally arrived to take over his wartime “caretaking” role at the French Archaeological Institute in Istanbul. 
In 1947 the French Ministry of Cultural Relations founded a Department of Iranology, ‘annexed’ to the 
French Institute in Teheran, headed by Corbin.  He writes:  
The moment had finally come: I was to carry out the project that had been 
germinating in my spirit ever since my attendance, all those many years ago, in 
the classes taught by Etienne Gilson. ...108 
The last of Corbin’s archived letters to Gertrud Bing at the Warburg Institute, by now in London, is dated 
1949, and accompanied by an edition of Abu Ya’qub Sejestâni’s Kashf al-Mahjub, Le dévoilement des 
choses cachées, or The Unveiling of That Which Is Hidden109, a fitting title indeed for the inaugural edition 
of the Bibliothèque Iranienne, founded in 1948 by Corbin who ‘over the course of twenty five years and 
with the help of several collaborators’110 was to edit a further twenty-one volumes. The text is in Persian, 
with an introduction by Henry Corbin.  The “Post-Scriptum” also concludes here, but not before noting that 
in 1954 Corbin was asked to succeed Louis Massignon as Head of Islamic studies in the Department of 
Religious Sciences at the EPHE in Paris. He would thereafter divide most of his time, year in, year out, 
between Paris and Teheran.  
                                                           
107 H. Corbin, “From Heidegger to Suhravardî ” 
108 H. Corbin, “Post-Scriptum”        
109 This translation from the English translation of “From Heidegger to Suhravardî” 
110 H. Corbin, “Post-Scriptum”        
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Chapter Two: Réalité-humaine 
 
The importance of Qu’est-ce que la métaphysique? (Gallimard 1938), Corbin’s eagerly awaited translation 
of Heidegger, to the “first wave” reading of Heidegger in France can hardly be overstated. Indeed, Corbin’s 
translation was itself really the first great “wave” of Heidegger to reach France in French, and the new 
lexical set contained therein was duly adopted as Heideggerian,111 including and especially Corbin’s now 
infamous translation of Heidegger’s Dasein as réalité-humaine. The subject and cynosure of this chapter, 
the Corbinian-Heideggerian term réalité-humaine subsequently made its way into the work of other French 
philosophers, most notably Sartre’s, only later to become the subject of great controversy, to the extent that 
it appears to have become the go-to case study in discussions of philosophical mistranslations, in e.g. 
Jonathan Rée’s essay “The Translation of Philosophy.”112 The aim of this chapter is to lay out some such 
criticisms as are levelled at Corbin’s réalité-humaine and to respond as best we are able, with reference 
firstly to Corbin himself, in his translator’s foreword to Qu’est-ce que la métaphysique?113  and the much 
later “Biographical Post-Scriptum”114; then to Corbin’s translations themselves, and finally Stefanos 
Geroulanos’ unprecedented and historically acute defence-by-contextualisation of Corbin’s réalité-
humaine.  
 
But first, some necessary clarification. Corbin is rightly referred to as “the first translator of Heidegger”. 
Criticisms are levelled at “Corbin’s translation”, but which one?  Why, the first, one might well assume, 
and yet this is not so. Even if one should refer by name to the text in question, therein lies cause for 
confusion, as Corbin’s first and second translations of Heidegger are respectively entitled: 1) “Qu’est-ce 
que la métaphysique?” and 2)  Qu’est-ce que la métaphysique? The first is a translation of the text of 
Heidegger’s lecture, entitled “Was ist metaphysik?”,115 published in essay form in Issue 8 of the journal 
Bifur in 1931116, the second, a book first published by Gallimard in 1938, comprising a number of 
Heidegger’s ‘opuscules and excerpts’117 as translated by Corbin,  including the eponymous translation of  
the essay “Was ist metaphysik?” as “Qu’est-ce que la métaphysique?”; which is, however, a very different 
translation to that which appears in Bifur. This contrary, to Ethan Kleinberg’s claim, e.g., in his book 
Generation Existential, (subtitled Heidegger’s Philosophy in France 1927-1961) that “this essay”—
referring quite unmistakeably to the first translation by Corbin of “Was ist metaphysik?”  that was 
published in Bifur—‘along with several other of Heidegger’s essays translated by Corbin, was published as 
Qu’est-ce que la métaphysique? (1938)’118. Building on this false foundation, Kleinberg then makes 
reference to Sartre’s first reading of Corbin’s Bifur translation of “Was ist metaphysik?”, which he (Sartre) 
claimed to have read ‘without understanding’119. Claiming this manner of reading to have ‘only intensified 
                                                           
111 E. Kleinberg, Generation Existential: Heidegger’s Philosophy in France, 1927-1961 Cornell University Press Ithaca and London 
2005 p.70 
112 J. Rée, “The Translation of Philosophy” New Literary History Volume 32, Number 2, Spring 2001, pp. 223-257 
113 H. Corbin, Qu’est-ce que la métaphysique? Gallimard, Paris 1938 
114 H. Corbin, “Biographical Post-Scriptum” English translation by Association des Amis de Henry et Stella Corbin 
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its effect’120 on Sartre, Kleinberg enters into a discussion of the effect of this “reading without 
understanding”  upon what Kleinberg identifies as Sartre’s first ‘philosophical treatise’, “La Transcendance 
de l’ego” (1937). Kleinberg writes: ‘In Heidegger’s Was ist metaphysik? Sartre found a formula that could 
explicate the relation of “existence to Being”’. Next, Kleinberg offers his own translation of a passage from 
Corbin’s translation of Heidegger’s “Was ist metaphysik?”, sourced from the book Questions I/II 
(Gallimard, Paris 1968), in which he says “this essay”—still clearly referring, by “this essay” to the one 
that was published in Bifur—was reprinted.  
 
Error upon error; since, as Kleinberg’s translation includes the term “human-reality”, followed by 
Kleinberg’s own square-bracketed qualification that ‘[Corbin translated Heidegger’s Dasein as réalité-
humaine]’—the term here correctly reproduced, I am pleased to say, replete with its hyphen—we know that 
it cannot have been Corbin’s Bifur translation that was reprinted in Questions I/II, as Kleinberg would have 
it, but must have been the later, improved, indeed Heidegger-approved, 1938 Gallimard translation, as  is in 
fact the case. And how do we know this? Because the term réalité-humaine simply does not appear in the 
Bifur translation. Thus the text cited here in translation by Kleinberg, with reference to his analysis of the 
development of Sartre’s ideas—from his (Sartre’s) first “reading without understanding” of Corbin’s 
translation of Heidegger in Bifur, via his own “La Transcendance de l’ego”, first published (as “La 
Transcendance de L'Ego: Esquisse d'une description phénomenologique”) in the journal Recherches 
Philosophiques (Issue VI, 1936-37), which ‘investigation into Husserlian phenomenology’ Kleinberg 
claims to also having served as ‘the prime motor for his [Sartre’s] displacement of the primacy of “things” 
in L’imagination and L’imaginaire through his use of the relation between being and nothingness’121 —
simply could not have been the precise and actual published source of Sartre’s “formula” for ‘explicat[ing] 
the relation of “existence to Being” (Kleinberg, ibid.), because it was not published until 1938, in the 
Gallimard Edition to which it lends its name.   
 
Sartre had, however, most certainly read the Bifur. Now, whether or not, as a fellow contributor to 
Recherches Philosophiques, the very journal in which his own “La Transcendance de l’ego” was first 
published, Sartre could have had access to a manuscript copy of Corbin’s Gallimard translation prior to its 
publication in 1938 is another matter entirely; and for scholars of Sartre, a very important one.  Scholars are 
famed for their pedantry, and rightly so; in this case, in the face of such great claims on the part of 
Kleinberg for Sartre’s encounter with “this essay” having forming the ‘impressionistic basis of what would 
become his philosophical and literary project’,122  it does seem of fairly fundamental importance to nail 
down which essay “this essay” is, exactly.  But to err is human, and without this pertinent information to 
hand, Kleinberg goes on to compound the error arising from his fudge of “this essay” by stating quite 
explicitly that:  
What is certain is that Corbin’s translation in Bifur gave Sartre the vocabulary 
and the philosophical tools he needed to begin his investigation into an 
understanding of consciousness that was not beholden to the subject-object 
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split nor to the distinctions of interior and exterior, which Sartre saw as 
characteristic of all French Philosophy.123   
This statement, referring as it does only to the beginning of Sartre’s investigations, is still vague enough not 
to be outright wrong in itself, were it not for Kleinberg’s already having quoted an excerpt of (his own 
translation of) Corbin’s translation of “Was ist metaphysik?” which he erroneously claims to be identical 
with that which appeared in Bifur. As above, this passage, sourced from Questions I/II (1968, Gallimard) is 
in fact from the later Gallimard translation, which, as we have seen, offers very different vocabulary than 
the Bifur translation, including the term réalité-humaine, which Sartre was indeed later to adopt into his 
own lexicon,  henceforth to reproduce inconsistently (whether by his own or his publishers’ carelessness), 
variously with or without its hyphen, and it shall further be argued, to largely deracinate, and make his own.  
Thus, as has been clearly shown here, “what is certain”, rather, is that Sartre’s much criticized use of the 
Corbinian translation of Dasein, réalité-humaine,  as a “philosophical tool”, simply cannot have been 
drawn from his (Sartre’s) reading of Bifur.  
 
 The need for precision in reference to these two translations by Corbin, as in relation to references to them, 
has been made clear, but has, unfortunately, far from always been observed. From here on, for the sake of 
clarity and precision I will refer to Corbin’s two translations of the essay “Was ist metaphysik?” as, 
respectively, the Bifur and the Gallimard translations, and to the entire book translated by Corbin (and 
published as Qu’est-ce que la métaphysique?) as the Gallimard Edition, giving dates as necessary. On the 
need for orthographic precision, more to come.  
 
As the majority of the criticism directed toward Corbin’s translation of Heidegger has centred on his 
translation of Dasein as réalité-humaine, such of it as is correctly directed, at least (unlike Kleinberg’s, 
ibid.) refers to the Gallimard translation. There is of course a substantive difference between the publication 
of a book, which was at the time the book, i.e., the only book of Heidegger’s to exist in French, and that of 
one essay in an avant-garde theoretical journal (Bifur)—albeit one well known to Paris philosophers, 
including the “first wave” readers of Heidegger, many of whom also published in Bifur, including Sartre, 
whose “Légende de la vérité” appeared in the very same edition124—so that, even without the infamy of  
réalité-humaine it might be expected that the Gallimard Edition should have garnered the most attention. 
The fact remains, even so, however, that the Bifur translation was the first appearance of Heidegger in 
French,  and yet it seems to have escaped not just criticism in the common sense but much of any scholarly 
attention at all, certainly in anglophone studies of the period. To his credit, aside from his erroneous 
identification of the Bifur as the réalité-humaine translation, Ethan Kleinberg does suggest other and 
evidentially plausible ways in which Corbin’s influence on the first wave reception of Heidegger in France 
may have preceded the Gallimard’s publication, attributing e.g., what he calls Alexandre Kojève’s 
‘sophisticated, if slightly impressionistic understanding of Heidegger’, to Kojève’s ‘relationship with 
[Emmanuel] Levinas and [Alexandre] Koyrè… [and] his friendship with Henry Corbin’.125 Kleinberg 
grounds this finding in the fact of Kojève and Corbin shared participation in Koyrè’s seminar; their 
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‘common interest in Orientalism, Eastern languages, and German philosophy’, and the fact that they were 
‘later’ to become colleagues at the EPHE, though his ‘later’ is a bit vague; Corbin, we may infer, is not 
exactly at the eye of Kleinberg’s storm of interest. Certainly, by 1933, when Kojève took over the Hegel 
seminars from his friend Koyrè, Corbin had already published his first translation of Heidegger’s “Was ist 
metaphysik?” in Bifur (1931), and may plausibly have begun his translation of the collection that was to 
become the 1938 Gallimard Edition. Noting Corbin’s two visits to Heidegger in the cause of this translation 
made in April 1934 and July 1936, Kleinberg states that it would be no exaggeration to regard the “first 
French translation of Heidegger” as having taken place ‘in the room adjacent to Kojève’s Hegel seminar at 
the EPHE’ (though I am uncertain as to whether this is to be taken factually or metaphorically).126 As for 
Corbin himself, he states in the “Biographical Post-Scriptum” that his 1934 visit with Heidegger in 
Freiburg was occupied with their drawing up together ‘a plan for the collection of opuscules and excerpts 
that I [Corbin] was to translate under the title “Qu’est ce que la métaphysique’.  Having been granted a 
year’s sabbatical leave from his post at the Bibliothèque nationale de France (BnF), where since November 
1928, he had been ‘assigned to work with the oriental collection’127, Corbin spent the academic year of 
1935-6 resident at the Französiches Akademikerhaus in Berlin, working on the translation. The “Post-
Scriptum” itself offers no clue as to whether or not Corbin had begun his translation for the Gallimard 
Edition in earnest prior to his first, 1934 trip to visit Heidegger. Certainly the translation was underway 
from April 1934 onward, while Corbin was still in Paris and Kojève’s Hegel seminars were ongoing. It is 
interesting to note that Corbin makes no mention of Kojève’s seminars in the “Post-Scriptum”, referring 
rather to Kojève as a fellow student and member of Alexandre Koyrè’s circle. While the “Post-Scriptum” is 
not an academic historical or philosophical text, but rather a narrative reminiscence, it is as such perhaps 
inevitably partial, but nonetheless a valuable and much cited source.  
 
Kleinberg’s emphasis on the personal and even physical proximity of Kojève, and his conduct of the Hegel 
seminar, to Corbin as the first French translator and translation of Heidegger, and thus to Heidegger, via 
Corbin, at only one remove, also serves to call our attention to Corbin’s unique position as intermediary 
and translocutor between Heidegger and his philosophy and arguably the most important philosophical 
assembly in Paris at that time (i.e., Kojève’s Hegel’s seminar, following on from Koyrè’s), even before the 
Gallimard book’s publication albeit after his initial contribution to Bifur.  Kojève’s own “impression” of 
Heidegger, via Levinas, Koyrè, and Corbin, is said by Kleinberg to have greatly influenced Kojève’s own, 
highly influential reading of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit;128I note that even prior to 1933, i.e., while 
the EPHE Hegel seminar was still Koyrè’s, Kojève is said by Corbin to already have held some fairly 
strong views of his own on the Phenomenology, recalling that Kojève and Fritz Heinemann were in 
complete discord as to its proper interpretation. 129 Koyrè, in turn, had strong feelings about Heidegger. We 
shall examine further the relationship between Kojève and Corbin, their respective readings of Heidegger, 
and use of the term réalité-humaine as a translation of Dasein later in this chapter. For now, let us turn to 
Corbin’s Bifur translation.  
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Corbin’s Bifur translation of Heidegger’s “Was ist metaphysik?” is prefaced by a luminous introduction by 
Alexandre Koyrè—literally so, as he describes Heidegger’s as the brightest star in Germany’s philosophical 
firmament, or, no, perhaps rather  a new sun rising, whose brightness eclipses all that of his contemporaries. 
This momentous introduction is not so much only of the text at hand, but of Heidegger himself (though 
many would already know of him through reports of his perceived routing of Ernst Cassirer at Davos in 
1929, e.g.), and of what for Koyrè appear as the major, refreshingly “down to earth” themes and problems 
of Heidegger’s oeuvre—his consideration of such ‘banal’ and ‘simple’ things as ‘existence and death, of 
being and nothing’, and his posing again of the question ‘of the self and the problem of being; what am I? 
and what does it mean: to be?’130—into French thought.131 Heidegger’s philosophy of existence heralds not 
only the start of a new stage in the development of Western philosophy for Koyrè, but a whole new cycle. 
We are  left in no doubt whatsoever that the occasion of this introduction is indeed considered and intended 
by Koyrè to be momentous. In the glossary of Bifur, Heidegger is described as: ‘One of the most important 
philosophers in Germany. Founded the philosophy of Nothingness [du néant]. It is said that he had the 
revelation grâce à the practice of skiing’.132 This would have been kind of an in-joke for those who had 
attended the 1929 Davos conference at which Heidegger reportedly went skiing every chance he got. They 
may have skied with him.  Of Sartre, who also contributed an essay to this issue of Bifur, entitled “Légende 
de la Vérite” (Legend of the Truth), it is simply but ominously written: ‘Young philosopher. Preparing a 
volume of destructive philosophy’.133  
 
With the Bifur translation right, as it were, here in front of us, we should recall that, as has already been 
observed, this translation does not contain a single instance of Corbin’s French neologism or 
“composition”, as he himself refers to it in the Gallimard Edition, réalité-humaine. Gayatri Chakravorty 
Spivak, renowned translator of Jacques Derrida’s De La Grammatologie [Of Grammatology]134 has 
famously called translation “the most intimate act of reading”.135 Of this first intimacy with Heidegger, 
however, here Corbin remains modestly uncertain. The text is pitted with original German words and 
phrases, and these are not limited, as one might perhaps expect, to Heidegger’s own consistently employed, 
i.e., proprietary, Heideggerian terms, the most proper of these being surely, as Corbin will come to state in 
his translator’s preface to the Gallimard Edition, ‘the term Dasein which supports the fundamental concept 
of Heidegger’s analytic’. Here he goes on to remark upon translational precedents he is aware of wherein 
the term Dasein is either simply cited in German, or ‘translated as “existence”, which latter translation, 
while certainly offering ‘the usual meaning of the word’, would he says, be sure to precipitate ‘a most 
unfortunate confusion between the notions of existentiel and existential.’136 The practice of “simply” citing 
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the term Dasein in German has become quite conventional in contemporary English translations and 
discussions of Heidegger. Further still, David Krell, e.g. in his English translation of Heidegger, Basic 
Writings,137 either follows, or certainly concurs with the example set by Macquarrie and Robinson’s 1962 
translation of Being and Time, of rendering  Dasein as Dasein, just so, i.e., in roman rather than italic 
letters. By reason and utilization of precisely which orthographic nicety, says Jonathan Rée, in his essay 
“The Translation of Philosophy”138 Macquarrie and Robinson have not “simply” left the German term 
Dasein untranslated, but actually coined Dasein as a new English term of Heideggerian vocabulary139, 
exclusively proper (and to all intents and purposes, aside from its lack of italicization in the English text, 
identical) to the (German) Heideggerian “existent-being” Dasein; which incidentally translates most 
directly into English as being-there, or more literally, if unnaturally, as there-being; thus retaining, in 
translation, all of the term Dasein’s “thereness”, i.e., its “thrownness”; its “displacedness” and at once its 
“placeness”,  its spatiality. Furthermore, according Rée, the English word being, the gerund form140 of the 
verb “to be” appears to be rather more adept in bypassing the metaphysical Latin of esse than either the 
German Sein, or the French être—both of which are compelled, by their own etymological routes, to go via 
the Latin esse to the Greek einai—to directly summon the Greek to on of ontology141. It is interesting to 
consider the fact that Macquarrie and Robinson have therefore chosen what we might call their absolute 
transliteration (and so avoid being forced to take a position, for now, on whether it is or is not a new 
English coinage, as Rée asserts) of Dasein, over “being-there”,  in itself a quite satisfactory literal 
translation, one which is indeed currently employed by many other English scholars of Heidegger who have 
chosen not to share/follow Macquarrie and Robinson’s usage.  Rée’s argument for Macquarrie and 
Robinson’s usage of Dasein, as such, as an English coinage, turning, as it does, on such a strict 
orthographical axis (i.e., no italics) becomes not only interesting but surprising when we turn to Macquarrie 
and Robinson’s own “Translators’ Preface” to Being and Time,142 in which  they in fact make very little of 
the special case of Dasein, other than to refer to it as one  among several other cases (including Zeitlichkeit 
[temporality], Sorge [care], In-der-Welt-sein [being-in-the-world]) where Heidegger ‘uses abstract 
nouns...as subjects of sentences where a personal subject would ordinarily be found’, and then stating very 
plainly that ‘we have tried to use as few English terms as possible to represent the more important German 
ones.’143 By “important” in this context it seems reasonable to infer that Macquarrie and Robinson have 
rather left untranslated—let us not say “cited in German”, because that brings us again to the tricky 
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question of italics, or lack thereof—what they consider to be the essential Heideggerian terms, because 
they consider them important as such, and not, as they are keen to stress, as “some” may have said, 
untranslatable. The discrepancy between Rée’s declaration of this translational decision as a coinage and 
Macquarrie and Robinson’s own clear statement that Dasein is one amongst several important 
Heideggerian terms “simply” left untranslated is quite interesting in itself; whether it is possible to argue 
that a sovereign English-Heideggerian term Dasein came to exist as such via back-formation, i.e., was 
“coined” gradually, via by others’ reference to Macquarrie and Robinson’s un-italicized precedent, and 
whether or not in that case it would still count as a coinage, per se, is something else again, it is notable that 
Rée has not found it necessary here to make any reference whatsoever to the translators’ explanation. When 
we come to Rée’s treatment, in the same essay (“The Translation of Philosophy”, ibid.) of Corbin’s  
translation of Dasein as réalité-humaine, it should be noted that while Rée, with all appearance of academic 
propriety and erudition, not only acknowledges the existence of, but gives a commendably accurate 
reference (page number et al) to Corbin’s own translator’s preface to the Gallimard Edition, in which he 
(Corbin) offers a far more discursive explanation for his translation of Dasein as réalité-humaine than is 
offered by Macquarrie and Robinson for their Dasein for Dasein, Rée then offers a one sentence, two-step 
summation of Corbin’s “defence”144 of réalité-humaine, which is not only reductive (to be expected, given 
the relative length and scope of Rée’s essay), but in its second “step”, as we shall see, pretty much plain 
wrong. Scholarly citation of a text being no guarantee said scholar has always actually read said text with 
any great degree of thoroughness.  
 
And so on to réalité-humaine, and the Gallimard translation; but not before returning first to Corbin’s Bifur 
translation of “What is Metaphysics?” to give it, if not its due attention, then enough attention, at least, in 
order to differentiate it substantively from the Gallimard. As in Macquarrie and Robinson’s own 
assessment of Being and Time, here in the Bifur translation it does not appear to be the case that the 
residual German pitting the text in parentheses, including (Dasein), has been judged wholly untranslatable. 
French phrases are proffered, but not insisted upon, as the subsequently offered German words in 
parentheses attest, and thus the opportunity, in fact, many opportunities for further, individual interpretation 
are made over to the reader. Such opportunities, as has been noted, are not limited to Heidegger’s 
proprietary, Heideggerian terms. The young Corbin-Petithenry—the name under which he has published 
this translation145—does not, what’s more, give us, e.g., a (Dasein) after every instance in which Dasein 
appears in the German original. Thus a first impression of this early Bifur translation might be that of 
caution and inconsistency. This cautious and uneven approach may be attributable to this being Corbin’s 
first published translation, but it also betrays a deep concern for acuity, transparency (apparent e.g., in the 
provision of so many German “originals”), and linguistic nuance, as his first footnote confirms, in which 
Corbin worries over the impossibility of giving a exact French equivalent to the grammatical twist in the 
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German phrase “es ist einem unheimlich”.146 All this suggests (to me) also a profound respect for both 
material and reader, and the seriousness of the task.147 Besides the complete absence of the contentious 
réalité-humaine, the original German term ‘(Da-sein)’ appears as such, in parentheses, only three times,148 
in contrast to its many occurrences in the original German. In place of Dasein and its variants as they 
appear in the German text, we find in the Bifur translation the multiple and various terms with which 
Corbin experiments in place of Dasein, e.g., (in order of appearance): ‘l’être humain’ [the human being];149 
‘son existence’ [the existence] (i.e., ‘...d’un être aimé’ [of a beloved being]);150 and ‘notre existence’ [our 
existence] for Heidegger’s ‘unseres Da-Seins’, 151 which is immediately provided in parentheses, the first 
such offering of the original German of any form of Dasein in the translation, and as such perhaps the first 
evidence of a dawning intuition on Corbin’s part that the various, i.e., inconsistent terms with which he has 
thus far made do must necessarily remain inadequate to Heidegger’s proprietary Dasein, not least in their 
very variety, notwithstanding Heidegger’s own play-full and emphatic variants, such as Da-Seins and Da-
Sein152. This “intuition”, if such it was, was fully realised by the publication of the Gallimard Edition, for 
which, in consultation with Heidegger, Corbin devised his own handy lexical “tool kit” to match 
Heidegger’s. This included, of course, the compound term réalité-humaine, which he duly employed, with 
Heidegger’s asked-for-and-granted approval, in place of every occurrence of Dasein, and whose 
composition and use he justifies at some length in his translator’s preface.  
 
Jonathan Rée’s 2001 essay “The Translation of Philosophy”153 comes to Corbin’s réalité-humaine by a 
slightly convoluted route via its translation into English as “human reality” by Bernard Frechtman, in his 
1948 translation of Sartre’s 1938 [sic] Esquisse d'une théorie des émotions, in which, says Rée, the term 
appears as réalité humaine [sic]. His usage of réalité humaine [sic], is, according to Rée,  a ‘deliberate 
allusion’ by Sartre to ‘a recent book by Henry Corbin called Qu’est-ce que la métaphysique?’154 Note Rée’s 
incorrect reproduction of the term as réalité humaine, i.e., sans hyphen, whereas even in my 1995 edition of 
Esquisse d'une théorie des émotions155,  which according to the information provided is a faithful 
reproduction of the first, 1938 edition, the term is correctly and consistently rendered as réalité-humaine, 
complete with its hyphen, as illustrated overleaf (albeit the purported first edition this page belongs to was 
in fact published in 1939 contrary to  the claim made in my 1995 edition). Here, the term first appears in 
quotations, directly attributed to Heidegger, for whom, Sartre writes here, ‘the notions of world and of        
« réalité-humaine » (Dasein)’ are inseparable’. 156 
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So much for Rée’s own orthographic precision.  Noting Derrida’s description of réalité humaine [sic] in his 
“Les fins de l’homme,”157 as ‘a “monstrous” phrase, but “so much the more significant”’, Rée goes on to say 
that ‘even though Corbin’s book is no longer much read’, as it is, nonetheless ‘a founding document of the 
existentialism of the war years…it is worth being reminded of the philosophically cracked note that sounds 
in it’158; the “note”, that is, of réalité-humaine. This translation is ‘cracked’, for Rée, due to the loss it 
represents of Dasein’s ‘long linguistic pedigree’, including the fact that ‘it was the word that 
Schleiermacher had used as the equivalent of ousia in his classic translations of Plato’ as well as for the 
loss of Dasein’s “everydayness” in German, which he says was also integral to Heidegger’s choice and use 
of the word. Although Rée will only concede Heidegger’s “apparent” [sic]159 endorsement of Corbin’s 
translation of Dasein as réalité-humaine, he does also offer his own summary of Corbin’s defence of the 
term, in a footnote, as follows:  
Martin Heidegger, Qu’est-ce que la métaphysique?, tr. and ed. Henry Corbin, 
Prologue by Martin Heidegger (Paris, 1938). This volume contains translations 
of the first two chapters of Division Two of Sein und Zeit (sections 46–53 and 
72–76), where Dasein is consistently translated as réalité humaine. Corbin 
defends the translation (it is clearly preferable to existence, and preserves the 
divisibility of Da-Sein) in his Introduction, p. 13.’160 
We have referred to this last sentence of Rée’s as a two-step summation. The first “step”, i.e. his statement 
that for Corbin, réalité-humaine is ‘preferable to existence’, is a direct reference to Corbin’s Preface to the 
Gallimard Edition, in which Corbin states that the use of “existence” in place of Dasein could ‘result in a 
most unfortunate confusion between the notions of existentiel and existential’, and, as such, he suggests, 
might further encourage the misapprehension that Heidegger’s Existenzphilosophie amounts to no more 
than ‘a return to the old debate of "essence " and "existence"(1).’161 So far, so good. As for Rée’s “second 
step”, i.e., his assertion of that Corbin defends réalité-humaine—or, rather, as Rée consistently mis-renders 
it, réalité humaine—as “preserving the divisibility of Da-Sein” (ibid.); it is very curious,  since,  far from 
referring to the so-called divisibility of Dasein—even rendered, as Rée has chosen to do here for emphasis 
(quite correctly following Heidegger’s own occasional, emphatic usage), as Da-Sein—Corbin is utterly 
clear that the compound term réalité-humaine ‘refers to a whole, homogeneous from the outset’.162 Neither 
is the term grammatically constituted by, or otherwise meant to stand for a subject, “réalité”, which 
receives the predicate humaine. Since Corbin’s stated emphasis is on wholeness, rather than divisibility we 
might well ask why then use a compound term at all? We might well ask the same of Dasein, and expect an 
answer in the region of the thereness, or rather the –thereness, that is, the thrownness, the dis-placedness of 
Dasein;  a being-there which is precisely not a subject, nor any kind of a thing—not even a human-
                                                           
157 Jacques Derrida, “Les fins de l’homme,” Marges de la Philosophie (Paris, 1972), p. 136  
“The Ends of Man,” tr. Alan Bass, in Margins of Philosophy p. 115. 
158 “existentialism”, says Corbin, with an almost perceptible shudder, ‘a word which the early Heideggerians would never have 
pronounced’. (H. Corbin, “From Heidegger to Suhravardî”. 
159 J. Rée, “The Translation of Philosophy” p.234 
160 J. Rée, “The Translation of Philosophy” p.234, footnote no. 20 
(1) [Corbin’s footnote] Cf. in the IXth International Congress of Philosophy, our communication over “Transcendantal [sic] et 
Existential”, VIII, 25-31 
161 H. Corbin, Qu’est-ce que la métaphysique? (Gallimard) p.13  
162 H. Corbin, Qu’est-ce que la métaphysique? (Gallimard) p.13 
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Thing163—to “be thrown”, or to “be there;” but a there-being, a being-there.  Another, simpler answer 
might also be that the formation of new compound terms is in itself characteristically Heideggerian, as 
noted by Macquarrie and Robinson164, who although they have not themselves chosen to emulate this 
practice of composite-coinage, have faithfully translated Heidegger’s own compound terms into English, 
with many hyphens.  
 
 In Corbin’s own words, which, in part since they have been so overlooked, misrepresented and ignored to 
date in numerous discussions and often rather out-of-hand (and second-hand) condemnations of his 
translation, it seems only necessary and fair to reproduce quite fully165:  
It appeared to us that the method of forming new lexicological resources with 
the hyphen symbol was infinitely preferable to the all too frequent creation of 
unforeseen or irritating neologisms. In the German, the author also frequently 
uses such notation, thanks to which the movement and new cohesion 
uncovered in his thinking are announced directly in the words themselves. 
These particularities have been carefully respected in the French text; and it is 
important, upon each encounter with these 'compositions', to reflect upon the 
intention that they express. Beginning with this term, what we are witnessing is 
the development of a technical lexicon of fundamental ontology. If réalité-
humaine is not a simple Positum, if its being is not the being of a thing that 
subsists in a uniform present, it is only in the most "active" sense of the verb 
being that it is its presence ; as a subject, it does not receive, but rather is this 
predicate; réalité-humaine realises, effecting a real-presence (Das Dasein ist 
sein Da). This presence, this "Da", is its Being-in-the-world (In-der-Welt-sein); 
and the ontological implications of this thesis means that "in the world" does 
not represent a receptacle containing its being; on the contrary, here "being" 
represents the original condition that renders possible the phenomenon "in the 
world".166 
What is immediately made clear is that the réalité humaine to which Rée refers is not Corbin’s réalité-
humaine, for the elemental reason that the hyphen is missing in Rée’s—the very symbol that Rée himself 
provides for us, implanted, thus, in a “Da-Sein” ostensibly so as to demonstrate that term’s very 
“divisibility”, which divisibility his pseudo-Corbinian réalité humaine[sic], sans hyphen, is supposed by 
Rée to be supposed by Corbin to preserve. Here is the same Rée who founded such a grand claim on the 
non-italicization of Dasein by Macquarrie and Robinson, while failing to engage with their own 
explanation. And yet Rée has overlooked the hyphen, which symbol Corbin makes a point of naming (in 
French, of course as trait d’union) as technically and lexicologically integral to the composition of this 
composition,  réalité-humaine; here employed by Corbin not only as symbol of the unity or homogeneity—
versus Rée’s “divisibility”—of réalité-humaine, but also and in addition, sometimes even in the midst of 
ostensibly non-compound words, to clarify the precise details of Heidegger’s thought; emphasizing not 
divisibility, but pro-jection; out-standing [ex-sistance]; out-folding [ex-plication]; trans-scendence: 
thrownness.  
                                                           
163 Cf. Heidegger’s “Menschending”, or “human-Thing” Being and Time, trans. Macquarrie and Robinson Blackwell, Oxford 1962, 
2006 p. 87.  
164 Macquarrie and Robinson, “Translators’ Preface” Being and Time, p.13  
165 The translation is my own, with the kind oversight of Dr. Deirdre Daly. 
166 H. Corbin, Qu’est-ce que la métaphysique? (Gallimard) pp.13-14. 
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the fundamental thesis is that "the essence of réalité-humaine consists in its ex 
-sistance" (Das Wesen des Daseins liegt in seiner Existenz). We must make 
absolutely clear in French, by means of orthographic modification, the specific 
relation of existence to Dasein. each time we want to emphasize the modality 
proper to réalité-humaine, we write ex-sistance; as for the verb of this 
existance, we reserve its etymological form "exsist" (exsistere). In ex-sisting, 
réalité-humaine trans-scends; it pro-jects (entwirft) a world, it makes to reign a 
world [elle fait que règne un monde].167 
This project is the potential-being [pouvoir-etre] (Seinkönnen) which is 
absolutely proper to it; potential-being always already actualised (existentiel), 
in which it ex-sists, and of which it belongs to this analysis to unveil the 
possibility of an initial outline (existential) (1). In ex-sisting, réalité humaine 
ex-plicates [ex-plique, lit. “out-folds”] a world; it is always already [d'ores et 
déjà] comprehension and interpretation (Aus-legung [“out-laying”]). Its mode 
of being is of being-revealing (Erschliessend [disclosing]), and at the same 
time, revealed-reality (Erschlossenheit [disclosedness]); of aleitheia168, 
ontological truth.169 
If the being of réalité-humaine is not that of a given-reality, a subsistent-reality 
(we have used, as accordant with this case, these two nuances of translation) it 
is that its presence is not a present uniform and continuous in time. The trans-
scendence is the pro-ject (Entwurf) into which réalité-humaine is always 
already [d'ores et déjà] thrown (geworfen) in its effectivity, (its abandonment, 
[sa déréliction]: Geworfenheit), assuming in advance its potential-being (its 
ultimate potential-being: death). This resolute decision (Entschlossenheit) is 
not a psychological disposition, but the mode of being of réalité-humaine as 
presence to [de par] its future. Ex-sistance is ek-static: the triple exstasis170 of 
the temporality of Time is the very structure of its transcendence.171 
Close attention should be paid to these further instances of orthographic modification in which Corbin has 
applied the hyphen or trait d’union as an aid to clarity and emphasis, e.g., “ex-sistance [lit “out-standing]”, 
where both the use of ‘a’ rather than ‘e’ to denote ‘the active noun from the participle’, and the hyphen, 
serve ‘to emphasize the modality proper to réalité-humaine’172, that is, “ex-sisting”. Following suit from its 
function in ex-sistance, the trait d’union next serves to emphasise how ‘in ex-sisting, réalité-humaine trans-
scends173 [lit.,‘from Old French transcendre or Latin transcendere, from trans- ‘across’ + scandere 
‘climb’]; it pro-jects [lit., “throws forth”, ‘from Latin pro- ‘forth’ + jacere ‘to throw.’ 174] (entwirft) a 
world’.175 These passages make it abundantly clear that the hyphen, or trait d’union is being entrusted to 
perform a great deal more than just its unifying function, whereby it serves to indicate the rapport, or 
corrélation of two verbal elements. The hyphen: lit., ‘together, in one, lit. Gk. hyph, hupho + en = ‘under + 
one’176;  in French,  the  trait d’union: trait = from Latin tractus ‘drawing, pulling’, union = ‘from 
ecclesiastical Latin unio(n-) ‘unity,’ from Latin unus, one.’177. The hyphen does also mark division (French  
césure) such as when a single word is “wrapped” from the end of one typographical line to the beginning of 
                                                           
167 H. Corbin, Qu’est-ce que la métaphysique? (Gallimard) p.13 
168 [my transliteration of HC’s Greek. RB] 
169 H. Corbin, Qu’est-ce que la métaphysique? (Gallimard) pp.14-15 
170 [my transliteration of HC’s Greek. RB] 
171 H. Corbin, Qu’est-ce que la métaphysique? (Gallimard) p.15 
172 H. Corbin, Qu’est-ce que la métaphysique? (Gallimard) p.13 
173 H. Corbin, Qu’est-ce que la métaphysique? (Gallimard) pp.13-14  
174 New Oxford American Dictionary 2010 
175 H. Corbin, Qu’est-ce que la métaphysique? (Gallimard) pp.13-14 
176 Oxford English Dictionary Second Edition Vol VII.1 Oxford 1989 
177 Oxford American English Dictionary 2010.  
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the next one. So where it marks such a division, it indicates either a division, a separation where there 
should not be one, throwing the readers’ attention onward toward the separated yet inseparable element; or 
else, where there is not a separation any more. As for the other, more straightforwardly unifying function of 
the trait d’union, indicating rapport, or corrélation: whereas e.g., the Oxford American English Dictionary 
(2010) has of English “correlation” ‘ORIGIN mid 16th cent.: from medieval Latin correlatio(n-), from cor- 
‘together’ + relatio (see relation)’ 178, the Oxford English Dictionary (1989)179 has ‘french cor + relation: 
cf. F. corrélation ‘the condition of being correlated; mutual relation of two or more things (implying 
intimate or necessary connexion)’.  Harrap’s Standard French and English Dictionary (London, 1996) 
then has of French cor-,  “tine, prong, or horn”; in this context, rather as if the hyphen were at once a 
prong—which may as well propel, to pro-ject, even, as secure, or skewer—and a bond180, which tensile and 
dynamic conceit accords very nicely with Corbin’s above usage and explication. A veritable pushmi-
pullyu.  
 
Thus, as we have seen, the correlative form may indicate where separation, or division formerly existed 
between two original words or terms, prior to their present conjoinment; or indicate a separation where 
there should be none; so for Rée to state, either in his own right, or to state that Corbin has stated that the 
composition réalité-humaine, or réalité humaine [sic] as he has it, is intended to preserve the divisibility of 
“Dasein/Da-Sein” seems at best a badly expressed half-truth, at worst a reductive inversion of what Corbin 
not only intended but went to great pains to disclose.  
 
If all of this attention paid to the hyphen seems somehow preposterous, or should a precedent be required I 
refer the reader to Jean-Luc Nancy’s book Noli me tangere, e.g., in which a great deal is made of that trait 
d’union which appears in the customary French rendering of the name of Mary Magdalene as Marie-
Madeleine, and which for Nancy indicates both separation and unity, or identity, even; traction and 
attraction. Thus: 
Everything about Mary-Magdalene is contained in her hyphen: ... But the 
hyphen does not make anything else appear and does not set into motion any 
dialectical machine.  It remains a line of separation, keeping each at a distance 
from the other.  Each is the truth of the other.  Mary of Magdalene, and 
Magdalene of Mary...Mary-Magdalene is neither one nor the other; she 
withdraws beneath her hyphen, overwhelmed by being exposed in this way. 
Mary—dash—Magdalene. Mary separated from Magdalene by a hyphen or a 
dash.  Mary drawn or withdrawn from Magdalene.  It is a question of Mary, 
Myriam, Meriam, MRAM, the feminine tetragram floating on fragrant waters.  
The Magdalan makes woman float: between grace and sin, creator and 
creature, she makes the dash float, this unifying dash that thus disunites. Like 
an unstable gangway between the nihil and the something, between the abyss 
and existence, this woman (perhaps woman herself? But stretched into two, her 
unity withdrawn in the between-two) introduces the irruption of something in 
the midst of nothingness and, reciprocally, the eternal return of the nothing in 
                                                           
178 Oxford American English Dictionary 2010.  
179 Second Edition Vol VII.1 
180 In German “BINDESTRICH” = “hyphen”; lit. Gm binde + strich: binden = tie, bind; strich = line, stroke (Oxford Duden German 
Dictionary, Revised Ed. Oxford 1990, 1997) 
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every thing. The same line or dash traces something in nothing and nothing in 
something: that is the line, the trait, the traction, of Mary-Magdalene 181   
Here, a digression, as the inevitable auto-presentation of the word hymen—inevitable given the subject182, 
the matter183; the whole unity—might we say intactness184—and/or separation of Mary-Magdalene as 
MRAM, the female trinity of mother-virgin-whore, and its orthographic proximity, in English as in Greek, 
to the word hyphen—makes for a cruder and infinitely more delicate reading of our hyphen. But what is 
this? A feminine Da-sein? We note with interest that “she” also has the characteristic (and) self-knowledge 
of thrownness for Nancy: 
She is the creature who knows herself to have been created, who knows that 
she has been thrown onto the earth and for nothing other than the earth itself, 
for its beauty and its barrenness, its pleasure and its pain185. 
Here, Nancy’s is an abject and authentic thrownness, far more existentialist, I would submit, than it is 
Corbinian-Heideggerian. Returning to Corbin, who, writing186 in 1978 in defence of his translation, states  
quite clearly that his use of the hyphen was both highly deliberate, and so integral to his attempt to convey 
the pro-jection, the trans-scendence, the ex-sistance, the there-being of Dasein réalité-humaine, that its 
negligent omission weakens the translation: 
Pre-sence, Da-sein.  I do not want to return here to a discussion of the reasons 
that, back in the day, led us, in agreement with our friends, to translate Dasein 
by réalité-humaine [human-reality].  I am aware of the particular weaknesses 
of this translation, especially when by an all too frequent negligence, we omit 
the hyphen, whose necessity we have explained elsewhere.187  Da-sein: being-
there, this is understood.  But being-there, is essentially to be enacting a 
presence, enactment of that presence by which and for which meaning is 
revealed in the present.  The modality of this human presence is thus to be 
revelatory, but in such a way that, in revealing the meaning, it reveals itself, 
and is that which is revealed.  
Rée, with his emphasis on division, is not alone in his mis-taking of Corbin’s réalité-humaine. Alas while 
Ethan Kleinberg correctly reproduces réalité-humaine as such, replete with its trait d’union, unlike Rée, 
who has taken, but alas mis-taken notice of Corbin’ introduction to the translation, Kleinberg’s own failure 
to take notice of the introduction at all,  and consequently to engage with Corbin’s explicatory emphasis on 
the pro-jection, trans-scendence, and ex-sistance of réalité-humaine also results in a poor assessment of the 
translation, which we, on the other hand, are now equipped to consider as a faithful attempt to convey 
Heideggerian Dasein, as (after, but not entirely with Meillasoux) “a correlationism”, albeit one with its own 
peculiarly Heideggerian characteristics. That is, to convey the “truth” of Dasein as réalité-humaine, as a 
                                                           
181 J.-L. Nancy, Noli me tangere pp.64-6.  
182 from Latin subjectus ‘brought under,’ past participle of subicere, from sub- ‘under’ + jacere ‘throw.’ Senses relating to philosophy, 
logic, and grammar are derived ultimately from Aristotle's use of to hupokeimenon meaning [material from which things are made] 
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185 J.-L. Nancy, Noli me tangere pp.63-4.  
186 (and/or talking, as this passage is excerpted from the transcript of an interview with Phillipe Nemo, later carefully polished up for 
publication as “From Heidegger to Suhravardî”, the text to which the Post-Scriptum is appended. 
187 Regrettably, I have  yet to discover this explanatory “elsewhere”. 
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correlative truth, a truth of correlation, whose prime characteristic is that of the pro-jection and tran-
scendence of (and to) the phenomena. This too, we can say, is its thrownness.    
 
Kleinberg, however, begins by stating that despite Corbin’s attempt ‘to convey the specific nature of 
Heidegger’s term by distancing it from the traditional philosophical understanding of “essence” and 
“existence”’, his (Corbin’s) ‘better intentions’ are ‘betrayed’ by his decision to use the term réalité-
humaine for Dasein, firstly because, he says, the term fails to ‘convey the spatial character of Dasein, 
which displaces the subject as the localizable site of being’; this fault he finds to be compounded by 
Corbin’s translation of Geworfenheit as sa déréliction, i.e., abandonment, dereliction, which while it 
corroborates e.g., ‘Jean Wahl’s reading of Heidegger as an existentialist in the tradition of Kierkegaard’, 
also, according to Kleinberg, ‘led the readers of Corbin’s translations to assume that Heidegger was 
emphasizing the specific and individual abandoned subject’.188 This is reasonable criticism, though we are 
bound to ask of Kleinberg, which readers? Though we must be left to wonder which of those readers also 
skipped over the translator’s introduction, a citation, to follow, of Jean-Paul Sartre, will give us strong 
indications that he was amongst them. Secondly, as a consequence of said failure to ‘convey the spatial 
character of Dasein’ and thereby ‘displace the subject’, Kleinberg states that ‘those ‘French scholars’ who 
were ‘trained in the Cartesian tradition’ subsequently ‘assumed that the presence of being was located in 
the specific human subject’.189  
 
Recalling that although Kleinberg thinks he is referring to the Bifur translation, which he believes to be 
identical to the Gallimard translation, in fact he, because it, is not: let us now refer these criticisms, indeed 
this accusation of “self-betrayal”, to Corbin’s introduction to the Gallimard Edition, and to our refutations, 
above, of Jonathan Rées, made with reference to said introduction, by which the first of Kleinberg’s 
accusations, regarding the conveyance of “spatiality” and displacedness, or lack therein, of réalité-humaine, 
are very well answered. 
  
With regard to Kleinberg’s secondly holding Corbin responsible, due to this apparent failure to ‘convey the 
spatial character of Dasein’ and thereby ‘displace the subject’, etc, for the erroneous assumptions 
subsequently made, according to Kleinberg, by said Cartesian readers, that ‘the presence of being was 
located [for Heidegger] in the specific human subject’190: let us refer to Corbin’s translator’s introduction, 
in which he states that ‘It should however never be forgotten that this compound term does not designate a 
reality that would first be posed, and then receive the predicate "human"; no, it refers to a whole, 
homogeneous from the outset.’ 191 Thus it is made abundantly clear that, grammatically or otherwise, the 
constitution of réalité-humaine is not that of subject-predicate.  
 
Thus far, Corbin’s worst mistake must surely be said to be his expectation that serious readers would not 
fail to read the translator’s foreword. Kleinberg’s remaining major criticism is of Corbin’s choice to 
                                                           
188 E. Kleinberg, Generation Existential p.71 
189 E. Kleinberg, Generation Existential p.70 
190 [my italics] E. Kleinberg, Generation Existential p.70 
191 H. Corbin, Qu’est-ce que la métaphysique? (Gallimard) p.12 [My translation. R.B.] 
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translate Vorhandenheit [more or less “at-handness”, or more literally but unnaturally, “fore-handness”] 
and Zuhandenheit [lit., more or less “to-handness”] as, respectively, realite-des-choses [reality-of-things] 
[sic] and realite-ustentile [utensile-reality], for being at once too theoretical, in not conveying the active 
nature of Zuhandenheit, and not theoretical enough, in the case of realite-des-choses [sic], which for 
Kleinberg ‘does not convey the contemplative and theoretical aspects of Vorhandenheit and instead implies 
that Heidegger is investigating the reality of things’, and furthermore, according to Kleinberg, caused a 
number of Corbin’s contemporaries, recalling Husserl, to have conceived of Heideggerian ‘”human-reality” 
as the locus of consciousness as the basis for intentionality’192. This Husserlian reading is a little beyond the 
narrow scope of our enquiry. As for Corbin’s realite-des-choses [sic], he states in the introduction that:  
Instead of ex-sistance [lit., “out-standing”] (which is always the ex-sistance of 
a world), the mode of being of the existent there discovered in the world is that 
of an in-sistance [lit., “in-standing”] in that world. It is that which, as opposed 
to réalité-humaine, forms reality-as-given, the reality-of-subsistent-things 
[réalité-des-choses subsistantes] (Vorhandenheit), and the encircling range of 
utensile-reality193 [réalité-ustensile]  (Zuhandenheit), all of those objects whose 
reality is revealed in the usage, in a " for ... " . 
While the word  “subsistantes”, is not adjoined to the other words that together make up the term’s long 
form, réalité-des-choses subsistantes, French grammar demands that it be considered an inclusion. 
Elsewhere in the introduction, Corbin abbreviates réalité-des-choses subsistantes to not réalité-des-choses, 
but réalité-subsistantes [subsistent-reality]. It is certainly true even as realite-des-choses subsistantes and 
réalité-subsistantes, both long and abbreviated forms of this term still lack the literal “handiness” of 
Heidegger’s, while in Corbin’s realite-ustentile, a certain handiness is at least implied. As to whether the 
term correctly rendered as realite-des-choses subsistantes still fails to convey Vorhandenheit’s 
‘contemplative and theoretical aspects’ (ibid.), before even getting into a discussion of the erroneous 
omision of “subsistent” by Kleinberg one might just as well counter that if taken alone and out of context, 
so might the term Vorhandenheit, to the extent that it relies upon its context for a nuanced explication. 
Unlike the virtual self-sufficiency of Dasein, which has the rare distinction of a kind of conceptual 
onomatopaeia (i.e., that in or out of context, it means very much what it reads like), the same general and 
ahistorical accusation and defence of over-reliance on context (including rather heavily, on his translator’s 
introduction) can very well be made of Corbin’s réalité-humaine. However, cf. Jonathan Rée’s argument in 
his “The Translation of Philosophy” that the term “Schematism”, e.g:  
is always specifically Kantian, and no one could begin to understand it without 
studying the Critique of Pure Reason. It is the same with Leibnizian 
monadologie and Hegelian or Husserlian Phänomenologie: to understand them 
is to understand not just a universal concept, but an individual thinker.194 
Having observed, by now, how Kleinberg’s errors of citation, attribution and inference have multiplied and 
radiated outward from his first erroneous assumption that Corbin’s 1931 Bifur translation was the same 
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193 I have risked my own coinage here, of utensile-reality which I hope is fairly self-explanatory, on the grounds that “instrumental-
reality”, the closest “natural” English term that came to hand, as it were, is too reminiscent of e.g., dials and gauges and clockwork, 
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194 J. Rée, “The Translation of Philosophy” p. 229 
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translation as appeared in the 1938 Gallimard Edition of Qu’est-ce que la Metaphysique?195 compounded 
by further errors arising from his failure to attend to Corbin’s translator’s introduction, we can agree with 
Rée, at least, on the importance of gaining an accurate grasp of a given term-, or text-’s, precise 
philosophical, and, we shall add, historical context. Based on his false assumption of the identity of these 
two textual entities, Kleinberg wrongly claims the Bifur translation to have contained the term réalité-
humaine. It is “this essay” which he now wrongly states to have been the subject of Sartre’s first 
“impressionistic” reading of Heidegger,  which is said to have had so profound an effect on Sartre’s early 
work.196 Getting into stride, Kleinberg takes arguments put forth in Le Collège de sociologie: 1937-1939197  
regarding ‘Corbin’s translation of Dasein as realité-humaine’ and applies them to an analysis of Sartre’s 
novel Nausea, written ‘in its first form between 1931 and 1933 and then rewritten while Sartre was 
studying Husserl in Berlin198’ in ‘the academic year of 1933’.199  Kleinberg:  
The concern of Nausea is to understand being as it is manifested in the human 
being, and here we see how Sartre’s interpretation of Heidegger’s philosophy 
diverges from Heidegger’s own project. Sartre, like Jean Wahl, Jean Hyppolite, 
and many others, took Henry Corbin’s translation of Dasein as réalité-humaine 
quite literally and therefore assumed that Heidegger was investigating the 
human actor.200 For Sartre, Dasein and human being are equivocal terms...the 
important point is that Sartre always equated Dasein with human-reality201 
If we accept the dates given by Kleinberg for the writing of Nausea, even though it was not to be published 
until 1938, it is impossible for the term réalité-humaine, which Kleinberg finds to have been such a 
profound influence on the conception of Nausea, to have been drawn from Corbin’s 1931 Bifur translation 
of “Was Ist Metaphysik?”, as Kleinberg claims, and thus to have affected or determined Sartre’s concern, 
according to Kleinberg, to ‘understand  being as it is manifested in the human being’,202 because, as has 
been well established, the term simply does not appear therein; though it may well be that Sartre’s 
“impressionistic” reading of the Bifur translation may still have affected his composition of Nausea; and, 
who knows but should any other scholar choose to embark upon a close reading of Nausea with reference 
to the 1931 Bifur translation, it may yet prove most enlightening. Meanwhile, several pages later, Kleinberg 
reiterates his erroneous citations of Corbin’s translation(s), while allowing the diagnostic precision of their 
stated influence to get looser:  
the most important factor in Sartre’s understanding of Heidegger is Henry 
Corbin’s translation of Heidegger’s work. Corbin’s translation of Was ist 
Metaphysik? appeared in 1931 and was republished [sic], along with 
translations of Vom Wesen des  Grundes and two sections of Being and Time, 
in 1938.  Sartre describes the event of this translation in terms of the 
contingency of circumstance of history. It is probably best to consider it in this 
                                                           
195 And then again in the 1968 Gallimard collection Questions I/II, Kleinberg’s sole source for “the” translation 
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light, rather than assign it the position of a specific “influence.” Corbin’s 
translation of Heidegger appeared to Sartre’s “situation, his generation, his 
époque” just when it “had to.” 203  
Sartre:   
It was for us that Corbin made the translation.  It stirred our first interest in 
Heidegger’s philosophy but we were not ready for it.  It took 12 or 15 years for 
Heidegger’s thought to arrive in France. It came little by little through the 
translations in Bifur (1930) and Recherches Philosophiques (1933) until finally 
it came to truly organize itself and to reclaim its teachings.204 
Reading these alongside one another, one might  assume that Kleinberg’s assertion that ‘Was ist 
Metaphysik? ... was republished, along with translations of Vom Wesen des  Grundes and two sections of 
Being and Time’ (ibid.) must be taken to mean that all of these texts were republished in the Gallimard 
Edition, i.e., that they had all been published elsewhere before, and on this erroneous basis, infer again that 
at least one of these initial publications might be that which Sartre recalls as having appeared in Recherches 
Philosophiques in 1933, perhaps translated by Corbin. Even knowing Kleinberg to be wrong in his 
assumption that the Gallimard Edition contains a reproduction of the Bifur translation of “Was ist 
metaphysik?”,  the conscientious researcher might then set off to consult said first publication(s)205, only to 
find that while Corbin did have an essay published in Vol. III (1933-4) entitled “ La theologie dialectique 
et l’histoire” in which he mentions Heidegger, along with Karl Barth, Karl Löwith, and Soren Kierkegaard,  
in a section entitled ‘Le temps propre de l’existence et l’eschaton’,  no translation of Heidegger, by Corbin 
or anyone else, appears in either Vol. II (1932-3), or Vol. III (1933-4) of Recherches Philosophiques. 
Corbin’s Vol. III essay itself contains no direct translation of Heidegger, and nor, as a matter of record, 
does Corbin make any independent use in it of the terms Dasein or réalité-humaine. A translation of 
Heidegger’s “Vom Wesen Des Grundes” does appear in Recherches Philosophiques Vol. I in 1931-2 (not 
’33)  entitled “De la nature de la cause”, and it is likely to this that Sartre refers, as translated not by  
Corbin, but rather by one A. Bessey. Corbin’s translation of a section of “Vom Wesen des  Grundes” in the 
1938 Gallimard Edition of  Qu’est-ce que la métaphysique? is thus published there for the first time.  
 
As for Sartre’s L’être et le néant/Being and Nothingness, the term ‘« réalité humaine »’ first appears 
exactly so, as in ‘pour Heidegger, la « réalité humaine » est ontico-ontologique, c’est-à-dire qu’elle peut 
toujours dépasser le phénomène vers son être’.206 This is translated in the first English edition by Hazel A. 
Barnes as: ‘for Heidegger also “human reality” is ontic-ontological; that is, it can always pass beyond the 
phemomenon [sic] towards its being’.207 Note then that in the first occurrence of the term in L’être et le 
néant, and although it is attributed to Heidegger, the proprietary hyphen is omitted. A couple of pages later, 
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Sartre commences with his ordinary usage of the term réalité humaine, [sic]208 without quotations and 
released from its explicit connection to Heidegger, although perhaps still implicitly referring back to that 
first Heideggerian « réalité humaine ». Indeed perhaps one might assume it to be Sartre’s implicit intention 
for every further instance of réalité humaine[sic] and réalité-humaine—as the hyphenated version also 
appears very occasionally throughout the book, according to no discernible grammatical or intentional 
design209—from the first on, to be read as Heideggerian. Yet four pages on, Sartre has recourse to the 
German term Dasein for the Heideggerian existant, thus: ‘C’est ce qu’exprime fort bien Heidegger, 
lorsqu’il ecrit (en parlant du  « Dasein », a vrai dire, non de la conscience)’210 [‘This is what Heidegger 
expressed very well when he wrote (though speaking of Dasein, not of consciousness...’]211, and this is not 
the only such case.212 This usage pattern strongly suggests that wherever Sartre uses the term—whether it 
appears as réalité humaine [sic], or réalité-humaine, in either case without quotations and unloosed from its 
explicit belonging to Heidegger (i.e., whenever the term is not explicitly used to designate the Heideggerian 
Dasein),  it could well be argued that here it functions as a Sartrean term. And while even these 
occurrences may arguably be variously distributed along a continuum between the Sartrean and the 
Heideggerian, it is clear that Sartre’s general deployment of the term réalité humaine/ réalité-humaine is by 
no means a consistently precise and referential deployment of Henry Corbin’s translation of Dasein. 
Indeed, the “Key to Special Terminology” in the 2010 English Routledge edition seems to settle this point, 
as the entry for “human-reality”213  reads: ‘Sartre’s term for the human being or For-itself.  Used both 
generally like (“mankind”) and for the individual man.’214  In short, there is a strong case for the argument 
that following the 1943 publication of L’être et le néant, extra to the French-Heideggerian term réalité-
humaine, Heidegger’s Dasein, as translated by Corbin, there was now also a Sartrean term in philosophical 
circulation, rendered indiscriminately as réalité humaine or réalité-humaine.  
 
It was highly fortunate for the late progress of this thesis that in 2010 Stanford University Press published 
Stefanos Geroulanos’ book An Atheism That is Not Humanist Emerges in French Thought215. In a chapter 
entitled “The Anthropology of Antifoundational Realism”216,  Geroulanos offers a valuable historico-
philosophical contextualisation and defence of Corbin’s translation of Dasein as réalité-humaine, as 
follows. Geroulanos argues that ‘the anthropological (and anti-anthropocentric) impulse’ that so 
characterized ‘the radical transformation of French thought in the early 1930s’, had two main sources, 
namely: 1) ‘new approaches in the philosophy of science’ and 2) ‘the import of German 
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phenomenology’217. These new approaches, writes Geroulanos,  originating in and around Corbin’s avant-
garde Parisian milieu, were to radically alter 
 the perceived relationship between the human subject and the world in which 
this subject finds itself, reducing man from his rationalist and idealist apex as 
supreme being and rational ruler of nature to a subject fundamentally trapped 
in modern reality’. 218 
It is immediately obvious how an exploration of the second of these “new approaches” might provide us 
with relevant context for Corbin—who not only translated Heidegger in the period in question, but 
continued to develop what he has explicitly described as a phenomenological approach to his later work on 
Islamic and comparative philosophy—but what of the first? This comes to seem less incongruous upon 
acquaintance with e.g., Corbin’s later work The Concept of Comparative Philosophy219, in which he 
expresses an abiding concern for the character of the Western scientistic paradigm and its  inherent 
consequences, and in which it is hard not to find a trace of Corbin’s teacher and friend, the scholar of 
science and religion Alexandre Koyré’s formative influence.220 Just so, Geroulanos describes how the 
development of these new approaches occurred in ‘the circle of émigrés around the historian of science and 
religion Alexandre Koyré’221.  Koyré, a great friend and later also a colleague of Corbin’s at the Ecole 
Pratique des Haute Etudes [EPHE], was also a founding editor of the journal Recherches philosophiques222 
to which journal Corbin was not only a contributor (of two essays223 and a number of reviews) but was also 
involved, with Koyré and others, in planning its content224. Corbin writes of Recherches philosophiques 
that its pages ‘represented a kind of precious laboratory’.  Koyré  also wrote the introduction to Corbin’s 
first, 1931 translation of “Was ist Metaphysik?” in the journal Bifur. The importance of the EPHE as a kind 
of hub for all that—and so many of those—who were shaping and would continue to shape French thought 
for the next few decades cannot be overestimated.  It was the institutional home for first Koyré’s, then 
Kojevé’s influential lectures on Hegel, although Corbin recalls that ‘most of Koyré’s classes finished at the 
Harcourt, the historic, comfortable café on the corner of the place de la Sorbonne and the boulevard Saint 
Michel’, at which  Café Harcourt Corbin says ‘a significant part of the French philosophy of the time was 
elaborated’. Then there were also ‘the soirées held by Alexandre Koyré and his wife in their little apartment 
on the rue de Navarre’, in the course of which, says Corbin, ‘The program for the next volume of the 
review Recherches philosophiques [Studies in Philosophy] always occupied a central position’225 . The 
EPHE was, crucially, one of only a few institutions in France at that time where (paid) research could be, 
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and indeed was encouraged to be conducted and disseminated outside the rigid confines of the French 
national curriculum.  
 
To some extent, writes Geroulanos, what he calls the French philosophical “event” of the 1930s should be 
understood as the fruition226 of various developments begun in the 1920s catalysed by such radical, outside 
interventions and influences as the “bitingly reductive” final public lecture in a series delivered in Paris in 
1928 by the Japanese philosopher and former student of Heidegger’s, Count Shuzo Kuki, on the “General 
Characteristics of French Philosophy”, in which Kuki summarized (and more or less summarily dismissed) 
establishment French philosophy according to these four traits: 
(i) inner observation (ii); an alliance with positivism; (iii) a fundamental metaphysical—
essentially Cartesian-dualism; and (iv) a “striving to be social”227  
And the infamous 1929 encounter at Davos between Martin Heidegger and Ernst Cassirer, where they 
debated ‘the contemporary importance of the Kantian tradition,’ prompted in large part by the publication, 
earlier in 1929, of Heidegger’s Kant and The Problem of Metaphysics, which ‘had challenged the “official” 
reading of Kant by the two major German Neo-Kantian schools’.228 The French contingent at Davos 
included, e.g., Leon Brunschvicg and the young Emmanuel Levinas. Geroulanos observes that while ‘both 
Cassirer and Heidegger rejected...the limits of anthropocentrism’, the ‘originality and harshness’ of 
Heidegger’s argument won out over Cassirer, which in the French context could really not fail to be read as 
a critique—and thus by implication, a symbolic defeat, also—of Brunschvicg’s reigning brand of neo-
criticism. As for Brunschvicg, who had ‘openly supported Cassirer’, Geroulanos relates that Brunschvicg 
later responded to Heidegger’s “victory” by attempting to recast, and thus ‘to recuperate the “profundity”’ 
of Heidegger’s argument,  as ‘a testament to the power and self-transformative potential of 
Kantianism,’229which to some extent, of course, it was; the young Levinas, for one, however, saw 
Heidegger’s Davos performance as nothing less than “the end of a particular kind of humanism”, 230 i.e., 
according to Geroulanos,  ‘the old, conventional, secular humanism’ which was then associated with 
Kantianism. 231 
 
As corollary to the philosophical ‘attack on man as at once ideal and ground’ begun in French thought of 
the 1920s, most clearly evident, according to Geroulanos, in:  
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(i) phenomenological and epistemological arguments directed against scientific 
positivism and neocriticism and (ii) the dismissal of man’s standing as a 
privileged observer of nature and causality 
Geroulanos identifies ‘an overturning of the classical transcendental juxtaposition of subject to object’, 
leading, in turn, to what he has coined ‘antifoundational realism, a kind of philosophical “realism”’ that not 
only ‘denies man any kind of transcendental separation from the reality he finds himself in, [but also] 
attributes to him a contribution to this reality’.232 Acknowledging the special importance of the journal 
Recherches Philosophiques to this period, Geroulanos cites two major philosophical moments: (i), ‘the 
transformations in epistemology occasioned by the discovery of uncertainty in quantum physics’, and (ii) 
‘the arrival of German phenomenology, rendering obsolete Kantian idealism and the debate between 
realism and rationalism that had dominated French epistemology and philosophy of science’, after which:  
In the hands of Jean Wahl, Gaston Bachelard, and Alexandre Kojève,  the 
critique of scientific determinism in quantum physics combined with the 
phenomenological critique of idealism, leading to antifoundational realism. 
Antifoundational realism undermined existing realism/idealism distinctions, 
and it specifically rejected the conception of Man as an all-powerful observer, 
transcendental to nature and the world.233 
This claim is well evidenced in the indices of Recherches Philosophiques, whose inaugural volume 
contains, in a section called “Present tendencies in Metaphysics”, both Jean Wahl’s introduction to his 
seminal “Vers le Concret”, Bachelard’s “Noumène et microphysique” 234, and an essay by Corbin’s teacher 
and friend Jean Baruzi235 ‘on the languages of mysticism’236, alongside a translation of Martin Heidegger’s 
“Vom Wesen Des Grundes”.237 ‘What these essays share’, writes Geroulanos, ‘is a critique of both classical 
realism and Kantian idealism; Wahl and Bachelard also converge by their attention to new scientific claims, 
while Baruzi and Wahl speak to the contemporary resonance of the problem of mysticism’. 238 Picturing 
Corbin here at this extraordinarily catholic—in the broadest sense—intersection of philosophical enquiry it 
is not so difficult to conceive of how the first French translator of Heidegger, growing up out of the same 
philosophical “scene” that gave rise to existentialism, could have “grown up” to become what  Christopher 
Delacampagne in The Columbia History of Twentieth-Century French Thought  (2006)239  correctly if 
rather narrowly calls ‘a specialist in Shi’ite Islam’, i.e., a scholar of comparative philosophy and 
mysticisms, once that that scene is rediscovered to have been as rich and strange as it was.  
 
Extra to acknowledging the vital importance of the ‘precious laboratory’240 that was Recherches 
Philosophiques, Geroulanos also wishes to stress the as yet undersung ‘major philosophical role’ played by 
Alexandre Koyré, the journal’s founder, especially for his ‘presentation of modern thought and science as 
conditioned by their metaphysical and religious premises’. Geroulanos also finds Martin Heidegger’s 
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‘approach to transcendence’ as set out in his “Vom Wesen Des Grundes” [“On The Essence of Ground”], 
and as translated and published, as above, in the first incredible volume of Recherches Philosophiques 
(1931-2)241, to have “rounded out” ‘the part played by antifoundational realism and Koyré’s study of man 
in modernity’ by ‘helped overturn the existing perception of the human being as transcending the world, so 
as to center on man’s “casting”  of this world’.242  
 
The second of Heidegger’s essays to be published in French translation, this first French publication of  
“Vom Wesen des Grundes”, under the title “De la nature de la cause”, was the work one  A. Bessey. 
Here I must give notice of having discovered, in the course of my research, yet another in the remarkable 
series of errors which continue to emerge in references to, or citations of, Henry Corbin’s translations of 
Heidegger, as In The Columbia History of Twentieth-Century French Thought, (2006) Christopher 
Delacampagne, in his essay “Heidegger in France” 243, wrongly attributes the above mentioned first French 
translation of “Vom Wesen Des Grundes” to Henry Corbin.  I can only guess that the reason for this strange 
accrual of false and references and citations is that none of these authors have considered Henry Corbin and 
his translation as the main focus of their own project. They seem therefore to have hurried, inferred, 
assumed, and only very rarely rather inattentive made forays into the original material. Thus, in the face of 
such mounting errata, while it is pleasing to note the acknowledgement of difference implicit in 
Geroulanos’ noting that Corbin’s second, Gallimard translation of “Was ist Metaphysik?” was, as he puts 
it—in a radical understatement, verging on error, since as we have noted, this was in fact a substantially 
different translation to that which appears in Bifur —‘adjusted’ to include the translation of Dasein as 
réalité humaine [sic], we are somewhat weary, but not surprised to notice that as Geroulanos now 
introduces the term réalité humaine [sic]244, in order to mount his sound and unprecedented defence of it, 
he nonetheless fails, though at least consistently (unlike, e.g., Sartre’s first edition of L’Etre et Neant), to 
include the hyphen, whether in English translation, in which language the hyphen seems a little more 
“unnatural” and unnecessary (despite which I note that Alan Bass, the English translator of Derrida’s The 
Margins of Philosophy, has chosen to consistently render his own translation of the term as “human-
reality”245) or in French246, although he does still recognise the vital significance of the (he says two) terms 
‘codependence [sic]’.  
 
As for Geroulanos’ treatment of such criticism as has been levelled at the term, Derrida’s sensational 
description of the term as “monstrous” is repeated here, along with more straightforward calumnies such as 
‘“poor”, “anthropologizing,”’ and ‘even [Janicaud’s] “execrable”’247— although rather than just being 
“thrown out there”, so to speak,  as  by e.g. Rée, Derrida’s “monstrous” is rather more shrewdly 
characterized by Geroulanos as  ‘a classically polysemous gesture.’248 Geroulanos does go so far as to 
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concede that the ‘plethora of harsh criticisms’ directed toward the term since its use by Sartre in Being and 
Nothingness, and subsequent rapid post-war decline in usage may perhaps, he says, be deserved ‘insofar as 
it humanized and concretized a term used by Heidegger to denote the “thereness” of the human being and 
its disclosure of Being, but neither its humanity nor its reality.’249 This obvious, literal objection is indeed 
hard to refute. Of Geroulanos’ remarks on the fate of “human reality” [sic] after its appearance in Sartre’s 
in Being and Nothingness, it might also be argued that it was not so much Corbin’s, but Sartre’s 
inconsistently rendered term that fell into disuse and popular disrepute, which historically nuanced 
argument bears comparison with Ethan Kleinberg’s suggestion that ‘the fundamental problem with 
Corbin’s translation of Dasein as réalité-humaine may not have seemed egregious before Sartre’s 
popularization’.250  Indeed, returning to the term’s pre-war, indeed pre-Sartrean significance, Geroulanos’ 
writes that:  
Perhaps the most appropriate term for a description of the place of man, 
following the antifoundational and realist tendencies of the early 1930s is that 
of human reality. Marking the codependence of the two terms—the 
impossibility of a reality pure of any human interaction and the lack of 
transcendental or absolute status for the human...In “human reality,” the human 
loses its separation from this reality and becomes enmeshed with it; at the same 
time, reality is designated as decidedly human, and not real by itself. 251 
We may recognise this “codependence” as what Meillasoux terms “correlationism”. 
Geroulanous continues: 
But “human reality” has a further force in 1930s thought...with Corbin’s 
translation, it now means Dasein, that is, it largely names “human reality” the 
pure thereness, nonideality, and existence that is indicated by Dasein, and thus 
adjusts both “human” and reality”...pulls away “the human” from the 
foundationalism and idealism to which it was formerly tied and for which 
“human reality” would later be unhistorically criticized 252 
Thus Geroulanos gives us to understand that the term had a dual significance in the early 1930s; while, he 
says, it ‘largely names [that] “human reality [etc]... indicated by Dasein’, what escapes this “largely” would 
largely to be accounted for by its naming of the co-dependence of the “human” and “reality” so 
characteristic of  the emergent thinking of antifoundational realism, of which, says Geroulanos, the 
‘complementarity of phenomenology and quantum physics’ formed the ground. 253 Note how closely 
Geroulanos’ characterization of the co-dependence of this antifoundational realist “human reality” accords 
with our reading, thus far, of the indispensible hyphen, the corrélation of Corbin’s réalité-humaine. Indeed, 
had Geroulanos not omitted the hyphen from his consideration of Corbin’s use of the term, it could only 
have strengthened his analysis. Considered in this light, Corbin’s choice of translation,  made in agreement 
with friends, can be read as a gesture of situating Heidegger in the then most contemporary context, by 
using the term that was most au courant, and which would then have had a matrix of resonances for the 
most contemporary, i.e., the most avant-garde readers, and but which with the passage of time would, 
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perhaps inevitably, elude later, “unhistorical” critique, as in the not-so-old adage, “You kind of had to be 
there.”  
 
In the French philosophical context of the early 1930s, writes Geroulanos,  the ‘shared hostility’ of 
‘phenomenology and theoretical physics’ toward ‘any imagination of a reality transparent to the mind’ was 
of particular significance’.  The sheer ‘epistemological novelty of these two movements, and the question 
of their role in philosophical treatments of realism’ had a great impact, ‘ most visibly in works on the 
history and philosophy of science  by Koyré and Bachelard, and most importantly in the turn to a new 
realism by Jean Wahl and Alexandre Kojève.’254  
 
Kojève and others took a particular interest in Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle, according to which in 
attempting to determine both the location and velocity of a moving electron, the physicist must bombard it 
with photons, whose energy is a) bound to impact on the movement and velocity of the electron b) in ways 
the observer cannot predict. In other words, not only is the physicist/observer inextricably implicated in the 
outcome of the experiment, their very involvement, i.e., their very attempt to measure a physical 
phenomenon a) alters the outcome of what they are attempting to measure, and b) it does so in an uncertain 
way. Thus not only can ‘the determinist foundation of post-Newtonian physics—that such a movement 
must be fully observable’, i.e., consequently predictable, ‘no longer be sustained,’ but ‘the Cartesian and 
modern construction of nature and space’, wherein the  ‘thinking, calculating observer (and his tools of 
study)’ are postulated as ‘strictly independent and separable from the objects and world of his study’, is, at 
the quantum level, quite simply proved wrong. And with the loss of this ‘transcendent observer’, writes 
Geroulanos, the ‘scientistic and positivist’255  hope that “man” may one day arrive at absolute knowledge—
i.e., the absolute “transparency” of a separate nature—is lost. In this way ‘the Copenhagen interpretation of 
quantum physics’256 which was understood to represent a ‘scientific revolution’257 also effected a 
‘philosophical paradigm shift’.258 The response of e.g., Kojève, Wahl and Bachelard was to call for a 
new—and for Kojève, far more complex—thinking of realism259 than was allowed for by the old schismatic 
‘debate between rationalism and realism’ that had characterized a great deal of  the early 20th century’s pre-
quantum era  philosophy of science, wherein a rationalism ‘allied to neocriticism and the claim that science 
proceeds from the reasoning human mind and encompasses the world as it may be understood’, was 
opposed to a realism characterised by the claim ‘that science seeks to comprehend a grand world external to 
man and proceeds  from the real data provided by this world.’ 260   For Kojève in particular, ‘the interaction 
between observing and observed systems in the milieu of a world’ (as in the Uncertainty Principle 
experiment, above) was especially interesting for the way in which ‘it reconfigures the philosophical 
conception of the subject-object relationship’. 261  
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On one hand the observed system is no less real than the observing system, and 
it is independent from the latter as regards its being; their interaction is itself 
also real. On the other hand, the totality formed by the two interacting systems 
is certainly real and “objective,”  in the sense that it exists independently as 
much of the empirical subject (the experimenter in the flesh) as from the 
gnoseological “knowing subject.”262 
Thus for Kojève, the independent realities of the observed and  observing  “systems” in the uncertainty 
principle  experiment suggest the possibility of ‘separate and complementary ontologies...one 
anthropological ontology and a separate one for the world and the things experienced by man’.263 We learn 
from Geroulanos that Kojève drew quite explicitly on ‘Heidegger’s treatment of Dasein and his rethinking 
of world and reality’ as a philosophical resource for ‘interpreting the successes and limitations of [the new] 
physics’, and vice versa.264 In ‘an elaborate 1936 note on Hegel and Heidegger’265, for example, Kojève 
reads this “ontological dualism”  of observed and observing systems into the separate-being and cor-
relation of that which Kojève refers to here as ‘the human being (Dasein)’266 and that which Kojève 
however deliberately refers to as ‘(Vorhandensein)’267, thus lending Being (-sein) 268 to Heideggerian 
Vorhandenheit269, which for Heidegger, it does not have (but which strangely accords with Corbin’s gloss 
of the ‘presential knowledge (ilm hozuri)’ of the gnoseology of the Ishrâqîyûn, in “From Heidegger to 
Suhravardî” (1978), cited in my chapter here “Corbin’s Debt to Heidegger”). Consider the above, in light of 
the following passages from Henry Corbin’s introduction to the 1938 Gallimard Edition:  
By contrast, for the existent that it allows to manifest in the horizon that it 
[réalité-humaine] projects,  the truth is essentially that of being there 
discovered [d'être mis à découvert] (Entdecktheit), ontic truth. Instead of ex-
sistance [“out-standing”] (which is always the ex-sistance of a world), the 
mode of being of the existent there discovered in the world is that of an in-
sistance [“in-standing”] in that world. It is that which, as opposed to réalité-
humaine, forms reality-as-given, the reality-of-subsistent-things [réalité-des-
choses subsistantes] (Vorhandenheit), and the encircling range of utensile-
reality [réalité-ustensile]  (Zuhandenheit), all of those objects whose reality is 
revealed in the usage, in a " for ... " . 
Compare, e.g., the independent being of Kojève’s “observed system”, and the “ontic truth” of Corbin’s 
d'être mis à découvert [being there discovered]. Compare  also the ontological truth (Corbin) with the 
“observing system” (Kojève), and the following excerpt from Corbin’s consideration of his translation of 
Dasein as réalité-humaine in the much later “From Heidegger to Suhravardî” (1978): 
Da-sein: being-there, this is understood.  But being-there, is essentially to be 
enacting a presence, enactment of that presence by which and for which 
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meaning is revealed in the present.  The modality of this human presence is 
thus to be revelatory, but in such a way that, in revealing the meaning, it 
reveals itself, and is that which is revealed.270 
Of course, they are both reading (into) the same Heideggerian ontology, but it  all gets much more 
interesting again when Geroulanos  offers the revelation, based on his research into Kojève’s archive, 
Corbin’s “human reality” [sic], was not, as we may have supposed his own  coinage but apparently a 
precedent established by Alexandre Kojève, in his ‘use of the term to translate Heidegger’s Dasein in his 
early, unpublished work’ (no date is provided),271 which ‘his collaborator and student Henri Corbin’272 is 
said by Geroulanos to have adopted. This claim certainly accords well enough with Corbin’s statement that 
the translation of Dasein as réalité-humaine was made ‘in agreement with our friends’.273  As for whose 
usage followed whose, without clear evidence to hand we shall have to trust in the scholarly ethics and 
good judgement of Geroulanos, but all of this does also suggest, via Kojève, a possible Heisenbergian 
influence on Corbin’s translation of Heidegger, as part of (as before) a wider contextual influence and 
inflection. Otherwise, considering again the above passage from “From Heidegger to Suhravardî”  it is 
perhaps worth asking why Corbin did not choose a more literal translation. Why not “être-la”? After all, he 
writes: ‘being-there [être-la]. This is understood. But...’. Why “But”? Why go further? Corbin quite clearly 
acknowledges the self-sufficiency of Dasein, as such. —‘But’— but, for him, it doesn’t say quite enough. 
From our earlier reading of his “Translator’s Preface” to the Gallimard Edition, in light of the above 
defence, it seems clear that the “more” Corbin determined ought to be translated into the naming of the 
Heideggerian existant, is, on the one hand, more of Heidegger, and more of Dasein in particular: by which I 
mean, more of the pro-jective aspect of Da-sein’s thrown-ness, more of the trans-scendent nature of Dasein, 
i.e., more of the “new transcendence” that Heidegger’s work, e.g., his “Vom Wesen Des Grundes” (included 
in the Gallimard translation) had to offer in place of the old, classical, transcendence: more of the potential 
that Heidegger’s work had for the thinkers of this other “human reality” [sic], i.e., that native to the French 
philosophical climate of the early 1930s. On the other hand, by his using their term,  “human reality”  for 
Dasein, albeit with it’s  proprietary, Corbininan-Heideggerian hyphen,  he was thus at once, as it were, 
situating, or orienting, Heidegger’s Dasein, in-relation-to the French philosophical avant-garde, as if to say, 
to those readers with a suitably nuanced grasp of all this, “Here is one of ours”. If so, it could be said that 
Corbin was exceeding his “pure” remit as translator. But only a hasty, unhistorical, ahistorical, or, at the 
time, “unhip” reading of his translation could find, e.g., a humanist human—i.e., a Cartesian ‘human 
subject’274 in Corbin’s réalité-humaine. As ever, Talem eum vidi qualem capere potui. Again, in the words 
of Sartre: ‘It was for us that Corbin made the translation.’ 275 
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Chapter Three: Corbin’s Debt to Heidegger 
 
Having previously traversed the course of the “Biographical Post-Scriptum”, we now double back to the 
text to which it is appended, namely the 1976 interview transcript, “From Heidegger to Suhravardî”, in 
which Corbin states that in order to ‘facilitate understanding of just what has been [his] work and [his] 
quest’, he finds it ‘agreeable, and moreover necessary’, to set out precisely what he ‘owe[s] to Heidegger’, 
and what of Heidegger he has ‘kept with [him] during a lifetime of investigations’.276 This is no tautology, 
or merely rhetorical distinction; there is a inherent difference, if by “owe” we might understand something 
like “that which I have appropriated”; in that some of the Heidegger he has “kept with him”, he represents 
here, as elsewhere, precisely in order to refute on theosophical grounds; thus, not so much a debt, this, a 
self-given obligation. The question of whether, and if so, then what, where, and to what extent Corbin may 
be said to have appropriated Heidegger—according to Robert C. Scharff’s definition of appropriation, 
given here in relation to Heidegger’s own appropriation of Dilthey as being ‘as much a matter of taking up 
and taking further as it is a matter of taking over and continuing what has already come to be’277—and 
where Corbin has rather recalled Heidegger, precisely in order to differ from him entirely, is what is at 
stake here.  
 
Corbin himself states, quite clearly, in “From Heidegger to Suhravardî” that when he refers to “the works 
of Heidegger” therein, he means only those that he had at his disposal by the time of the publication of the 
Gallimard Edition of Qu’est-ce que la métaphysique?  in 1938, already a substantial (and paradigm-
shifting) oeuvre. Healthy scepticism alone would constitute a more than adequate ground to set about 
testing this claim of Corbin’s; however, such a vast undertaking (considering the volume of both 
Heidegger’s and Corbin’s collected works post-1938) exceeds the scope of the thesis.  I am rather gladly 
inclined to take Corbin’s insistence on this point as a guide, and have chosen to further confine those 
Heideggerian texts to which I refer in this reading of “From Heidegger to Suhravardî” to those explicitly 
mentioned by name therein, and those that appear in the Gallimard translation, which are, in order of 
appearance: What is Metaphysics? (1929); On the Essence of Ground (1929); Chapter I and subsections 72-
76 of Chapter V of Division Two of Being and Time (1927); Part 4 of “the Kant book”, i.e.,  Kant and the 
Problem of Metaphysics (1929), and notes from a conference on Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry, 
which last I have presumed to set aside here. 
 
I am nonetheless bound to mention here, however, that, as has been noted in my chapter “From Paris to 
Teheran”, Stella Corbin states that her husband Henry continued to work on his translation of Being and 
Time while in Istanbul278, where he was assigned from 1939-1945 in order to compile an edition of 
Suhravardî manuscripts in Arabic and Persian. This strongly suggests that Corbin may have embarked upon 
a complete translation of the work, or if not then perhaps at least to reworking and/or expanding upon the 
excerpts he translated for the 1938 Gallimard Edition. It is highly significant, both in terms of what of 
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Heidegger Corbin may have “kept with him”, of Heidegger, and for Corbin scholarship in more general 
terms, to note that he was working on both Heidegger and Suhravardî in this period. We also know from 
the “Post-Scriptum” that Corbin’s own student copy of Being and Time was replete with Arabic marginalia.  
 
Corbin opens the main discussion in “From Heidegger to Suhravardî” by stating that, for him, ‘Heidegger’s 
great merit will remain in his having centred the act of philosophizing in hermeneutics... a term borrowed 
directly from the Greek and one that has its common usage among biblical specialists.’  He continues:  
We owe the technical definition to Aristotle: the title of his treatise peri 
hermenêias was translated into Latin as De interpretatione. ...in contemporary 
philosophical parlance hermeneutics is that which, in German, is called das 
Verstehen...the art or technique of “Understanding”, as this was understood by 
Dilthey. 279 
Here Corbin’s apparently general definition of hermeneutics in fact pertains directly to Heidegger, via the 
Dilthey reference, as follows. As Robert Scharff notes, in his 1997 essay “Heidegger’s “Appropriation of 
Dilthey before Being and Time”; in his ‘famous [1923] Time-lecture to the Marburg Theological 
Society’280, Heidegger announced as ‘“the first principle of hermeneutics” that gaining access to history 
rests upon understanding what it means to be historical’.281 Just a few years later, in Section 77 of Chapter 
V of Being and Time, “Temporality and Historicity”282, Heidegger attributes his own arrival at this 
understanding of hermeneutics to  his  appropriation of the work of Dilthey, just as, in the introduction to 
Chapter V, he states the sole ‘issue’ of  the analysis contained therein to be the furtherance of the adoption 
of Dilthey’s own pioneering research.283 Scharff, again writing in 1997, states that recent Heidegger 
scholarship, including ‘reconstructions of  [his] early lecture courses’ shows not only that the process of 
Heidegger’s appropriation of Dilthey ‘took nearly ten years’, during and ‘in terms of’ which ‘appropriation 
process...Heidegger first worked out his conception of philosophy  as a “hermeneutical way”’, but 
moreover that ‘the first, or what Kisiel calls the “Dilthey Draft”’284 of Being and Time285 itself began life as 
‘a projected review article of the Dilthey-Yorck Correspondence’, which then got entirely out of hand.286 In 
other words, it seems that Heidegger’s “appropriation” of Dilthey, with the aforementioned review at its 
epicentre, was the very kernel and whorled impetus from which the whole first book of Being and Time 
itself was, as it were, flung out;287 eventually coming to figure within its edifice as Chapter V, “Temporality 
and Historicity”: this being one of the two excerpts of Being and Time that Corbin translated for the 
Gallimard Edition of Qu’est-ce que la métaphysique?, albeit excluding its final Section 77, entitled “The 
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connection of the foregoing exposition of the problem of historicality with the researches of Wilhelm 
Dilthey and the ideas of Count Yorck” 288, a vestige of the germinal review, above,  cast aside for the 
Gallimard translation yet with which Corbin is undoubtedly also familiar.  
 
Returning to “From Heidegger to Suhravardî”; having  now declared the ‘direct link between the Verstehen 
as hermeneutic in Dilthey’s “Comprehensive Philosophy”’ and Heidegger’s analytic of Dasein,  Corbin 
traces the origin of Dilthey’s concept of hermeneutics, in turn, from his own reading of ‘Schleiermacher, 
the great theologian of the German Romantic period’,289290 going on to state that it is precisely in ‘the 
filiation of hermeneutics itself passing through the theologian Schleiermacher’ that ‘the theological origins, 
namely Protestant, of the concept of hermeneutics that we use in philosophical circles today’ may be 
relocated. That a relocation of ‘this link between hermeneutics and theology’ appears necessary to Corbin 
derives from his ‘impression’ that ‘unfortunately...our young Heideggerians have somewhat lost sight [of 
it].’ This “loss to sight” he attributes291 to the very ‘idea of theology...that holds sway today, in France  as 
elsewhere’ and which by its nature appears to Corbin to obscure this connection itself, in its very 
possibility.  Here, I believe Corbin is referring to the triumph of religious orthodoxy, and the concomitant 
exclusion and neglect of esoterism and “prophetic hermeneutics” that Corbin finds to derive in large part 
from the uniquely Christian dogma of fleshly Incarnation, and the subsequent phenomenon of social, i.e., 
ecclesiastical Incarnation, and theology as dogmatic mediation, as he sets out in Alone With The Alone, e.g.. 
 
Thus, in order to restore the connection to sight, i.e., that between theology and hermeneutics, for Corbin it 
is not sufficient merely to somehow jog the collective philosophical memory, by e.g., retracing the filiation 
of philosophical hermeneutics, as above, but requires the restoration of an ‘altogether different...idea of 
theology’ itself, one whose connection to philosophical hermeneutics may more easily be countenanced. 
Here, we arrive at one of the abiding Corbinian themes—appropriately framed within the familiar 
Heideggerian device of the Wiederholung (“retrieval/revival”)—as such a restoration, for Corbin, may 
ultimately only be achieved via ‘the concurrence of the hermeneutics practiced within the Religions of the 
Book: Judaism, Christianity, Islam’ which ‘from the very outset’ have ‘put into play the same themes and 
vocabulary familiar to phenomenology’, because, for Corbin, ‘it is therein that hermeneutics has developed 
as a spontaneous exegesis’, and thus ‘therein lies reserved its future palingenesis.’ 292  
 
But why? as Corbin both rhetorically asks, and answers.  Not only because, as we shall see, for Corbin, as 
for Heidegger, according to Giorgio Agamben: ‘the origin [in Greek, arkhē, meaning at once origin and 
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commandment] never ceases beginning; that is to say, never ceases to govern and command what it has 
initiated’293, apparently regardless of whether it may be lost to sight—but also, specifically, here for Corbin 
Because therein one is in possession of a Book upon which all depends.  It is 
indeed a question of understanding the meaning, but of understanding the true 
meaning.  Three things to consider: there is the act of understanding, there is 
the phenomenon of the meaning, and there is the unveiling or revelation of the 
truth of this meaning.  Now, are we to understand by this “true” meaning that 
which we currently call the historical meaning, or rather a meaning that refers 
us to an altogether other level than that of History as the word is commonly 
understood? 294   
Corbin now states that if he himself lays claim to phenomenology, ‘it is because philosophical 
hermeneutics is essentially the key that opens the hidden meaning (etymologically the esoteric) underlying 
the exoteric statement.’ However, while he is happy to state that he found his way to hermeneutics via 
Heidegger, Corbin rejects  the ‘“virtuous insinuations”’ of syncretism levelled at him by ‘certain historians’ 
on the grounds that he had “mixed up” Heidegger with Suhravardî.’ Corbin states for the record that he has 
not used ‘Heidegger as a key’ during his own hermeneutic explorations, having rather made use of ‘the 
same key that [Heidegger] himself had made use of, and which was at everyone’s disposition’: i.e., the 
clavis hermeneutica. The appropriate question, for Corbin, is therefore rather that of the extent to which 
‘the Heideggerian hermeneutic, a distant offspring of Schleiermacher’ figured for him as ‘the threshold of 
an integral hermeneutics.’295 
 
While Henry Corbin arrived at Marburg University well after Heidegger himself departed for Freiburg, any 
doubt as to whether Corbin is acquainted with earlier Heideggerian works than those he translated for the  
Gallimard Edition is removed, when, continuing with the theme of hermeneutics, he commends 
Heidegger’s 1916 habiliation thesis on Duns Scotus’ Theory of the Categories and of Meaning 296 to the 
reader’s attention, having himself found those of its pages concerned with the significatio passiva both 
‘illuminating’ and, indeed, immediately useful upon being asked ‘to stand in for [his] dear departed friend 
Alexandre Koyré at the Section of Religious Sciences in the Ecole des Hautes Etudes’ from 1937-1939, 
and ‘discourse upon Lutheran hermeneutics’. 297 E.g. (Heidegger): 
 The term modus significandi can be understood either as the modus 
signficandi activus or the modus significandi passivus. The modus activus is 
the act of meaning as an accomplishment of consciousness.  It is called this 
because the bestowal of meaning by the apprehending consciousness is “like an 
action”.  The modus passivus means the result of the accomplishment, the 
objective correlate of the act, which Lotze designates as impression, immediate 
givenness to the extent it is conceived of in the measure of meaning, that is, is 
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informed.  The modus activus is nothing else than the subjective side, the 
modus passivus being the objective side of meaning.’ 298 
 
For it is Corbin’s conviction that the ‘notion’ of the significatio passiva ‘dominates the hermeneutics of the 
young Luther’, as in the following example: 
  Confronting the psalm verse “In justitutia tua libera me” the young Luther 
asks:  How can divine justice, the aspect of Righteousness opposed to that of 
Mercy, be the instrument of deliverance?  There is no way out of this quandary 
so long as we consider this justice as an attribute that we confer upon God 
Himself.  Everything changes, however, as soon as we consider it in its 
significatio passiva.  By this we mean that justice by which we are made to be 
just. 299  
That is to say, ‘the divine quality is only manifest to the extent that it is invested in the person’. 300 
Discoursing of hermeneutic keys, the ‘key of the significatio passiva’ (which will prove indispensable to 
our imminent reading of “Corbin’s Imaginal”),  now serves to open a way, in the text of “From Heidegger 
to Suhravardî”, to the ‘mystical philosophy’ of Islam; in many of whose ‘great tracts’ Corbin says he has 
also ‘run across this same hermeneutic situation’, and whose ‘specificity’ he was able to recognise as such, 
thanks to his already having the “key” in question to hand.   
A simple example: the advent of Being in this theosophy consists in putting 
Being in the imperative... .That which is primary is neither the ens nor the esse, 
but the esto. “Be!” This imperative inaugurator of “Being”, this is the divine 
imperative in its active aspect (amr fi’lî); but considered in the “being” that it 
makes “to be”, the “being” that we are, none other than this same imperative, 
but in its significatio passiva (amr maf’ûli). 301 
In this triple citation by Corbin, of Luther, Islamic theosophy and Heidegger’s own habiliation thesis on 
Duns Scotus, we have our first intimation of what we might call Corbin’s “vertical correlationism”, that 
of/between Be!ing and be!ing, which, for him, intersects the “horizontal” correlation of Dasein, opening the 
“closed hermeneutic circle” to a creative infinitude.  
 
Cf. also Giorgio Agamben—who in his lecture “What is a Commandment?” (ibid.) prefers to translate the 
biblical en arkhē ēn ho Lógos as ‘in the commandment was the word’, leaning, as it were, on this “side” of 
the term’s etymological ambiguity, in emphatic recognition of this Be! as the original commandment and 
Begin!ing.  Corbin’s deliberately chosen, most original example of the significatio passiva, the very arkhē-
type of all others, at work in Islamic philosophy as in all three of the Bookish monotheisms, when read in 
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parallel with Corbin’s preceding Lutheran exposition of the significatio passiva—wherein human justice, or 
just-being is the outcome of the divine imperative Justice—i.e., Be just!  in its significatio passiva—
necessitates that beings, as creatures of the divine imperative Be! are thus to be understood not merely as 
created-beings, but as be!ings of Be!ing in significatio passiva, i.e., as creative-creatures of divine 
creativity—also illuminates Corbin’s own reading of, “debt” and relation to Heidegger; whose own 
‘conception of the history of being’ is defined, again according to Agamben, by the formulation, ‘intrinsic 
to our culture’, wherein ‘the arkhē, the origin [the beginning] is always already...the foundation that 
commands and rules’302, as may certainly be seen at work even in Heidegger’s impulse towards 
Wiederholung, driving the “violence” of his own arkhē-logy.  
 
Where Heidegger touches on theological genesis in Part 4 of the Kant book, however, he does so in order to 
state  that even were the “impossible possibility” of a rational proof of ‘a Being-created of man’ possible, 
then even by thus characterizing ‘man as an ens creatum’303 we would still 'only prove once more the fact 
of his finitude’, precisely as a created-being, which we might understand in terms of the “dependency” of 
the created-being on being created; this however is still a rather useless proof for Heidegger’s own agenda, 
as he says it would neither exhibit the essence of finitude, nor ‘determine this essence to be the basic 
constitution of the being of man’. For Heidegger, underlying the question of First Philosophy, that of 
“What is being as such?”, i.e., the “question of being”, lies the yet more original ‘Question of Being’, i.e., 
that of “What is Being as such?"; where Being, as the “Being of being”, is that which ‘generally determines 
the being as being’. 304 Note, this is still a relation of dependency; wherein being is dependent on Being 
for/as that which determines its beingness.  
 
Thus, while in “What is Metaphysics?”, however, Heidegger’s whole proof of finitude hinges on  Being’s 
Creative-Being, i.e., on the doctrine of creation ex nihilo, in Part 4 of the Kant book, the Heideggerian 
“Being of beings”, as that which makes beings beings, i.e., ‘that which determines beings as such’, appears 
to hold only a passing similarity to the amr fi’lî (Be!ing) of what Corbin calls “mystical Islamic 
philosophy”, in relation to ‘the “being” that it makes “to be”, amr maf’ûli’.305 Here (in Part 4 of the Kant 
book) Heideggerian Being is not classed here as “creative”, but merely “determinant”, such that my 
paraphrastic resort, above, to the term “makes”, in describing Heideggerian Being as “that which makes 
beings beings”, appears imprecise and misleading.  
 
The comparison of Corbin’s theosophical “Be!ing and be!ing”, (i.e., be!ing as  Be!ing in significatio 
passiva) with Heideggerian “Being and being” as set out in the Kantbook thus recalls Corbin’s remark, in 
“From Heidegger to Suhravardî” that he is ‘left with the impression...formulated by a colleague’306 that ‘the 
Heideggerian hermeneutic gives the impression of a theology without theophany.’307  
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While for the duration of Heidegger’s essay “What is Metaphysics?” Being is restored to its creative 
theological function  as the Summum Ens, it is only so as to facilitate Heidegger’s proof of the finitude of 
Being itself, per se, according to the doctrine of creation ex nihilo. However, in its very dependency upon 
the doctrine of creation ex nihilo, this proof, at once “outs” and implies a critique of the doctrine itself, as 
follows.  
 
 In the following passage from “What is Metaphysics?”, Heidegger states that in contrast to ‘ancient 
metaphysics’, which, he says, ‘conceives the nothing in the sense of nonbeing, that is, unformed matter, 
matter which cannot take form as an in-formed being that would offer an outward appearance or aspect 
(eidos)’:  
Christian dogma denies the truth of the proposition ex nihilo nihil fit and 
thereby bestows on the nothing a transformed significance, the sense of the 
complete absence of beings apart from God: ex nihilo fit—ens creatum. Now 
the nothing becomes the counter-concept to being proper, the summum ens, 
Gods as ens creatum. ... no one is bothered by the difficulty that if God creates 
out of nothing precisely He must be able to relate Himself to the nothing. But if 
God is God he cannot know the nothing, assuming that the “Absolute” 
excludes nothingness. 
 
Thus for Heidegger even this ‘cursory historical review’ ‘awakens for the first time the proper formulation 
of the metaphysical question concerning the Being of beings’, and problematizes the nothing, which may 
no longer remain as ‘the indeterminate opposite of beings but reveals itself as belonging to the Being of 
beings’, i.e., it introduces limit, finitude, to the essence of Being itself; thus problematizing creation ex 
nihilo. (Unless I am missing something), it seems rather easy to see how the significatio passiva would 
solve this theological problem. If be!ing is Be!ing, simply another mode of Be!ing, then the nothing, the 
nihilo, has nothing to do with it.   
 
Heidegger’s intention here is not to solve the problem at all; instead he relentlessly pushes this traditional, 
dogmatic construction  to auto-destruction; that is, to the destruction of Creative Being as Absolute, and 
thus down comes the whole edifice.  At the same time, however,  he relies on the doctrine of creatio ex 
nihilo in “What is Metaphysics?” for his own proof of finitude, even while he is destroying the doctrine 
itself. He then takes his proof of finitude, so obtained, and as the saying goes, “runs with it”, having just 
torn the dogmatic Christian Creator God “out of the sky”, to be consumed by the nihil.  The question 
remains whether Heidegger is really treating of “the numinous itself” here, or, rather, as in the essay’s title, 
the tradition of metaphysics itself.  God is only gone into nothingness if this—the dogma of creation ex 
nihilo, that is—is the only theological formulation available to you. Here, it seems to me, is a point where 
Corbin’s putative left and right Heideggerianisms, anticipated in “From Heidegger to Suhravardî”, might 
diverge; one in which the death of God has just been effected, and the other in which it which the 
limitations of dogmatic Christian theology, and the traditional metaphysics grounded upon it, have just 
been rehearsed/announced.  
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If, when in “What is Metaphysics”  Heidegger raises the traditional conception of God as the Summum Ens 
to allow, he says, for ‘the proper formulation of the metaphysical question concerning the Being of 
beings’,308 then in stating that ‘the nothing reveals itself as belonging to the Being of beings’, Heidegger 
has announced nothing less than the nihilation of God.  Where God/the Summum Ens must figure as an 
Absolute, and where the Absolute must figure as that which is without dependency, without relation, this 
mere relationality alone, never mind that it is to the Nothing, is a(n)nihilation. As such, Heidegger’s canting 
recitation of the dual and exclusive concern of “scientific man”, as founded in the doctrine of creation ex 
nihilo, as ‘...beings only, and besides that—nothing; beings alone, and further—nothing; solely beings, and 
beyond that—nothing’309; as the “dependent” creature Dasein is dangled out into the void (cf. ‘Latin 
dependere, from de- ‘down’ + pendere ‘hang’’310) only seems to echo and ever amplify the nothing as 
absence of God; yet, it is in fact precisely and only a God, i.e., the conception of God as the Summum Ens 
which has been annihilated; the Absolute dissolving, by definition, into the finitude of its very “in relation 
to”. The potential for nihilism is clear, for those for whom the traditional metaphysical, i.e., the dogmatic 
theological construct of creatio ex nihilo is the whole and the only paradigm.  Doubtless many have read 
Heidegger in this way, yet his working out of “Absolute Finitude” does not preclude the possibility of a 
theos absolutely. While Being persists, as it does throughout “What is Metaphysics?” precisely as the 
Summum Ens and in relation to the Nothing, as such it is neither Absolute, nor theos, according to 
Heidegger’s proof,  above: that is, if theos, i.e., God as Being/the Summum Ens, is required to be Absolute. 
Thus, conversely, theos/Absolute is not Being. Thus the Absolute Is not; and round about here, as the verb 
“to be”, runs out of usefulness in relation to theos/the Absolute, in any further attempt to determine what 
theos/the Absolute might “be” if theos/the Absolute is not, we begin to approach the terrain of, e.g., 
Corbin’s late essay, “Apophantic Theology as an Antidote to Nihilism.” 311   If, however, Be!ing and be!ing 
are (“vertically correlated”) modes of the same Creative Imperative Be! then the Absolute/theos may be 
Be!ing—note here not just the imperative, but also the gerund form—but “Is” “something” other than the 
Being of traditional metaphysics entirely—“something” that “is” not. Ineffably so.  
 
Thus if Heidegger is announcing a “death” of God here, it is  an inevitable death of God as conceived by, 
and intrinsic to the “playing out” of the same metaphysical tradition whose very “Whatness” (and 
“Whyness”, even as in “Why this conception of God and not another?”) is put into question here: 
implicitly, by Heidegger, through his merry destruction of it, and explicitly by Henry Corbin.  It is a death 
of the God as the Summum Ens of traditional metaphysics, as informed by dogmatic Christian doctrine. 
“This and nothing more”.  
 
Acknowledging Heidegger’s awareness of ‘the difficulty...which arises’ re the question of  ‘the relation 
between the Summum Ens and the non-ens, the nihil, the nothingness, when we say that the ens creatum is 
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created ex nihilo, from nothingness, by the Ens increatum’, Corbin states in “From Heidegger to 
Suhravardî” that ‘Here we are touching upon a fundamental difficulty, so radical in fact, that it throws in 
question the very meaning of monotheism.’ In his opinion, the best “observation” of this difficulty has been 
carried out by ‘the Islamic “theosophers” whose unparalleled vigilance stems’, he believes, ‘from the fact 
that the horizon of Islamic thought and spirituality is dominated by the tawhîd, the affirmation of the 
Unique.’ And what’, he asks rhetorically, ‘is the nature of this “Unique”?’  
 In Islamic theosophy, Ibn ‘Arabi (XIIIth century) firmly established the 
difference between the theological tawhîd (olûhî) and the ontological tawhîd 
(wojûdî).  The exoteric theological tawhîd effectively affirms the “Unicity” or 
Oneness of God as Ens Supremum, as the Existent which dominates all other 
existents.  The esoteric ontological tawhîd affirms the transcendental “Unicity” 
or Oneness of Existence/Being.  Existence/Being or the Esse, is essentially one 
and unique.  The beings (existents) which Existence actualizes in their very act 
of being are essentially multiple.  The one and unique Existence, and the one 
and unique Divine Existent, ineffable in the depths of its mystery, is the [Deus] 
Absconditum and can only be addressed from afar by an apophantic or negative 
theology.  It cannot be positively known except in its theophanies: the 
Theophany itself is therefore essential for an affirmative theology to be 
possible. 312 
Alas, says Corbin, even for many Sufis and thus many Orientalists after them, ‘a catastrophic confusion’ 
has been prone to arise ‘between the Esse or Existence/Being (wojûd in the Arabic) and the Ens or the 
Existent (mawjûd in the Arabic).’ And with that, Corbin states his firm conviction that  ‘here, no question, 
we have not left Heidegger’s company’, though as to whether he means to imply here that Heidegger 
himself may have suffered such confusion, or rather that, in following his “working through” of this 
traditional “confusion” to its inevitable conclusions, some of Heidegger’s interpreters may have got 
snagged, and remained “confused”, Corbin remains politely oblique.  
 
If the making ‘of God a Summum Ens, the Ens unicum, the unique existent being’ causes ‘all the other 
existent beings [to] fall into abysmal indifferentiation and nothingness’, as in Heidegger’s “What is 
Metaphysics”, then, the beings of a metaphysics suddenly bereft of God as Being, are alone with nothing 
qua nothing, pro-jected into the nihil a quo nihil fit of ‘nihilism plain and simple’.313  Corbin’s pressing 
desire to find an ‘antidote’ to nihilism, to rescue ‘all other existent beings’ from this abyss, then the “death” 
of not only this God, but this dogmatic theology continues to appear not only inevitable, but quite 
necessary: clearing a way not for nihilism, however, but for an apophantic theology, in which “the nothing” 
may figure as the nihil a quo omnia procedunt; the nothing of the Absconditum, i.e.,  “the nothing from 
which everything proceeds”.  Thus the destruction, or auto-destruction of the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo 
as intrinsic to the whole paradigm of traditional metaphysics, which is proclaimed and witnessed, even set 
in motion by Heidegger in his “What is Metaphysics?” is a moment of great potential for Corbin.  
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Returning to where we left off in “From Heidegger to Suhravardî”, and Corbin’s discourse on 
hermeneutics, Corbin’s exposition of the significatio passiva in Lutheran terms of divine and human 
Justice, e.g., serves to illustrate and conclude his case for ‘hermeneutics as Verstehen, meaning that that 
which we truly understand is never other than that by which we are tried, that which we undergo, which we 
suffer and toil with in our very being’.   As such, says Corbin, hermeneutics ‘does not consist in 
deliberating upon concepts’.  Rather, in a passage which makes the kinship, for Corbin, of this 
‘hermeneutics as Verstehen’ (Protestant in origin) and the ta’wil of Corbin’s “mystic [Islamic] 
theosophers”, quite apparent; as will become clear in “Corbin’s Imaginal” , Corbin states that: 
it is essentially the unveiling or revelation of that which is happening within us, 
the unveiling of that which causes us to emit such or such concept, vision, 
projection, when our passion becomes action; it is an active undergoing, a 
prophetic-poietic undertaking.314 
Moving on, in “From Heidegger to Suhravardî”, Corbin recalls how, like so many others he awaited the 
imminent publication of a sequel to the first book of Being and Time, though with the special personal 
circumstance that, during his second, 1936 meeting with Heidegger over the Gallimard translation, Corbin 
states that Heidegger placed in his hands the now firmly lost, i.e., never published, whereabouts-unknown, 
effectively occulted manuscript of the second book of Being and Time, half joking that Corbin might heft 
the weight of it. For his part, though he has no more idea what may have come of this manuscript than 
anyone else, Corbin avows his certainty, and certainly his wish, that it would ‘have completed the 
ontological edifice of what we have referred to as the “historial’ in Being and Time’ (cf. Chapter 5, 
included in the Gallimard translation), but which without it, for  Corbin, is ‘nought but an arch deprived of 
its spring’.  Instead, we are left to “make do” with the Kant book, i.e., Kant and The Problem of 
Metaphysics. 
 
Written up in ‘three weeks of uninterrupted work’315 immediately following the Davoser Hochschule 
(March 17-April 6, 1929), the Kant book is said to have been based on Heidegger’s ‘preparatory work’ for 
his Davos lectures,316 and the notorious disputation there with Ernst Cassirer on what the book’s English 
translator says were ‘some of [what were to become] the [Kant book’s] more controversial aspects’317. In 
the preface to the First Edition, Heidegger states quite clearly that ‘This interpretation of the Critique of 
Pure Reason arose in connection with a first working-out of Part Two of Being and Time’, and as such 
should serve as ‘a “historical” introduction of sorts to clarify the problematic treated in the first half of 
Being and Time’318. On these grounds319 Heidegger commends the Kant book to the reader as ‘a fitting 
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supplement to that book’,320 though the proffered ‘“historical” introduction’ is an altogether different 
proposition than the historial “completion” Corbin was hoping for.  Furthermore, unlike the essay “What is 
Metaphysics?” the emphasis and insistence on the horizon of finitude for Dasein in the Kant book’s 
conclusive, “ground-laying” Part 4— in which the “bridge” between the two projects of Being and Time 
and the Kant book is most explicitly outlined, and which is the only part of the Kant book included in the 
Gallimard translation —marks the point of, as it necessitates Corbin’s parting from Heidegger’s way. We 
should note again here that these two texts: “What is Metaphysics?” and Part 4 of the Kant book, appear 
consecutively, in that order, in Corbin’s 1938 Gallimard translation.  
 
Heidegger introduces this fourth and final part of the Kant book, entitled “The Laying of the Ground of 
Metaphysics in a Retrieval”, by stating that if the result of investigation contained therein were “merely”, as 
it may have seemed thus far, only his finding for ‘the transcendental power of imagination as the ground for 
the inner possibility of ontological synthesis’,  there would have been no need to do more than cite ‘the 
appropriate quotations’ from Kant’s Transcendental Deduction and Transcendental Schematism. So, then, 
he asks rhetorically, what has been the point of all this effort, i.e., ‘what else is the ground-laying to yield?’ 
The answer, he says, is a grounding of his own “fundamental ontology”, in light of  revelations made in the  
Kant book’s three preceding Parts concerning the essential finitude of Dasein. For, he says, ‘What occurs in 
the Kantian ground-laying...[is] nothing less than...the grounding of the inner possibility of ontology as 
brought about as an unveiling of transcendence, i.e., [an unveiling] of the subjectivity of the human 
subject.’  
 
According to Heidegger, the ‘more original form’ in which Kant, in ‘the Critique of Pure Reason’ brings to 
light that which was previously offered in Kant’s Anthropology, toward ‘the interpretation of knowledge 
and its two sources’, shows the Anthropology itself to be ‘[in]adequate for the transcendental problematic’. 
It is, he says, ‘not pure’; thus making the ‘demand for an adequate, i.e., a “philosophical anthropology” for 
the purpose of a laying of the ground of metaphysics even more pressing.’ 321  
 
The urgency and attraction of a new, “philosophical anthropology” for French philosophers of the late 
1920s and 1930s has already been touched on in here in the chapter “From Paris to Teheran”.  In his letter 
of July 15th to Gertrud Bing of the Warburg Library, 1933, Corbin refers to  those ‘philosophemes’ which 
he says he is currently attempting to ‘systematize via philosophical anthropology, i.e., the crisis of 
historicism and phenomenological ontology!’322 I cannot help but recall the high hopes Corbin professed to 
hold for the “other”, lost, second book of Being and Time.In Part 4 of the Kant book, however, the 
necessary constitution of such a new philosophical anthropology is not Heidegger’s main priority, and, as 
it, too, is shortly deemed inadequate—as not sufficiently ‘pure’, or fundamental as the real question at 
hand, it too is soon aside  here323.   
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Extra to the three “fundamental” questions posed by Kant, in the Critique of Pure Reason as together 
uniting ‘all the interests of my reason, both speculative and practical’324—which Heidegger notes also 
correspond, or rather are ‘associated with the three divisions of authentic metaphysics as Metaphysica 
Specialis’, namely Cosmology, Psychology, and Theology—i.e., those of  
 
1. What can I know? 
2. What should I do? 
3. What may I hope ? 
 
Heidegger insists that (as per Kant’s development of the concept of ‘Philosophy in general’ in the 
Introduction to his lectures on Logic, 325) a fourth, more “fundamentally fundamental” question must be 
asked here, to which he says the above three questions evidently refer, i.e.: 
 
4. What is the human being?  
 
 By their reference to, i.e., their dependence upon, this fourth and more fundamental question of 
“philosophy in general”, a reversal is effected so that the fourth is ‘transformed into the first, which then 
discharges the remaining three from itself’. Heidegger characterises the first three questions by stating that 
in each case: 
What is asked about is what can be placed in the expectation and what cannot. 
All expecting, however, needs a privation. If this neediness even arises in the 
innermost interests of human reason, then it attests to that reason as one which 
is essentially finite.  
But human reason does not just disclose finitude in these questions; rather its 
innermost interest is with finitude itself. ...it is not a matter of doing away with 
the ability, duty, and allowing [to hope], in this way to extinguish finitude, but 
rather the reverse.  It is precisely a question of becoming certain of this finitude 
in order to hold oneself in it.  
Accordingly, finitude does not depend simply upon human reason but instead 
its finitude is perishing [Verendlichung] i.e., “Care” about the potentiality-to-
be-finite. 326 
Thus, he continues, it is ‘because these three questions ask about this one [problem], finitude’, they not 
only ‘“let themselves be related” to the fourth: What is a human being?’, but precisely in their relation to it, 
insist upon the transformation of this fourth/first question itself into a question ‘about the finitude in human 
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beings’327. Human reason is not finite because it poses the three questions, but quite the reverse: it poses 
these questions because it is finite. 
 
In this way for Heidegger, the ‘laying of the ground for metaphysics’, in ‘a “disentangling” (analytic) of 
our knowledge, i.e., of finite knowledge, into its elements’ (which analytic Kant, in the Critique of Pure 
Reason calls “a study of our inner nature”) insists that ‘the “inner nature” of “our” self as the finitude in 
human beings is made into a problem.’ 328  
 
The next task at hand, for Heidegger is “The Problem of a Possible Determination of Finitude in Human 
Beings”, for, regardless of the fact that ‘the finitude of human beings [is] evident everywhere and always in 
a thousand different ways’329, it  sufficing, for Heidegger, ‘to cite any of our imperfections’: as for ‘wherein 
the essence of this finitude exists’, however, and ‘how this finitude completely determines the human being 
from the ground up as the being that it is’, Heidegger finds any attempt to conceptualise the essence of 
human finitude per se by the method of aggregating ‘all human imperfections and abstracting what is 
common to them’ to be wholly unreliable, on the grounds of the possibility that such imperfections merely 
constitute ‘remote factical consequences of this essence of finitude and hence only become understandable 
through it.’ How then is the essence of human finitude to be determined? Heidegger takes the fact that the 
‘present question’ arose ‘in the course of the task of the laying of the ground for metaphysics’ undertaken 
in Parts 1-3 of the Kant book, as ‘a fundamental question ...demanded by this task itself’ as indication  that 
we may therefore look back to the ‘problematic of the laying of the ground of metaphysics’330 for guidance. 
If one wished to engage with this proof altogether thoroughly, on its own terms, it is made clear that a 
reading of Parts 1-3 would be advisable.  
 
However, in order that the question at hand may ‘be determined on the basis of a more original retrieval of 
the laying of the ground of metaphysics’ than that undertaken thus far in Parts 1-3 of the Kant book, 
Heidegger declares his intention to ‘turn’ the question away from the ‘orientation’ toward ‘the fixed 
discipline and systematic of Scholastic metaphysics’ maintained by Kant, toward ‘the free field of the 
particular problematic’, while yet holding ‘the Aristotlean way’331 of posing the question of “the being as 
such”, in ‘an admittedly obscure connection to the question concerning beings as a whole’332 as 
“unfinished”, i.e., something to be developed further as a problem, in such a way  that ‘the essential 
connection between Being as such (not the being) and the finitude in human beings must be brought to 
light’333.  
 
Heidegger characterises this Aristotlean way of posing the question by its two “obscurely” connected 
‘directions of questioning’ that together make up ‘the question of what the being in general and as such is’. 
He then awards precedence to the “direction of questioning” that asks about being as such, which he calls 
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the Question of Being, since he says before we ask ‘What is the being?’ We must ask the ‘more original’ 
Question of Being i.e., that of  ‘What does Being mean, which is already understood in advance in every 
question?’    
 
In addressing the Question of Being, Heidegger now turns to address ‘something in ancient philosophy 
which [he says] has been accepted as all too self-evident’; i.e., the ‘what-Being’ of ‘the being which is 
manifest to us’,  which philosophy calls ‘essentia (essence)’, with reference to which “what-Being”, we 
‘determine and interrogate’ the being ‘in every relationship [we have] to it,’ as that which ‘makes a being 
possible in that which it is’.  However, since ‘the [“mere”] appearing [Gk. eidos]...of a being gives the same 
information to the question of what it is’, such that the essence, or ‘what-Being of the being is therefore 
[also] called [Gk. idea] ’, the further question then ‘arises...whether it—the being with this determinate 
what-Being—might be, or rather might not be’, i.e., only appearing to be. 
 
  This calls for a further philosophical determination of ‘“that-Being”, existentia;  (actuality)’, which, for 
Heidegger, may be distinguished from the designation of realitas by the fact that while, like the designation 
‘possibilitas (inner possibility)’, realitas stands for ‘the thingness of a thing’, i.e., for a thing’s being-
possessed of “what-Being”;  existentia vouches for a thing’s that-Being, i.e., for its actual-Being per se, i.e., 
for the fact that it is; which realitas does not. Conversely, it is important to note for our comparative 
reading of Corbin that the designation of realitas does not rule out a being possessed of that-Being, 
actualitas, either.334  
 
Contemplating Corbin’s loaded plump for the term “réalité-”, i.e., from “realitas”, with “-humaine” in 
order to translate “Dasein” for the Gallimard Edition, over e.g.,  “l’existence-”, from existentia, or even just 
plain French “-la”; I note that, in the Critique of Pure Reason,  (in both the first and greatly revised second 
edition), Kant defines “reality” (Realität) ‘as a category or “pure concept of the understanding”’, as ‘that 
which corresponds to a sensation in general’ or that “the concept of which points to being (in time)” [my 
italics]’.335 Here, ‘the correspondence of the category of reality with sensation is accomplished by means of 
perception’, where ‘perception is not prior to the category of reality, underwriting it in some way, but 
requires that the category be given in order to take place’. As such, the correspondence implies that  ‘the 
category of reality can thus only be applied as empirical reality in space and time [my italics]’.336 On this 
Kantian authority, Corbin’s “réalité-”, might also be read as indicating Dasein’s horizonal situation within 
the Heideggerian Weltanschauung; then again, as we shall see, the above comparative definition of realitas 
vs. existentia which is found in Part 4 of the Kant book, also supports the “reality” of Corbin’s imaginal, as 
precisely that which, for Corbin, potentiates a liberation from that Weltanschauung, that “isle of Occidental 
exile”, 337 via Corbin’s “vertical correlation” of Be!ing and be!ing, of which it is both the “place” and the 
medium.  But we are getting ahead of ourselves here.  
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In Part 4 of the Kant book, the crucial determinations here for Heidegger are “what-Being” and “that-
Being”, i.e., essence and existence; possibility and actuality.  In order to ascertain if the Being of what-
Being and that-Being is the same or different in each case, however, says Heidegger we must ask again, 
‘what is Being as such?’. From whence, he says, we are driven to asking the ‘still more original question’ 
of where exactly we might ‘stand’ (cf. existentia, ‘from Latin exsistere ‘come into being,’ from ex- ‘out’ + 
sistere ‘take a stand’’338) in order that we might be able to ‘comprehend Being’, i.e., conceptualise ‘Being 
as such’  as that which ‘all of us as human beings already [i.e., pre-conceptually] and permanently 
understand’?  
 
 In this way, ‘the question concerning the possibility of the concept of Being’ is ‘driven back’ yet again ‘to 
the question concerning the essence of the understanding of Being in general’, further refining the task of 
the ground-laying for metaphysics into that of ‘the elucidation of the inner possibility for the understanding 
of Being’. The next question for Heidegger is ‘whether and in what way the problem of Being by itself 
shows an inner relation to finitude in human beings.’ Our comportment toward beings, he says, is obvious; 
‘the being is known to us—but Being?’ 
 
In light of the vertigo he insists must seize us if ever we should attempt ‘to determine such a thing, even if 
we should comprehend it properly’339, Heidegger asks rhetorically whether Being is ‘then not something 
like the Nothing [das Nichts]?’ adding that ‘no less a person than Hegel said: Pure Being and pure nothing 
are thus the same”.  As such, he says, with the Question of Being we are ‘poised on the brink of complete 
obscurity’, yet which it is best not to attempt to ‘evade prematurely’ if we are to ‘bring the full  peculiarity 
of the understanding of Being closer to us.’340  Here it is worth pausing to wonder if this Nothing, which 
here Heidegger, after Hegel, is likening to Being, is the same Nothing upon which, in “What Is 
Metaphysics?” Being has been determined to be related; dependent upon (in its Creative-Being), for its 
creating beings out of (the Nothing), thus not Absolute, and thus finite, upon which, for Heidegger, beings 
themselves are dangled out into Nothingness. If, that is, “we” must remain within the now-broken construct 
of  traditional metaphysics, informed by the dogma of creation ex nihilo.   
 
N.B., Heidegger’s invocation of Hegel at this point in the Kant book also recalls a remark of Howard 
Caygill’s that in a problem that ‘goes back to Hegel’, the absolute and the infinite are not the same;  herein, 
says Caygill, lies an ‘ambiguity’ which has the potential to ‘upset a thinking of finitude such as 
Heidegger’s’341. Add this to the fact that  the very doctrine upon which his proof of the finitude of Being 
relies in “What is Metaphysics?” is tested to auto-destruction by the proof, and that thinking of finitude 
starts to look rather shaky. As for Part 4 of the Kant book, here too, dependency, as a kind of relation-to, is 
declared the mark and proof of finitude.   
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Moving on with Part 4 of the Kant book, Heidegger states that even with all ‘all its constancy and breadth’, 
our innate preconceptual understanding of Being is ‘for the most part completely indeterminate’; ‘the Being 
of the being...is given as something completely beyond question’, such that ‘Being [Sein] as such comes 
into question so seldom that it appears if there “is” nothing of the sort’. 
 
Even so, it is this very preconceptual, indeterminate understanding of Being that fundamentally determines 
‘man’ as ‘the being which he is’, for Heidegger; without which “he” [sic] would be otherwise, ‘regardless 
of the wonderful faculties with which human beings have been equipped’ (including reason; so much for 
the cogito).  Moreover, ‘man is a being in the midst of beings in such a way  that [both] the being that he is 
himself and the being which he is not are always already manifest’, which ‘mode of the Being of human 
beings [Dasein] is only possible’ for Heidegger ‘on the grounds of the understanding of Being’ which ‘we 
call’ existence.342  
 
The -thrownness and -thereness, i.e., ‘the existence of human beings’ amongst other beings which are here 
presumed not to have an awareness of Being as Being thus constitutes for Heidegger ‘an irruption into the 
totality of beings’ of such awareness; in human-being’s ‘surrendering’ to which—i.e., in its letting ‘the 
being as such be’, and in so doing, itself being ‘delivered up as a being’—it is that ‘the being in itself first 
becomes manifest, i.e., as being’. Thus, for Heidegger, existence—as the “irruption”, the ‘thrown being’ of 
human-beings, necessarily ‘means dependency’, because precisely in order to ‘let the being as such 
be...what and as it is...the existing being must already have projected that it is a being on the strength of 
what has been encountered’. Thus it is by the dependency of human-being, as Dasein, on the “already 
encountered” for its being Dasein, definitively aware of Being as Being, etc; —by which Heidegger 
characterises human  “-sein’s”  intrinsic relation to the “Da-”,    “-there”. And, as dependency is the mark 
of finitude for Heidegger, it follows that the being of Dasein, i.e., existence ‘as a mode of Being’, is now 
declared as ‘in itself finitude’.343   
 
Here again we are reminded of Henry Corbin’s insistence on the indispensability of the hyphen, or trait 
d’union in his translation of Dasein as réalité-humaine, which, here (the hyphen) in this context seems ever 
more intensely Heideggerian.  
 
Returning to the Kant book, Heidegger states that:  
Only because the understanding of Being is the most finitude in what is finite, 
can it also make possible the so-called “creative” capacities of the finite human 
creature. On the grounds of the understanding of Being, man is the there [das 
Da], with the Being of which occurs the opening irruption into the being so 
that it show itself as such for a self. More original than man is the finitude of 
the Dasein in him. 344  
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Thus, he continues, the question of ‘what man is’, even framed according to a philosophical anthropology, 
which as an anthropology, is already treating of “man as man”, is thus overtaken as ‘the necessary question 
for a laying of the ground for metaphysics’ by that ‘the metaphysics of Dasein’—note, of Dasein—whose 
‘fate’, as ‘the metaphysics which occurs necessarily as Dasein...remains bound to the concealing occurring 
of metaphysics in Dasein itself’. 
 
Thus, as Heidegger already hopes to have demonstrated during Parts 1-3 of the Kant book, he says, the 
‘authentic, correctly understood outcome’ of ‘the Kantian effort lies precisely in the connectedness’ 
between ‘the question concerning the possibility of ontological synthesis and that of the unveiling of the 
finitude in human beings’, which he equates to ‘the demand for reflection concerning how a Metaphysics of 
Dasein is to be concretely realized.’ 345  
 
Here, even as he demands reflection upon the how of such a ground-laying, Heidegger may already be seen 
to have begun construction; as the ‘question’ of Dasein’s finitude, already demonstrated by Heidegger on 
grounds of “dependency”, is built into the ground-laying’s very fundament in the next section, ‘the 
fundamental question of the laying of the ground for metaphysics’, i.e., ‘the problem of the inner possibility 
of the understanding of Being out of which all explicit questions of Being should be able to grow’. As such, 
says Heidegger, the Metaphysics of Dasein must unveil the inner constitution of Dasein as ‘the inner 
making-possible of the understanding of Being’—which, as ‘the unveiling of the constitution of Being is 
[called] Ontology’, and, ‘insofar as the ground for the possibility of metaphysics is found therein—the 
finitude of Dasein as its fundament—it is called Fundamental Ontology’.346  
 
In “The Essence of Ground” (also included in Corbin’s 1938 Gallimard translation) Heidegger identifies 
transcendence—which he says here means “surpassing”347, defined as ‘a “relation” that passes “from” 
something “to” something’, to which ‘there thus belongs that toward which such surpassing occurs’ and ‘in 
each case something that is surpassed in this surpassing’348—as ‘belong[ing] to human Dasein as the 
fundamental constitution of this being, one that occurs prior to all comportment’, just as, along the same 
lines, to be a subject also ‘means to be a being in and as transcendence’349, in as much as there is no 
“subject” existent prior to those “objects” with which the subject exists as a subject only in-relation-to.  
This is not to say that the subject-object relation is the same as “surpassing”, which is  no ‘theoretical 
grasping of objects.350 No; neither, in surpassing, are ‘objects—the beings that are objectified—that toward 
which a surpassing occurs.’  
What is surpassed is precisely and solely beings themselves, indeed every being 
that can be or become unconcealed for Dasein, thus including precisely that 
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being as which “it itself” exists. In this surpassing Dasein for the first time 
comes toward that being that it is, and comes toward it as “itself”. 351 
In this way, ‘transcendence constitutes selfhood’, in that even as ‘the surpassing in each case intrinsically 
concerns also beings that Dasein “itself” is not’, it is at once ‘precisely, in and through this surpassing [that] 
it first becomes possible to ... decide who and in what way a “self” is, and what is not a “self”. 352 What is 
fundamentally “unconcealed” in the surpassing is the Being of beings, including that of Dasein “itself”; and 
which itself is this surpassing, to the extent that Heidegger calls “transcendent Dasein” a tautological 
expression.   
 
But while “beings themselves” may be that which is surpassed, and while the condition of Dasein’s being 
able to ‘comport “itself” toward beings’ is that of already having surpassed them;  since ‘surpassing occurs 
as a whole’,  Heidegger names not beings but ‘world as that toward which Dasein as such transcends’. He 
thus determines ‘transcendence as being-in-the-world’, where the concept of ‘world ‘co-constitutes the 
unitary structure of transcendence’ and as co-constituent may itself ‘be called transcendental’. 353 As such, 
“world” may well be considered in  parallel with the réalité- of Corbin’s réalité-humaine.   
 
From here it is no great leap to identify “transcendence as surpassing” with the kind of relationality that 
Heidegger calls “dependency”, and that has been ascertained to be signified by the “indispensable” hyphen 
in Corbin’s translation of Dasein as réalité-humaine. As we have seen, for Heidegger (though not for 
Corbin), as per both “What is Metaphysics?” and Part 4 of the Kant book, “dependency” signifies the 
finitude of both Being and being; from all which it would also appear to follow that, for Heidegger, 
transcendence itself must equate to finitude also. And this suggestion is indeed borne out during the 
following elaboration.  
 
But exactly what does Heidegger mean  here by “world”?  How is it like and unlike to, say, realitas, or 
existentia? For Heidegger, ‘talk of being-in-the-world’ has a ‘twofold significance’.  According to the first, 
factical definition, where world is merely ‘the term for everything that is, for totality as the unity that 
determines everything’, and “being-in-the-world” is taken to mean merely ‘belonging among the other 
beings’, then  all beings must be supposed to be transcendent. If however ‘being-in-the-world’—as 
transcendence—is to be ‘attributed legitimately and exclusively to Dasein...as its essential constitution’354 
(cf. “dependency” qua finitude) then we are left with ‘the problem of transcendence’.  It follows that here 
both “world” and “being-in-the-world” must have an additional significance. Their  determination as “not 
just arbitrary” demands of Heidegger the undertaking of a survey—albeit, he says, with ‘certain gaps’—of 
‘the chief meanings that come to the fore in the history of the concept of world’.355 This entails quite a 
sprint through “ancient philosophy”, Heraclitus, St. Paul, St. John of the Gospel, St. Augustine, Thomas 
Aquinas and, most extensively, Kant, before arrival at the following definition:  Whereas for Kant, says 
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Heidegger, for whom “world” is like to an idea, i.e., a pure, ‘“inferred concept[]”...of the form of a whole’, 
as distinct from a ‘“reflective concept[]” of the understanding’ where in, via ‘inferential activity, reason is 
concerned with attaining something unconditioned in relation to the conditions’, for Heidegger356  
‘what is metaphysically essential in the ...meaning of [Gk.] kosmos, mundus, 
world, lies in the fact that it is directed toward an interpretation of human 
existence [Dasein] in its “relation to beings as a whole. Human Dasein...exists 
in such a way that beings are always manifest as a whole.357  
As such, ‘World belongs to a “relational structure distinctive of Dasein as such, a structure that we call 
being-in-the-world.’ Cf. yet again, the “indispensability” of Corbin’s hyphen. Again, also as per the 
“preconceptual understanding” of Being advanced in Part 4 of the Kant book 
it is not necessary that this wholeness be expressly conceptualized; its 
belonging to Dasein can be veiled, the expanse of this whole is changeable.  
This wholeness is understood without the whole of those beings that are 
manifest being explicitly grasped or indeed “completely” investigated in their 
specific connections, domains, and layers.  Yet the understanding of this 
wholeness, an understanding that in each case reaches ahead and embraces it, is 
a surpassing in the direction of world.  358 
With this definition, Heidegger comes full circle to “pick up” three points he made near the start of his 
“historiographical survey” of the concept of world, in response to certain  ‘hints’ gleaned from Heraclitus’ 
distinction between the ‘single and therefore common world’ of the wakeful, and the individuated—and by 
implication, many worlds of the dreamer, as follows:  
 
(1) World refers to a “how” of being of beings, rather than to these beings themselves 
 
(2) This “how” determines beings as a whole. In its grounds it is the possibility of 
every “how” in general in limit and measure 
 
(3) This “how” as a whole is in a certain manner prior 
 
(4) This prior “how as a whole is itself relative to human Dasein. The world thus 
belongs precisely to human Dasein, even though it embraces in its whole all 
beings, including Dasein.359 
 
Thus “world” is neither a “that-”, a “what-”, but a “how-Being”. For Heidegger, ‘the essence of Dasein’s 
relation to world, i.e., ...the intrinsic possibility of being-in-the-world (transcendence)’ is that in ‘coming 
toward itself from out of the world Dasein gives rise to itself [zeitigt sich] as a self, i.e., as a being entrusted 
with having to be’. As such, ‘world shows itself to be that for the sake of which Dasein exists’; yet for 
Heidegger, since  ‘Dasein is in such a way that it exists for the sake of itself’, i.e., for the sake of ‘its 
potentiality for being,’360 it follows that world  must have ‘the fundamental character of the “for the sake 
of...’. Thus, it is in this way that ‘to selfhood belongs world; world is essentially related to Dasein.’ This 
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“belonging” does not mean, however, that world may be ‘declared as something purely “subjective,”’ 
“falling” as such ‘into the inner sphere of a “subjective” subject’; and nor ‘for the same reason’ may it be 
declared  as something ‘merely objective either, if “objective” means: belonging among beings as 
objects.’361  Rather, as ‘the originary projection of the possibilities of Dasein’, insofar as, in the midst of 
beings, it is to be able to comport itself toward such beings,’ ‘world is brought before Dasein through 
Dasein itself’. Dasein’s ‘projection of world also always casts the projected world over beings’, and it is 
precisely this prior, ‘projective casting-over [Überwurf]’, this ‘primordial history’ ‘in which the being of 
Dasein is temporalized’ [as]... being-in-the-world’, i.e., transcendence, which as such ‘first makes it 
possible for beings as such to manifest themselves’.  
“Dasein transcends” means: in the essence of its being it is world-forming, 
“forming” in the multiple sense that it lets world occur, and through the world 
gives itself an original view (form [Bild]) that is not explicitly grasped, yet 
functions precisely as a paradigmatic form [Vor-bild] for all manifest beings, 
among which each respective Dasein belongs. 362 
 
World gives itself to Dasein in each case as the respective whole of its “for the sake of itself,” i.e., for the 
sake of a being that is equioriginally being alongside...what is present at hand, being with...the Dasein of 
others, and being toward...itself. Dasein is able to be in relation to itself as itself in this manner only if it 
surpasses “itself” in this “for the sake of” [Umwillen]. ... [Thus] all forms of comportment are rooted in 
transcendence’. 363  
 
Now returning to “From Heidegger to Suhravardî”; in a statement that recalls his description, in the 
“Biographical Post-Scriptum”, of his own annotation, in Arabic, of his student copy of Being and Time, 
Corbin informs us that of ‘the strange vocabulary that Heidegger puts before us’ (and which, he says, 
‘made a rude trial of his first French translator’), direct equivalents of ‘all those terms designating the acts 
by which the modalities of the human-presence are revealed’ are also to be found ‘in the classical Arabic of 
the great visionary theosophers of Islam’. E.g:  
“zohûr”, the manifestation, the act of a thing revealing itself, appearing; 
“izhâr”, the act of making something appear, of making it manifest itself; 
“mozhir”, that which causes such a thing to manifest itself... In Persian, there 
are terms such as hast-kardan “make-to-be”; has-konandeh “that which makes-
to-be”. 364  
 
It is sufficient to note’, he continues, ‘that with these few terms we may already feel the entire 
phenomenological vocabulary entering into play.’ 365  As such, Corbin hopes that ‘the mutual benefit, for 
these two domains, that resides in knowledge of both the Islamic theosophical vocabulary and that of 
phenomenology’ should be self-evident. And neither should we be much surprised at this since, he says, the 
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‘bridge’ between these ‘domains’ is not so very difficult to find, since e.g., ‘as Etienne Gilson has shown 
us’, the great Persian neo-Platonist ‘Avicenna is a starting point for Duns Scot’s thinking’ and we have ‘the 
historians of the Toledo school in the 12th century’ to thank for ‘a common Arabo-Latin philosophical 
vocabulary’, he says, going on to list many examples. Yet despite the existence of such a bridge, or bridges, 
between these domains, Corbin is at pains to emphasise that a great disparity nonetheless exists ‘between 
the intended level or horizon with which their investigations are concerned’.366  In Being and Time, for 
example: 
the “Analytic” - which is the application of the Heideggerian Hermeneutic - 
already tacitly posits a fundamental philosophical choice, a conception of the 
world, a Weltanschauung...[which] announces itself at the horizon within 
which the “Analytic” of the Da of the Dasein is deployed. 367 
However, while Corbin himself rejects the Heideggerian Weltanschauung, he says, he is adamant that the 
Analytic itself may be usefully retained while giving ‘the Da of the Dasein another situs, another 
dimension, than that given it in Being and Time.’368 Such a retention depends entirely on the fact that, for 
Corbin, Dasein’s intrinsic “dependency” its “surpassing”, i.e., its transcendence, does not, for Corbin, 
equate to absolute finitude.  
 
Corbin goes on to say that his own encounter with Heidegger’s writing on historicality was ‘decisive’ for 
him; it seems doubly so, at once initiating his own subsequent conviction that ‘if there is a “meaning to 
History”’, it lies not ‘in the historicism of historical events’, but rather in the ‘secret, esoteric, existentiating 
roots of History and of the historical’369—and marking ‘the moment in which, while following the example 
of the Heideggerian Analytic’—which he characterises as having ‘the interesting virtue of bringing us to an 
understanding of the underlying motives that have lead the humanity of today to cling frantically to the 
historical as though it were the only “Reality”’, according to ‘a laicising of the idea of the Incarnation, in 
the wake of which even the theologians have been dragged into a generalized and omnipresent 
sociology’—Corbin was himself ‘drawn to explore hermeneutical levels that his [Heidegger’s] program had 
not yet envisioned’, inspired by the knowledge that ‘the contrast between historiality and historicism ‘is 
already perfectly well known - albeit expressed in different terms - to the Gnostics and Cabalists of the 
Religions of the Book.’ 370  Here, then, is a clear  “appropriation” of Heideggerian historiology, by Corbin, 
in the whole double sense of appropriation, as defined by Robert Scharff (ibid.), as being ‘as much a matter 
of taking up and taking further as it is a matter of taking over and continuing what has already come to 
be’.371 
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Corbin feels it hardly necessary, he says, to identify the ‘starting point’ of this trajectory of his own 
research as lying in Heidegger’s ‘incomparable analysis’372, (here, referring surely to  Chapter Five of 
Being in Time, “Temporality and Historicality”)373 — 
...showing the ontological roots of the Historical sciences, showing effectively 
that there is a more original, more primitive historicism than that which we call 
the “universal History”; the History of external events, the Weltgeschichte, or 
simply History in the ordinary everyday sense of the word. 374 
In his translator’s foreword to the 1938 Gallimard Edition, Corbin introduces his own retrieval of the 
archaic French term historial to translate the Heideggerian term Geschehen, in order to properly 
‘distinguish between history as historical reality...and history as historical science’ yet in such as way as to 
‘make the common roots of the two [Heideggerian] terms Geschehen and Geschichte discernable in 
French’.375 Macquarrie and Robinson, the two English translators of Being and Time, note that ‘while the 
verb geschehen ordinarily means to “happen” ... Heidegger stresses its etymological kinship to Geschichte 
or “history”’. 376 Heidegger himself declares his use of the term Geschehen to designate the ‘elemental 
historicality of Dasein’, i.e., that ‘temporal kind of Being which Dasein itself possesses, regardless of 
whether or how Dasein is an entity ‘in time’, and which is ‘prior to what is called “history”’ i.e., 
Geschichte.  As ‘the specific movement in which Dasein is stretched along and stretches itself along’ 
between birth and death, i.e., [as between being and nothing?]  Geschehen is that which concerns the very 
‘question of Dasein’s “connectedness”’, i.e.,  the ‘ontological problem of Dasein’s historizing’. 377 That the 
theme of the historial is so strongly in evidence in Corbin’s essay “The Concept of Comparative 
Philosophy”378, e.g., first delivered as a lecture in Teheran in 1974, testifies to the lasting impression of 
Heidegger’s “historial” discourse on Corbin.  
 
Here Corbin goes on to say, that while, as previously indicated, he rejects the Heideggerian 
Weltanschauung, as an horizon of absolute finitude, he wishes to stress that since taking up the clavis 
hermeneutica, he has retained all he has learnt from Heidegger about ‘how it might be used and adapted,’ 
including, as before, ‘all the resources of an “Analytic” of this Da-sein’, of which Corbin insists ‘it is not at 
all necessary to adhere to ...[Heidegger’s] tacit Weltanschauung to make use of’. 
The hermeneutic proceeds from the “act of presence” signified in the Da of the 
Dasein; its task is therefore to illuminate how, in understanding itself, the 
human being-there situates itself, circumscribes the Da, the situs of its 
presence and unveils the horizon which had up until then remained hidden.   
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Indeed, he says, it is the very Weltanschauung itself which ‘pre-existential philosophical choice...is itself 
constitutive of the Da of Dasein, of the act of Being-there present to the world and its variants’, whether for 
Heidegger, who ‘arranges...around this situs ... all the ambiguity of human finitude characterized as a 
“Being-toward-Death” (Sein zum Tode)’, or as for ‘a Mollâ Sadrâ, or an Ibn ‘Arabi’, for whom he says ‘the 
Presence as they experience it in this world - as it is unveiled by the “phenomenon of the world” lived by 
them - is not that Presence whose finality is death, a Being-towards-Death, but a “Being-towards-Beyond-
Death”, let us say: Sein zum Jenseits des Todes’.  
From hereon in, all that remains to be done is to hold and press this notion of 
Presence, as closely and as intently as possible.  To what is this human 
presence, this Being-there, present? 
Da-sein: being-there, this is understood.  But being-there is essentially to be 
enacting a presence, enactment of that presence by which and for which 
meaning is revealed in the present.  The modality of this human presence is 
thus to be revelatory, but in such a way that, in revealing the meaning, it 
reveals itself, and is that which is revealed.   
Thus beyond the Weltanschauung of Heidegger, yet remaining with the hermeneutics of presence, Corbin 
recounts ‘the gnoseology of the Ishrâqîyûn’, who  distinguish between ‘the common form of knowledge... a 
formal knowledge (‘ilm sûrî)’ that is ‘produced through the intermediary of a re-presentation, of a species, 
actualized in the soul’, and that which ‘they designate as a presential knowledge (ilm hozuri)’, which is 
‘immediate presence, that by which the soul’s “act of presence” itself gives rise to the presence of things, 
and renders present to itself no longer objects but presences.’  This latter is typified by the Ishrâqîyûn’ ‘as 
“Oriental” knowledge (‘ilm ishrâqî)’, referring to an Orient not to be found ‘on any geographical maps,’ 
but rather  
‘the dawning Light, a Light prior to all revealed things, to all presence, for it is 
that which reveals them, that by which the Presence is...at one and the same 
time the dawning of the Orient of Being upon the soul and the dawning of the 
matutinal illumination of the soul upon the things which it reveals and which it 
reveals to itself as co-presences.   
Thus, Corbin continues:  
 it will make all the difference, when we pose the question as follows: which 
presences does the human presence, render present to itself, in enacting its own 
presence?  In other words, with which constellations of presences does the Da 
of the Dasein surround itself when it reveals itself to itself?  To which worlds 
is it being present in its being there[?]  
Thus faced with the choice, as he saw it, of whether to ‘limit [him]self to the phenomenon of the world 
analyzed in Sein und Zeit’, or rather ‘intuit, accept and amplify [his] presence to all the worlds and “inter-
worlds”, as they are discovered and revealed to [him] by the “Oriental” Presence of our Islamic Iranian 
“theosophers”?’, the grounds of Corbin’s own “resolute decision” announce his departure from Heidegger, 
or more precisely, his Weltanschauung, as follows: 
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On the one hand, we are made to hear the pathos-laden adage of the 
Heideggerian Analytic: to be free for one’s death.  On the other hand we have 
the firm invitation to a freedom for the beyond of one’s death.  Let us hold onto 
the word Entschlossenheit: the decision-resolute [la decision résolue].  Today 
this term is translated by decision without withdrawal [decision sans retrait].  
This is even better.  For it is a question of knowing whether and in what 
measure this resolution is not a movement of withdrawal, of retreat, before 
death, an impotent inability to be free for that which is beyond one’s death, to 
render oneself present to, and for, that which is beyond death.  I’m afraid that, 
having become the victims of widespread agnosticism, the humanity of today 
falters before the freedom for that which is beyond death.  We have invested 
such a great measure of genius in building up all possible defences: 
psychoanalysis, sociology and dialectical materialism, linguistics, historicism, 
etc., everything has been put in place to prohibit all perspective on, concern 
for, and signification of the beyond.  ...People tranquilize themselves by 
repeating: “ death is a part of life”.  This is not true, unless one means to limit 
life to its biological expression.  But biological life is itself derived from 
another life which is its independent source, and which is Life in its very 
essence.  So long as the “resolute-decision” remains simply “freedom for one’s 
death”, death presents itself as a closure and not as an exitus.  And so we will 
never take leave of this world.  To be free for that which is beyond death, is to 
foresee and to bring about one’s death as an exitus, a leave-taking of this world 
towards other worlds.  But it is the living, and not the dead, which leave this 
world.379 
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Chapter Four: The Imagination in Heidegger’s Kant book 
For Heidegger, according to his own momentous purpose for Part 4 of the Kant book, the extraordinary 
Wiederholung undertaken in Parts 1-3 of the Kantbook of the role attributed to the imagination by Kant in 
his Critique of Pure Reason, and more particularly, in the first edition of that book, is after all, really “not 
all that”. Though it may thus far have seemed, he says, that his finding for ‘the transcendental power of 
imagination as the ground for the inner possibility of ontological synthesis’ would be the conclusion of his 
investigation of Kant and The Problem of Metaphysics (the Kant book), should this have been so, says 
Heidegger, he need have done no more than cite ‘the appropriate quotations’. 380 
Instead, he now directs our attention to what else ‘occurs in the Kantian ground-laying’; i.e., ‘nothing less 
than...the grounding of the inner possibility of ontology as brought about as an unveiling of transcendence, 
i.e., of the subjectivity of the human subject.’381 As we have seen in the previous chapter, transcendence, 
for Heidegger, equates to finitude; the point at which Corbin’s path diverges from his. Being however in no 
such haste as Heidegger, almost dismissive, in his  rush to establish finitude, of the intricacies and 
“violence” of Parts 1-3 of the Kant book, as if a “mere” working out—for a comparative reading of Corbin, 
and of Corbin as the first French translator of Heidegger,  the resonance for Corbin of a fundamental 
ontological role being accorded to the imagination is not to be passed over, notwithstanding that these Parts 
1-3 did not appear in the Gallimard.  This reading of Parts 1-3 of the Kant book is offered largely without 
commentary in this chapter. Its ramifications for our comparative reading of Corbin will be rehearsed in the 
conclusion.  
 
Appended to this reading of Parts 1-3 of the Kant book is a gloss of the infamous debate between 
Heidegger and Ernst Cassirer which concluded their Kant lectures at Davos (the ‘Davoser Hochschule  
course (March 17-April 6, 1929)’, immediately following which, the Kantbook is said to have been written 
up in ‘three weeks of uninterrupted work’382 and ‘based on the preparatory work’ for those lectures.383  It is 
offered here in order to complete the reading of the Kant book, in the hope that it crystallizes some of what 
has gone before, and  to provide philosophicohistorical context.  I also find this transcript to to offer 
compelling grounds for the undertaking of comparative research on Cassirer’s work on the symbolic and 
Corbin’s philosophy of the imaginal; though Corbin himself, to the best of my knowledge, while claiming 
to have discovered his own spiritual kinship with the Cambridge Platonists via Cassirer’s book The 
Platonic Renaissance in England, maintains silence on this point. 
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 Kant and The Problem of Metaphysics 
Preface to the Second Edition 
Readers have taken constant offence at the violence of my interpretations. 
Their allegation of violence can indeed be supported by this text. 384 
For Heidegger, there are two senses to ‘the expression “The Problem of Metaphysics”’. In the first sense, it 
refers to ‘the problem for Metaphysics’385, that is, ‘the question concerning beings as such in their totality’. 
In the second sense, it refers to the problem of Metaphysics per se, i.e., of Metaphysics as Metaphysics; for 
Heidegger, however, these two problems are essentially inextricable as it is the problem for Metaphysics 
which ‘allows Metaphysics as Metaphysics to become a problem’.386 Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics 
is Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason as ‘a laying of the ground for metaphysics’, 
in such a way as to place ‘the problem of metaphysics before us as a fundamental ontology’.387 
 
The question, for Heidegger, is how such a ‘laying the ground for metaphysics’ ever came to be a critique 
of pure reason in the first place, to which he proposes to develop the answer ‘through a discussion of the 
following three questions:  
 
(1) Which concept of metaphysics is found in Kant?  
(2) What is the starting point for the laying of the ground for this traditional metaphysics?  
(3) Why is this ground-laying a critique of pure reason?388   
 
This tripartite articulation of Heidegger’s initial question also nicely describes the movement of a 
Wiederholung, as, according to Heidegger’s definition, ‘the retrieval of a basic problem...through the 
working-out of which is transformed’389, in that the last of the three questions, that of ‘Why is this ground-
laying a critique of pure reason?’, i.e., is a return to the initial, overarching question, only transformed and 
informed via the previous questions and answers.  
 
As to the first question: “Which concept of metaphysics is found in Kant?” Heidegger finds that Kant’s 
initial traditional, Scholastic concept of metaphysics, as laid out in the Critique of Pure Reason ‘may be 
characterized roughly’ by the definition given by Baumgarten in his Metaphysica (2nd Edition, 1743) thus: 
‘Metaphysics is the science which comprises the first principles of human knowledge.’390 To which, 
Heidegger is moved to add the explanatory footnote: ‘Metaphysics is the first science in so far as it 
comprises the decisive grounds for what human knowing represents’;391 continuing to add, back in the main 
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body of the text, that for Baumgarten, ‘Ontology, cosmology, psychology, and natural theology [therefore] 
refer to metaphysics’.392  For Heidegger, however, there is a ‘peculiar and at first a necessary ambiguity’ 
within the Scholastic conception of the ‘“first principles of human knowledge”’,393 the sources of which 
appear to be threefold, as follows:  
 
1). The first source of ambiguity for Heidegger lies in the fact that “Metaphysics” was originally simply a 
technical term for ‘those of Aristotle’s treatises that were arranged [sequentially] after those belonging to 
the Physics’, and only ‘later’ came to be understood as indicative of the philosophical character of the 
content of these treatises. In turn, says Heidegger, this later understanding came to ‘channel the 
interpretation of these treatises in a specific direction’394. Thus Kant himself insists that the name 
Metaphysics cannot be merely accidental, since, as meta (= trans-) + physica, it describes so perfectly what 
Kant himself understands metaphysics to be, i.e., ‘a science that is, so to speak, outside of the field of 
physics, which lies on the other side of it’.395 This “substantial” interpretation favoured by Kant, and the 
alternative, “accidental” possibility, therefore constitute the first source of ambiguity for Heidegger, 
making it  necessary to ‘ask whether what is brought together in the Aristotelian Metaphysics is 
“metaphysics” at all’. 
 
2). The second source of ambiguity for Heidegger, from which, he says, the need for this subsequently 
over-interpreted, technical term of “metaphysics” ‘sprang forth’, is the fact, uncomfortable for the 
Scholastics, that ‘what Aristotle strove for’ in his Metaphysics ‘as authentic philosophy or philosophy of 
the highest order’, would not precisely fit into any ‘subsequent Scholastic...discipline or framework’. Thus 
for the Scholastics “metaphysics” was (and still is, for Heidegger, though on markedly different grounds) 
‘the title of a fundamental philosophical difficulty’.  
 
3). The third source of this ambiguity regarding the Scholastic definition of  metaphysics as the “science of 
first principles” lies in ambiguity itself, i.e., in the ‘lack of clarity’ that Heidegger finds to lie in the very 
Aristotlean treatises known as the Metaphysics, for and from which “metaphysics” was named; wherein, he 
says, ‘a remarkable doubling [Doppelung] appears precisely in the determination of the essence of “First 
Philosophy”’ which, ‘to the extent that Aristotle himself has anything to say about this’ is ‘both 
“knowledge of beings as beings”’396 and also ‘of the most remarkable region of beings out of which being 
as a whole determines itself’. In other words, First Philosophy, for Aristotle, is both a knowledge of beings 
and a knowledge of Being. Heidegger finds it neither possible nor even desirable to hastily reconcile this 
Aristotlean “doubling”, or ‘apparent disunity’, which he says does not even originate with Aristotle, but 
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‘has prevailed since the beginnings of ancient philosophy’. For Heidegger the task in hand is rather to 
‘illuminate the grounds for the apparent disunity and the manner in which both determinations belong 
together as the leading problem of a “first philosophy” of beings.’ Thus returning to ‘the essential 
determination of “Metaphysics”’ or “First Philosophy” as offered by Aristotle, Heidegger finds its only 
value to be that of ‘an announcement of the problem’,  which itself in turn only raises more questions, as 
follows: 
In what does the essence of the knowledge of Being by beings lie? To what 
extent does this necessarily open up into a knowledge of beings as a whole? 
Why does this point anew to a knowledge of the knowledge of Being? Thus, 
“Metaphysics” simply remains the title for the philosophical difficulty.397 
 
According to Heidegger, the subsequent development of Western metaphysics has been characterised by ‘a 
lack of understanding concerning the questionable and open nature of the central problems left by Plato and 
Aristotle’.398 The Scholastic response to Aristotle’s “remarkable doubling”. i.e., his definition of “First 
Philosophy” as concerning both beings and Being, was to divide metaphysics into a) Metaphysica 
Specialis, concerned with beings as such, and b) Metaphysica Generalis, concerned with being in general 
(ens commune). In keeping with the Scholastics’ devout Christian ‘this world- and Dasein-consciousness 
[Welt- und Daseinbewußtsein]’,a the “content” of Metaphysica Specialis was then assigned to principle 
divisions, or ‘spheres’, according to which God is allied with Theology, ‘(the object of which is the 
summum ens)’;399 Nature is allied with Cosmology; and Humanity, in turn, allied with Psychology. This, 
then, for Heidegger defines what he calls the “horizonal” character of Kant’s concept of metaphysics: 400 
i.e., that Kant begins his “critique of pure reason” within the horizon of this bounded, dualistic— and in the 
case of Metaphysica Specialis, further “spherically” divided—Scholastic conception of metaphysics.   
 
On the necessity, for Kant, of a “Ground-Laying” in the sense of ‘an essential determination of 
metaphysics’401 and how this became a Critique of Pure Reason,  Heidegger explains that ‘the other theme 
that is essential for the development of the Scholastic concept of Metaphysics concerns its type of 
knowledge and its method’. Since the object of metaphysics is both “being in general” and beings, right up 
to the Summum Ens/God, for Kant it is therefore a ‘science of the highest dignity—no less than the “queen 
of sciences”’, and must therefore be ‘assimilated to an appropriate ideal for knowledge’ such as 
mathematics, which as it is ‘rational in the highest sense...a priori because it is independent of chance 
experiences’, may be called a ‘pure science of reason’. Regarding reason, as the Scholastics did, as the 
highest, “God-given”, human faculty, Kant  accordingly declares metaphysics—Generalis and Specialis 
both—to be ‘a “science established on the basis of mere [i.e., “pure”] reason”’. However, in light of ‘the 
constant “miscarriage” of all undertakings’ to date in Metaphysica Specialis—which, for Kant is  and must 
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be metaphysics in its highest form—Kant declares that ‘all attempts to extend the pure knowledge of reason 
must be held back’ until the ‘inner possibility’ of metaphysics as a science of pure reason has been 
clarified, and ‘thus arises the task of a ground-laying in the sense of an essential determination of 
metaphysics’. 402  For Heidegger, therefore, this is the task of the Critique of Pure Reason—this, and not, 
even while it is concerned with the inner possibility of metaphysical knowledge—any kind of a theory of 
knowledge as such.  
 
But while the Critique of Pure Reason is not, for Heidegger, concerned with developing a theory of 
knowledge, there is still, he says, necessarily a question of method, or as Heidegger prefers, of 
“comportment”, since ‘in an exceptional sense’ metaphysics, as ‘pure, rational knowledge of what is 
common to all beings’ and of ‘the specific wholeness of its principle divisions’ must attempt ‘from time to 
time’ to “overstep” ‘what experience can offer’, and thus attempt to “grasp” supersensible being.  And yet, 
lacking ‘binding proof’ for such supersensible “insights”b as it wishes to claim for its own, how then can 
metaphysics do, and be, any such thing? Kant is thus effectively ‘forced back’, acc. Heidegger, by the force 
of his own reason, from any further undertaking in Metaphysica Specialis toward ‘the question concerning 
the essence of Metaphysica Generalis’404, i.e., the question of how beings might be known as such; i.e., 
how beings might be known as beings. Henceforth, Kant’s ‘ground-laying’ becomes necessarily ‘the 
elucidation of a comporting toward beings in which this essence shows itself in itself so that all assertions 
about it become provable on the basis of it’405. Here, then, for Heidegger, Kant is brought directly ‘into 
dialogue with Aristotle and Plato for the first time’, and, since knowledge of being in general (i.e., of 
beings as beings) may no longer be taken for granted in an indeterminate way, ‘the deepest shock wave 
strikes the structure of traditional metaphysics’.406   
 
How, then, ought one to most properly, or as it were reasonably comport oneself toward the question of 
being? As for Kant, in the words of Heidegger, ‘what makes the comporting toward beings (ontic 
knowledge) possible is the preliminary understanding of the constitution of Being, ontological 
knowledge’,407 i.e., that kind of knowledge which falls under the purview of Metaphysica Specialis, the 
possibility of which, has, as we have seen, has thus far been problematized by and for Kant, to the point of 
impossibility. What Kant really wants to say here, according to Heidegger,  is that ‘not “all knowledge” is 
ontic, and [even] where there is such [ontic] knowledge, it is only possible through ontological 
knowledge’:.408 Hence, an apparent impasse.  
 
Kant therefore looks to the “realisation” of the mathematical natural sciences, wherein as ‘reason has 
insight only into what it produces itself according to its own design [Entwurf]’ and must therefore 
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not allow itself to cling...to Nature’s apron strings, but must lead the way with 
principles of its judgements according to permanent laws, and...constrain 
Nature to answer its own questions.409  
 
The purely reasonable character of mathematical natural science thus provides Kant with his model for the 
‘fundamental connection between ontic experience and ontological knowledge’.410 What Kant also wants to 
say here, according to Heidegger, is that we might get on a lot better with metaphysics if, ‘rather than 
utilising ‘the “old” concept of truth’—the adequatio, i.e., according to which knowledge must correspond 
to objects—we should assume instead ‘that objects must conform to our (a priori) knowledge’. For 
Heidegger, however, far from doing away with the adequatio, Kant’s “Copernican Revolution” not only 
presupposes it, but ‘indeed even grounds it for the first time’ in ontology, since the correspondence of ontic 
knowledge to beings as “objects” now depends on the knowledge of beings as beings, i.e. on ‘the 
unveiledness of the constitution of the Being of beings’.411  
 
Now, because, for Kant, ontological truth, as ‘that which makes ontic knowledge possible’,412 requires a 
“stepping-beyond”; and since pure reason is supposed to supply the principles with which to know 
something entirely a priori, Kant’s next step is to “reduce” the problem to a critique of pure reason itself, 
i.e., the inner possibility of ‘a priori synthetic judgements’. Accordingly, ‘ontological knowledge’ is now 
characterised as ‘a judging according to grounds (principles) which are not brought forth experientially’,413 
i.e., what Kant calls a transcendental investigation. Heidegger wishes to emphasize that, for Kant, to 
philosophize transcendentally, i.e., to enquire into the possibility of transcendental truth, or knowledge, is 
not a case of setting ‘“a theory of knowledge”... in place of metaphysics’ but rather a questioning of ‘the 
inner possibility of ontology’.414 And, since ‘Nothing can be presupposed’ here, ‘least of all the factum of 
the natural sciences’ (which, at the time Heidegger is writing, is being thoroughly destabilised (again), 
precisely by the science of quantum physics, e.g., the Heisenberg principle;) Kant must now ‘pursue the a 
priori synthesis exclusively in itself...to the seed [keim] which provides it ground’, 415 since, in Kant’s own 
words, ‘“Critique requires knowledge of the sources, and Reason must know itself”’416.  
 
Yet despite this clearly stated requirement, according to Heidegger, ‘previous interpretations’417 of the Kant 
book have, he says, ‘unduly neglected or interpreted...the preliminary and sufficient characterization of the 
original dimension’ (my italics)—which Heidegger concedes may be attributable to the very fact that rather 
than entering into an explicit discussion of the original dimension or ‘field of origin’ of reason itself here,  
Kant himself  instead ‘takes th[is] for granted in the sense of “self-evident presuppositions”.’418 
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For Heidegger, however, since ‘“In whatever manner and by whatever means a knowing [eine Erkenntnis] 
may relate to objects, intuition [defined as ‘receptivity for impressions’], is that through which it relates 
itself immediately to them, and upon which all thought as a means is directed”419, it follows that intuition is 
necessarily prior to reason in human knowing. Sincerely wishing to hammer this into the reader, Heidegger 
therefore states clearly and often in this part of the Kant book that ‘knowing is primarily intuiting’420. This 
means that thinking, i.e., reason as judging, is secondary to intuition, and serves ‘that to which intuition is 
primarily and constantly directed’. Human knowing, for Heidegger, is therefore best described as ‘a 
thinking intuiting’,421 and while ‘receptivity for impressions’ (intuition) and ‘spontaneity of concepts’ 
(thinking) are the ‘two basic sources [Grundquellen] of the mind’,422  neither of these alone is knowledge . 
In fact the precise point that Heidegger makes here is that intuition alone is not knowledge; there is no point 
in his making the same claim for thinking alone, where thinking is defined as “reason as judging”, since it 
has already been established that without “an intuiting” to serve, thought alone, thus defined, would have 
nothing to think, nothing to judge. The occurrence of thinking, as such, is thus dependent upon the priority 
of intuition; in order that knowing, in turn, may occur as a consequence.  
 
The ‘inherent relationship’ for Kant, between the faculty of intuition (i.e., “pure”, and not sensory 
sensibility), and the faculty of thinking is their ‘descendency from the same class (genus)’423 of 
repraesentio, i.e., that for both of them ‘“Representation in general (repraesentio)...is the species”’.424 It is 
this conspecificity which allows for their eventual ‘unification’ in knowledge, as above.  Even so, 
Heidegger observes that these two “stems” of the species of representation seem very different to one 
another, and if indeed they do have a common “root”, as the original source of their conspecificity, at this 
point in the Critique of Pure Reason it remains unknown.   
 
Finite Reason  
For Kant, says Heidegger, the finitude of human reason does not ‘consist only or primarily’ in its 
‘instability, imprecision, or capacity for making errors’, but rather ‘in the essential structure of knowledge 
itself’.425 In keeping with the “traditional” (i.e., Scholastic) ‘this world- and Dasein-consciousness’, Kant 
defines finite human knowledge as such in contrast to the absolute, infinite, divine knowledge of God, 
which Kant calls intuitus originarius426, since as knowledge, divine knowledge also has the character of 
intuition. Unlike finite, human intuition, divine intuition never offers, or constitutes an “object” for divine 
knowing; there is no ‘being already at hand’ for divine knowing to “take the measure” of, i.e., to “think”;  
since if there were any ‘being already at hand’, i.e., prior to  divine knowing, then, by definition,  divine 
knowing would not be infinite or absolute.  
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 For Kant, therefore, it is rather the case that in its ‘immediate representation’ of the ‘unique, singular being 
as a whole’, the intuitus originarius actually ‘brings this being into its Being’. And, as divine originating 
intuition knows ‘the being as a whole...immediately...seeing through it in advance’, it simply 
‘cannot...require thinking’. Thinking is thus ‘the mark of finitude’,427 and finitude is thus the first intrinsic 
truth that human reason must know of itself.  
 
Finite Intuition 
Unlike divine intuition, for Kant, acc. Heidegger, human, finite intuition requires the existence of intuitable, 
i.e., “sensible” objects, thus the character of its finitude is to be ‘found in its receptivity’.428  
 
For Kant, there are two kinds of sensible intuition in finite knowing:   
 
1) Pure intuition of space and time. Heidegger acknowledges Kant’s  attainment here of ‘a concept of 
sensibility which is ontological rather than sensualistic’, wherein ‘if empirically affective intuition of 
beings does not need to coincide with “sensibility”, the possibility of a non-empirical [i.e. “pure”]  
sensibility remains essentially open.’429 
 
2) ‘“Empirical intuition of what is immediately represented, through sensation, as actual in space and 
time”’430.  
 
Veritative Synthesis 
In order for it to become knowledge (that is, to become understandable and communicable to others), for 
Kant, finite intuiting requires that what is intuited be determined ‘as this and that’. 431 This is the role of 
thinking, by which the intuited is ‘further represented with a view to what it is in general’. Kant names this  
general representation of what an intuited being is in general repraesentio per notas communes 
(“representing in general”).432 This “general” representation of the primarily intuited is then kept in view,  
that from this ‘viewpoint’ its particularity may be determined.433  
 
This determinate representation, as ‘the assertion of something about something’, is called predication, or 
judgement. In representing what an intuited being is in general, a judgement is ‘a representing of the 
unifying unity of concepts in their character as predicates’. This ‘unifying representing’ is called 
‘predicative synthesis’, and it is in this way the understanding (i.e., the faculty of judgement, or thinking) 
‘helps to set forth the content of the object... as a comprehensively grasped unity’ which ‘applies to many’. 
The understanding is thus a productive434 faculty, but only in its producing the form of the concept, while 
the content of the concept, i.e., ‘the universal...in which the intuited comes to be conceptually 
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represented...is derived from the intuitable’. 435 This “production” of human, finite thinking is not, as divine 
intuition is, immediate creation, in other words, but a kind of  “forming out of”, a “fashioning”. It is by this 
‘union (synthesis)’ of intuition and thinking that ‘thinking is mediately related to the object’, by which the 
truth of the object’s being is determined. This “union” of thinking with intuition is called the veritative 
synthesis, and it is, for Kant, in Heidegger’s words, ‘the essence of intuiting finite thinking’.  
 
However, even while finite, human knowledge must necessarily be ‘delivered over to the being which 
already is’, note that it is “mediately related” to the object;  the ‘being as being in itself, i.e., not as 
object’436 can never be known to us as such. Thus for Kant “in the world of sense...however deeply we 
enquire into its objects... [we have] to do with nothing but appearances”’;437 therefore, continues Heidegger, 
‘for it’s own [very] possibility’,  ontic knowledge, i.e., knowledge of beings as beings, must be grounded in 
ontological knowledge, that is, ‘a knowing of the Being of beings prior to all receiving’.438  
 
And since, continues Heidegger, when it comes to ‘the knowing of Being’ “prior to all receiving”, ibid., 
‘what should now be taken in stride...cannot be a being which is at hand and presents itself’.439 The 
knowledge of Being rather requires a ‘pure representing’, a ‘pure intuition’ which ‘must give itself 
something capable of being represented’. It must therefore ‘in a certain sense be “creative”,440 and thus 
‘apparently nonfinite’.  Suddenly, it appears that the finitude of finite knowledge is open to question after 
all, and with that ‘the question of the possibility of ontology for a finite creature’ has become a lot ‘more 
complicated’.441 What, then, is the constitution of the finite creature (humanity, Dasein) that makes such an 
a priori, pure intuition possible?  In what is it “grounded”? If we wish to discover ‘to what extent 
ontological knowledge can be the condition for the possibility of ontic knowledge’, then for Heidegger, 
after Kant, its own possibility, its own origin must also be ‘unveiled’.442  
 
The Unveiling of the Origin 
For Kant, as we have seen, the ‘two stems of human knowledge...which perhaps spring forth from a 
common but to us unknown root”’ are ‘sensibility and understanding’.443 For Heidegger, it is precisely this 
pointing to the “unknown root” that makes the Critique of Pure Reason ‘a philosophizing laying of the 
ground of philosophy’;444 and it is through the discovery of this “unknown root” that both the inner 
constitution of Dasein, and with that, the very possibility of ontological knowledge may come to be known.  
 
How, then, is the unknown origin, the “fundamental source” [Quellgrund] of a priori, ontological synthesis 
to be revealed? According to the traditional, Scholastic divisions, since the “region of its “unveiling” is the 
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human mind, the problem would seem to be proper to the discipline of Psychology. Then again, because it 
also has to do with ‘an interpretation of knowledge’, the discipline of Logic would also seem to have some 
proper claim on the problem; however, says Heidegger, because of the ‘originality and uniqueness of what 
Kant sought’, neither discipline is suitable or sufficient for this ‘“study of our inner nature”’.445 Thus the 
method for the ‘unveiling’ of ‘the origin’, of that “ground” in which, for Heidegger, metaphysics ‘is rooted 
as a “haunting” [Heimsuchung, lit. “homeseeking”, often translated elsewhere as “visitation” 446] of human 
nature’ must largely be left open.  It may yet ‘be understood as “analytic” in the broadest sense’, says 
Heidegger, though not as a “breaking up”, but rather a “loosening of the seeds” [Keim] of ontology, to 
reveal its ‘essential structure’ and ‘the construction of the substructures [Fundamente] necessary to it’.447 
And yet however it is to be understood, as Kant himself states in his letter to M. Herz of 1781,  this 
problem ‘will always remain difficult,’448 because ‘it includes the metaphysics of metaphysics’.449  
 
Before we come to the unknown root, however, the two “stems” of pure, finite knowledge –i.e., pure 
intuition and thinking— must be discussed, beginning with pure intuition.  
 
Pure intuition, or an ‘Elucidation of Space and Time as Pure Intuitions’. 
Kant’s definition of space and time as pure intuitions begins apophantically, i.e., with what they are not,  
thus:  that which ‘is represented in pure intuition [i.e. space and time] is no being  (no object [Gegenstand], 
i.e. no appearing being) but at the same time it is plainly not nothing’.450  
 
Space is no ‘”empirical representation”’, and neither may it simply be ‘stripped off’ or abstracted from 
‘many different things’; hence space is not a concept. Space is rather a ‘pure represented’ that must be 
represented ‘necessarily’ and ‘in advance’ as ‘that within which what is at hand can first be encountered’, 
in order that such encounters may “take place” at all. Space is that which makes “extensiveness” possible,  
and the ordering of things in terms of “above”, “below” and so on. Space does contain limitations, and thus, 
parts; but as its parts, its limitations, are also spatial, they’re all space as well. The “parts” of space are not 
unified “under” it, as they would be in the predicative synthesis of a concept; and for this reason also space 
is not a concept, for Kant, but a unique object. As to what space is—as ‘immediate representing of a unified 
particular [repraesentio singularis]’,451 in which ‘what is intuited...in a preliminary glimpse...stands without 
reference to a particular object and is unthematic as well’,452 space gives ‘what is intuited immediately’, 
and  ‘as a whole’.453 Space is thus defined as a pure intuition which gives ‘the totality of those relations 
according to which what is encountered in the senses would be ordered’. 
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There are, however, also ‘givens of the “inner sense” which indicate...no spatial references’, 454 and these 
belong to time. Time, as ‘pure succession’, is the form of our inner sense; that which determines ‘”the 
relation of representations in our inner state”’455 while ‘”having nothing to do with shape nor position.”’ 
Time does not determine ‘”outer appearances”’456 as such, except that in as much as all appearances are 
“inner” representations, it is ‘”the a priori condition of all appearances whatsoever”’.457 Heidegger goes on 
to add that ‘the more subjective time is, the more original and extensive is the expansiveness of the 
subject’.  
 
Thus according to the ‘mediate within-time-ness’ of all representations, whether ‘determined through 
external sense’, or not,458b time thus has ‘a preeminence over space’459 as the universal pure intuition, 
which, ‘in its ontological function’ as ‘essential bit of pure ontological knowledge’,460 must be considered 
as ‘the guiding and supporting essential element of...the transcendence that forms knowledge’.461 The 
possibility of pure intuition having been established via these characterisations of space, and especially 
time, as such, Kant’s investigation now turns to pure thought.  
 
The possibility of pure thinking (as a priori synthetic judgement) 
The concept, as “product” of the faculty of understanding (thinking, i.e.), is formed by a process of 
“reflection”, which Heidegger describes as ‘the keeping-in-view of the one which applies to many’, that 
they may thus be ‘likened to one another’.462 The possibility of a priori synthetic judgements—and thus of 
ontological knowledge, beyond the pure intuition of space and time—necessarily requires a ‘pure concept 
[conceptus dati a priori]’, that is, ‘a “reflected” representation’ whose content’ is ‘obtainable a priori’, and 
not ‘read from appearances’.463 But how can the understanding—thinking, i.e.— whose usual function in 
concept formation is only that of a forming-out-of, an ‘empty...binding-together’464 of a concept, whose 
content, however, is ‘derived from the intuitable’ 465 —here itself be ‘capable of giving a content’466?  
 
Following the pattern of concept formation, previously given, the answer that seems to suggest itself is that 
the content of a pure concept should surely rather be derived from pure intuition. For Kant, however, says 
Heidegger, the answer is given in terms of the a priori existence of  ‘a manifold’ of the ‘pure unities of 
possible unification’,467 ‘in light of which a unifying in general [i.e., a pure conceptualisation] is possible’. 
Hence more than being just an empty “binding together”, the function of the understanding in pure concept 
formation is the representation of a priori unities, which, as pure concepts have this form already and are 
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thus their own content. Thus the pure concepts are not “reflected concepts”, but rather ‘concepts of 
reflection, or reflecting concepts’,468 which, for Kant ‘have the character of ontological predicates which 
have been called “categories” since ancient times’.469 There then follows some discussion, on Heidegger’s 
part, of the sufficiency of Kant’s investigation into the “essence” of the pure concepts, or categories; d but 
suffice it to say for our purposes here that, like pure intuition,e pure, a priori concepts are found to exist; 
thus a priori, transcendental knowledge is found to be possible.  
 
Imagination as pure synthesis 
The two “stems” of pure finite knowledge having duly been discovered, what of their mysterious “root”? 
Recalling that for both “stems” ‘”Representation...is the species”’ 470 it is perhaps not such a surprise when 
it is announced that ‘the essential construction of knowledge’, occurs by the pure, synthetic ‘power of the 
imagination’,471 which ‘holds the central [mediating] position’472 between them. For Heidegger, far from 
providing us with ‘the empty simplicity of an ultimate principle’; far from a facile “happy ending”, i.e., this 
revelation of the ‘essential unity of pure knowledge...as a multiform action which [as yet] remains obscure 
in its character,473 must instead be regarded as ‘the correct beginning of the laying of the ground for 
ontological knowledge’, of which, ‘because it [knowing] is an action’ the essence ‘can only become 
apparent to the extent that it is traced out in its springing-forth’474.  
 
The formation of pure finite knowledge as Schematism (and Schema-Image). 
For Kant, however, Heidegger informs us that it was very strange indeed to discover that the binding 
‘medium’ of transcendental synthesis together should be the imagination, and he repeatedly stressed ‘the 
obscurity into which all discussions of the Transcendental Deduction must move’475 because of it (N.B., 
here Kant is using the term “deduction” in not a logical, but a juridical sense). Kant nonetheless continued 
to strive towards developing his elucidation of transcendence into what Heidegger calls ‘the systematic 
totality of a presentation’,476 most notably in the 11-page section entitled On the Schematism of the Pure 
Concepts of the Understanding,477 which Heidegger holds to be ‘the central core’ of this entire ‘voluminous 
work’. In order to continue with our own elucidation, we must therefore turn to Heidegger’s treatment of 
the Schematism, in particular his discussion of ‘Making-Sensible’.  
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In order that a being might become its object, finite knowledge requires that there be a ‘turning-toward’ on 
the part of the finite creature, which turning-toward is at once an offering, of ‘the horizon of its possible 
encountering’, in which ‘the being might offer itself as such’. This ‘turning-toward’, or ‘letting-stand 
against’ which thus also has ‘the character of an offering’, must itself also have the character of ‘a 
preparatory bearing in mind of what is offerable in general’, that it –the offered—the offering-being, i.e., 
the object— may be ‘immediately...taken in stride in intuition’ in order that ‘the pure understanding’ may 
thus be ‘grounded in a pure intuition which guides it and sustains it’. Thus, in its turning-toward, the finite 
creature forms the “horizon” of its letting-stand-against in order that it might ‘“form” a look of the offering 
[being] from out of itself’.478  
 
This forming of the horizon ‘as a free turning-toward’, which, in forming the horizon, also ‘in 
general...provides for something like an image’, is accomplished by ‘the pure power of imagination’. This 
is what Heidegger calls ‘the double-forming of the look’;  at once the ‘making-sensible [i.e. intuitable] of 
the horizon’, and the letting-stand against’, understood as ‘a representing of unities as such which regulate 
all unification (pure concepts)’. Transcendence is thus ‘formed in the making-sensible of pure concepts’, 
and, for Kant, continues Heidegger, this ‘pure making-sensible occurs as a “Schematism”’.  
 
As intuition, pure sensibility must ‘necessarily’ take ‘what is intuitable in-stride’, and, as it is pure, it must 
innately do so ‘prior to all empirical receiving’. What, then, is taken-in-stride and made-sensible here? As it 
is finite, even pure, finite intuition ‘cannot exactly produce [i.e., create] an intuitable being’479—thus its 
‘pure making-sensible’ must be ‘the taking of something in stride which indeed is formed first of all in the 
taking-in-stride itself’,480 and this “something” is the “something like an image”, provided for by the power 
of the imagination. The qualifier, “something like-”, is essential here because the ‘pure making-sensible of 
pure concepts’ (ibid.) does not—indeed, cannot, offer an image per se, as represented in an ‘immediate 
look’ or ‘intuition’,481 since as we have seen, ‘what representation represents in the manner of the concepts 
[is]... the “in general”, as a ‘unity applicable to several’. As ‘a represented universal’, the concept is without 
a particular, and thus ‘cannot be represented in a repraesentio singularis’. How, then, may ‘the look of its 
possible likenesses [be] shared?’ 482  
 
Here Heidegger draws our attention to the three different ways he says Kant uses the word “image”, 
depending on what it is that ‘comes into view’, as follows: 
 
1. ‘The look of a determinate being to the extent that it is manifest as something at hand. It offers the 
look’. 
2. “A likeness taken”, i.e., ‘the look which takes a likeness of something at hand’. 
3. Image ‘can also have the full range of meaning of look in general’, whether or not ‘a being or a 
non-being will be intuitable in this look’.  
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To illustrate these image-kinds, Heidegger offers the successive examples of a corpse, its death mask, and a 
photograph of its death mask, drawing our attention to that fact that, extra to appearing as the image of a 
particular corpse/death mask/photograph, each image-kind also serves as an example of what it is “in 
general”, with the death mask as a likeness-image, and the photograph as an image of a likeness-image, 
offering successively more of these “in general” image “layers”; so that where the corpse offers the look of 
“a corpse in general”, the death mask offers both the look of “a death mask in general”, and also, as it is a 
likeness-image, it offers the look of “a corpse in general”. The photograph offers—and so on.483 
 
For in order to understand this “something like an image” that is provided for by the power of the 
imagination (as before), we must consider the question of what the “in general” look of something would 
be, but without the particular look of either a being at hand or a likeness—without, in fact, a look at all.  In 
short, this “something like an image” which regulates the specific ‘making-sensible’484 of the intuitable,  is 
not a “what”, but, rather a “how” of representation which Kant calls ‘the schema of this concept’485; whose 
‘formation in its fulfilment as the manner of making the concept sensible’  Kant calls schematism, and 
which occurs ‘primarily in the power of imagination’.486 Thus while ‘the representing of the rule is [called] 
the schema’,  since it is ‘related to something like an image, i.e., [since] the image character belongs 
necessarily to the schema’, the “general form”, or product of schematism, may be called the schema-image.  
 
The concept itself ‘is nothing’ beyond the ‘regulative unity’ of the schema, in which it is ‘grounded’ and to 
which it immediately refers, and the schema, in turn, ‘necessarily remains relative to possible schema-
images, of which no uniqueness can be demanded’. Thus e.g., when the concept of “dog” comes to mind,  
says Heidegger, ‘my power of imagination can specify the form [Gestalt] of a four-footed animal in 
general, without being limited to any particular form’. 487 As such,  in Kant’s own words: ‘it is not images 
{immediate looks} of the objects which lie at the foundation of our pure sensible concepts, but rather the 
schemata’. The schematism is thus the essence of conceptual representing, and thus of ‘all finite 
knowing’.488  
 
Thus, continues Heidegger, ‘If the Schematism belonging to the essence of finite knowledge and finitude is 
centred in transcendence then the occurrence of transcendence is at its innermost a schematism’. Thus, he 
continues, if Kant ‘is to bring to light ‘the ground for the inner possibility of transcendence’ it follows that 
he must ‘necessarily’ come across ‘a “transcendental schematism”’489—and so he does. 
 
Transcendental Schematism  
                                                           
483 M. Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, ibid. p.65 
484 M. Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, ibid. p.67 
485 I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 1st Ed. p.141, 2nd Ed. p.180 in M. Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, ibid. p.68 
486 M. Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, ibid. p.68 
487 M. Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, ibid. p.69 
488 M. Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, ibid. p.71. It is with this in mind, e.g., that Richard Taft, the English 
translator of this edition of Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, chooses to translate Heidegger’s term Vorblick (commonly 
“foresight”, lit. “preview”) for “the offering of the horizon of possible objectivity” as ‘schematizing premonition’. 
489 M. Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, ibid. p.71 
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Of course, the pure concepts, as pre-presenting the ‘rules in which objectivity in general as preliminary 
horizon for the encountering of all objects is formed’ cannot be brought into the same ‘kinds of schema-
images’ as those into which ‘the schemata of empirical and mathematical concepts’ are brought. Instead, 
the pure concepts are brought into what Kant calls the “pure image”—into time, that is, which, as ‘pure 
intuition, (for Kant, the pure succession of the sequence of nows)... is such as to procure a look prior to all 
experience’; a ‘pure look, which gives itself in such pure intuition’. 490 As such, time is thus ‘the pure image 
of the schemata of the pure concepts of the understanding’;491 and as the schemata of pure concepts refer 
‘essentially and necessarily to time’,492 it follows that the regulating unities they represent necessarily 
regulate the pure concepts of the understanding in time, which, as pure intuition, is also ‘their sole pure 
possibility of having a certain look’ at all. Thus ‘through internal self-regulation in time as pure look, the 
schemata of pure concepts... articulate the unique pure possibility of having a certain look into a variety of 
pure images’. In this way, the schemata of pure concepts are ‘”nothing but a priori determinations of time 
according to rules”’, or ‘”transcendental determinations of time”’. As such, they are themselves, for Kant, 
‘a transcendental product of the power of imagination.’493 This, then is the Transcendental Schematism, the 
very ‘ground for the inner possibility of ontological knowledge’.494   
 
Transcendental Schematism as Determination of Time 
Heidegger now pauses to outline what he describes as Kant’s ‘lapidary presentation’ of ‘the complete unity 
of the pure concepts of the understanding’, extracted ‘from the Table of Judgements’; also his ‘definitions 
of the schemata of the individual, pure concepts of the understanding of the Table of Notions’,495 and, 
according to ‘the four moments of the division of the categories (Quantity, Quality, Relation, Modality)’, 
the ‘four possibilities of formability’ which ‘the pure look of time must exhibit’ as ‘time-series, time-
content, time-order, and time-inclusiveness’.  While Heidegger concedes there is a certain point to all this, 
to the extent that ‘the more clearly the essential structure of...all that belongs to the whole of transcendence 
is brought to light’ the better we shall be able to ‘find our way in the darkness of these most original 
structures’,496 for Heidegger it would have been better still if instead Kant had  rather ‘developed’ this 
characterization ‘systematically through analysis’497 as he did, above, in ‘the Transcendental Schematism’, 
which Heidegger says he intends to prove is ‘no baroque theory but...created out of the phenomena 
themselves’.498 As proof, Heidegger offers an ‘admittedly...short and rough’ interpretation of the 
transcendental schema of the category of substance, which yields a number of further insights into the 
nature of time, as follows.  
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495 M. Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, ibid. p.74 
496 M. Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, ibid. p.75 
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 Time, he says, as ‘pure sequence of nows, is always now’ and ‘thus shows its own permanence’.499 Time is 
‘not one thing among others which lasts’—things may last, and change, and pass “in time” but time itself— 
“immutable and lasting”’ 500—does not pass.c  Time simultaneously ‘gives the pure look of something like 
lasting in general’, and ‘at the same time’, ‘the image of pure change in what lasts’, and as such, it ‘presents 
that which forms the ground in pure intuition’,501 since it is ‘”in this preliminary view of the pure image of 
persistence a being which as such is unalterable in the change can show itself for experience” (i.e., Being-
at-hand)’. Thus time, ‘given as a priori’ in the Transcendental Schematism, not only ‘bestows upon the 
horizon of transcendence the character of the perceivable offer’, but also, ‘as the unique pure, universal 
image...gives a preliminary enclosedness to the horizon of transcendence’, within which any given being 
‘can have this or that particular, revealed, indeed ontic horizon’.502 Thus, in summary, as Kant puts it,  
[there] is but one quintessence [Inbegriff] in which all our representations are 
contained, namely, the inner sense and its a priori form, time. The synthesis of 
the representations rests on the power of imagination, but their synthetic unity 
(which is required for judgement) [rests] on the unity of apperception.503  
Finite Transcendence as Creativity 
At once a ‘going-out-to’, a turning-towards which in the ‘standing-out-from’ at once ‘forms and therein 
holds before itself—a horizon’504, the “ecstatic-horizonal” forming of transcendence is at once the forming 
of the possibility of experience. To the question of: ‘Does not the finite creature become infinite through 
this creative behaviour?’ the answer in Kant, for Heidegger, is ‘absolutely not’—not, at least,  in the sense 
of intuitus originarius. Not only does ontological knowledge not create beings, it does not even ‘relate 
itself at all, thematically or directly to the being’, but rather to what Kant variously refers to as ‘the 
nonempirical object = “X”’; a ‘Something = X of which we know nothing...’  and a ‘Nothing [which] 
means: not a being, but nevertheless “Something”’, which Nothing-thing Heidegger defines ‘according to 
its essence...[as] pure horizon’.505  
 
Thus, as before, the apparent “creativity” of ontological knowledge, which lies in its “forming” of 
transcendence, ‘is nothing other than the holding-open of the horizon within which the Being of the being 
becomes discernable in a preliminary way’.506 Thus, writes Heidegger ‘if knowledge means: apprehending 
of beings’, then ‘ontological knowledge is no knowledge’ at all. However, says Heidegger, if truth, as the 
second condition for finite knowledge (the first being the very possibility of experience507) be taken to 
mean ‘unconcealment of’ [aletheia], rather than, e.g., “adequacy to”, as in the adequatio508) then while the 
‘original truth’, or “unconcealment” of transcendence ‘must bifurcate into the unveiledness of Being and 
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the openness [Offenbarkeit] of beings’ as above, since Kant has no other “use” here for ontological 
knowledge beyond that it ‘serves for the making-possible of finite knowledge’, let it simply be said that the 
truth of ontological knowledge lies in its ‘letting the being be encountered within the horizon’. 
 
Nonetheless, for Heidegger,  
it must at least remain open as to whether this “creative” knowledge, which is 
always only ontological and never ontic, bursts the finitude of transcendence 
asunder, or whether it does not just “plant” the finite “subject” in its authentic 
finitude. 509 
The Imagination 
So we come to the third section of the Kant book, and its ‘explicit characterization’ of the pure, synthetic 
‘power of imagination’, as ‘the formative centre of ontological knowledge’, as the ‘holding-open of the 
horizon which is discernable in advance through the pure schemata’, which themselves also ‘“spring-forth” 
as the “transcendental product”510 of the transcendental power of the imagination’. Thus, as a spontaneous 
‘”forming”’ of the horizon which is ‘simultaneously’ receptive, i.e., ‘takes things in stride’,511 the power of 
the imagination appears as a ‘faculty of forming [Vermögen des Bildens] in a peculiar double sense’, which 
“falls between” ‘both of the Kantian faculties of knowledge’, i.e., intuition and thinking, or sensibility and 
understanding.   For Heidegger, it is precisely this “falling between” which gives the power of imagination 
its ‘remarkably iridescent character’. 
  
But what exactly does he mean by this;  how exactly is this pure, spontaneous, double-forming, synthetic 
power of the imagination to be understood? 
 
 For Kant, says Heidegger, the power of imagination is, in general, ‘a faculty of comparing, shaping, 
combining, distinguishing and in general of binding-together (synthesis).’512 While, for  Kant, as he makes 
clear in his 1798 Anthropology, e.g., ‘not all productive power of imagination is pure’b, his Critique of Pure 
Reason is concerned only with the pure power of imagination; which, ‘to the extent that it forms 
transcendence’, says Heidegger, ‘is rightly called the transcendental power of imagination’, and which is 
regarded by Kant as the ‘third basic faculty’513of the mind, where faculty means a ‘basic ability of the 
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human soul to do something’; which “something”, in the case of the transcendental power of the 
imagination, is the forming of ‘the basis for all knowledge a priori’.514  
 
However, notes Heidegger, while Kant consistently characterizes ‘the essential unity of ontological 
knowledge’ as being comprised of the three elements of ‘pure intuition (time), pure synthesis by means of 
the imagination, and the pure concepts of apperception’; and while, in the Transcendental Deduction, Kant 
refers to the ‘“three original sources of the soul”’, he makes it explicitly clear elsewhere in the text, that our 
mind, or ‘power of knowledge’ itself has only two ‘basic sources’, i.e., the  two “stems” of pure sensibility 
and pure understanding. Moreover, observes Heidegger, the whole text is in fact structured, overall, 
according to this “two sources” thesis, i.e., in a way  ‘corresponding to the bifurcation of the whole 
transcendental investigation into a Transcendental Aesthetic [pertaining to intuition/sensibility] and a 
Transcendental Logic [pertaining to the understanding/thinking]’.  
 
Thus, for Heidegger,  as it is untreated in the Aesthetic where, he says, ‘as a “faculty of intuition”, it 
properly belongs’, and treated instead in the Logic, where, ‘strictly speaking’ it may never properly belong 
‘as long as logic remains confined to thought’, the transcendental power of imagination is effectively, left 
‘homeless’.515  
 
We are thus called to revisit  Heidegger’s opening characterization of the “origin”, or ground, in which 
metaphysics is rooted as a haunting, or visitation—literally, a “home seeking” [Heimsuchung]—of human 
nature; recalling, too the  “unknownness” of the “common root” to which the two stems of ‘pure intuition 
and pure thinking lead back’—and which, in its turn, in “binding-together”, it “forms” and “lets spring-
forth”d—which, while it yet retains a great deal of “unknownness”, we may now clearly identify as the 
“homeless” third faculty, itself, i.e., the transcendental power of imagination.516  
Strange root in a strange ground 
Even following the revelation of its structural “homelessness” in the Critique of Pure Reason, however, the 
question nonetheless remains, of in what the “unknown root” may be rooted.  Heidegger’s subsequent 
characterisation of ‘the transcendental power of imagination as ‘in general the origin of all that is 
“synthetic”’, that is, ‘the “syn” of the totality of space and time’517 adds nothing to our knowledge of its 
“ground”, or “origin”, which thus remains unknown, since all we have seen of its “rooting” so far is 
comprised of its binding-together of “stems”, as yet, it remains homeless. And, even as he commits himself 
to venture no further in his original unveiling of ‘the specific way in which the pure power of the 
imagination, pure intuition, and pure thinking hang together...than the Kantian ground-laying itself contains 
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indications of it’, Heidegger  now warns us that ‘the strangeness of the previously laid ground’ will only 
increase ‘with the growing originality’ of his own interpretation.   
 
For Heidegger, Kant’s use of the term “original” in his description of space and time as ‘original 
representations...is not to be understood...ontically or psychologically’, but rather as characterizing ‘the 
way according to which these representations are represented’, i.e., in their “springing-forth” and “being let 
spring forth”. In other words, the pure intuitions of space and time originate in the transcendental power of 
the imagination to let them “spring forth”; and so they do, at once “pro-posing” and taking-in-stride ‘the 
look of space and time as totalities which are in themselves manifold’, as such (in what Kant calls the 
Synopsis of pure intuition), in a ‘taking-in-stride’ which is ‘the formative self-giving of that which gives 
itself’. 518 This is what is meant by their being so “rooted”.  
 
Thus, just as the faculty of intuition is let-spring-forth, and thus able to “self-give” that which it “takes in 
stride” as object of intuition, i.e., ens imaginarium, by the transcendental power of the imagination; it is 
also by the transcendental power of the imagination that pure intuition gives itself such a look as it might 
catch sight of in advance, and thus by which the pure intuitions of time and space, as manifold totalities, are 
made intuitable as such. However, while Kant is clear that that which is ‘intuited in pure intuition as such is 
an ens imaginarium’, he is equally clear that time and space are not objects as such, but rather ‘”forms to be 
intuited”’, which are themselves ‘”the formal condition of ...appearance”’519.  
 
‘Pure space and time’ are not beings at hand, for Kant, i.e., they are no-thing.  And yet, as we have seen, as 
‘possible forms of the Nothing,’520 they are still ‘Something’521 intuitable; and, even as ‘intuitions without 
things’, they must ‘nevertheless have what is intuited in them.’ As Heidegger states that ‘on the grounds of 
its essence, pure intuiting is pure imagination’.522  
 
In this way, writes Heidegger, ‘the transcendental character of transcendental intuition is first clarified’, and 
‘the effort by the Marburg School...to apprehend space and time as “categories” in the logical sense and to 
absorb the Transcendental Aesthetic into the Logic’ is rendered ‘untenable’, save perhaps for the possible 
‘insight’, suggested but ‘admittedly not clarified’ as a motive for this attempt, ‘that the Transcendental 
Aesthetic, taken by itself, cannot itself constitute the whole of what lies closed up in it as a possibility. 
However’, he continues, the ‘interpretation’ of ‘the peculiar “syn”-character of pure intuition’ leads not to 
‘the belonging-together of pure intuition with the synthesis of the understanding’ but rather, to its origin in 
the transcendental power of imagination’, in which, for Heidegger ‘pure thinking’ is clearly also rooted.  
 
Pure Thinking as Pure Imagination 
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If pursued, this ‘interpretation’—according to which pure reason is found to originate in, i.e., to-be-formed-
and-let-spring forth-by the ‘essentially sensible’ and thus, traditionally, ‘lower and inferior faculty’523 of 
pure imagination—must lead inexorably to nothing less than the “fall” of pure reason from its traditional 
position as the highest faculty— a prospect for many in Heidegger’s day, as in Kant’s, much like the 
canopy of the sky being torn asunder, as Heidegger was well aware. He is thus quick here to reassure the 
reader that  
...it is not a question here of the empirical, explanatory derivation of a higher 
faculty of the soul from an inferior one. Provided that the consideration of the 
ground-laying the faculties of the soul are not substituted for the subject of the 
discussion in any way, then the order of precedence as to “lower” and “higher,” 
which grows out of such an arrangement of the faculties of the soul, likewise 
cannot guide us—not even for the purposes of an objection. 524 
The grounds for his reassurance are that, as we have seen, by no means every intuition ‘must already be 
sentient, empirical’, and therefore the supposedly ‘“more inferior” of the affections of the corporeally 
conditioned senses do not belong to the essence of sensibility’. Pure sensibility is a transcendental faculty. 
Its character of sensibility is no ground, therefore, for assigning ‘the transcendental power of the 
imagination’ to ‘the class of inferior faculties of the soul, especially not if, as transcendental, it is to be the 
condition for the possibility of all faculties’.  
 
Thus, now that ‘the most difficult (because it is the most “natural”) objection to a possible origin of pure 
thinking in the transcendental power of imagination has fallen’, he continues, ‘Reason can now no longer 
be claimed as “higher”’. And, in case it seems unpalatable to accept that pure thinking ‘springs forth from 
the transcendental power of imagination as a faculty’, Heidegger reminds us that the claim is “rooted” in 
the fact that, like intuition, thinking also belongs ‘to the same genus of pre-presenting [des Vorstellens]’, 525 
i.e., as we have seen, for both of them, “representation is the species”. More precisely, for Heidegger, that 
which essentially ‘characterizes the Being-understanding of the understanding’ lies in its ‘Being-
dependent’ ‘upon intuition...in the pure synthesis of the pure power of imagination’, wherein lies ‘the origin 
of thinking in the power of the imagination’.  
 
Heidegger finds evidence for this “Being-dependent” of thinking in Kant’s own interpretation, in both ‘the 
Transcendental Deduction and in the Doctrine of the Schematism’, e.g., in which, he says,  ‘the functions of 
judgment’ and ‘also the pure concepts as notions’ are presented as ‘artificially isolated elements of the pure 
synthesis [my italics]’, arguing that however Kant might appear to constantly orient himself with respect to 
formal logic ‘as if with respect to an “Absolute”, Kant’s ‘absorption’ of formal logic ‘into what he calls 
Transcendental Logic, which has the transcendental imagination as its theme’ shows a clear ‘rejection of 
[the independence of] traditional logic’526 as in the following statement (2nd edition):  
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And so the synthetic unity of apperception is the highest point to which we 
must ascribe all employment of the understanding, even the whole of logic, and 
in conformity with it, transcendental philosophy. Indeed, this faculty is the 
understanding itself.527 
Thus, continues Heidegger, former ‘preconceptions’528 of the independence of thinking as logic, suggested 
‘through the tactical existence of what was [note the past tense] apparently the highest and irreducible 
discipline of formal knowledge’ can no longer stand. Instead, the investigation of the ‘original essence of 
understanding’ must begin with just this essence, and while ‘the characterization of thinking as judging is 
indeed [still] appropriate’, for Heidegger its ‘designation’529 by Kant as ‘faculty of rules’ already ‘comes 
closer’,530 ‘because from there a way leads out’ to its ‘basic determination’531 as ‘pure apperception.’ 532  
 
These are such “rules”, or ‘represented unities’, that, held out in advance, thus ‘give direction to every 
possible unification that is represented’, and whose ‘proper affinity’ ‘must itself also be grasped...in 
advance in a lasting unity through a still more anticipatory pro-posing of them’.  This pro-posing is none 
other than ‘the basic impulse of the letting stand-against-of’, a ‘proposing [vorstellenden] self-orienting 
toward’ in which the “self” is at once ‘”thrown out” with it’. In this (“ecstatic-horizonal”) way, ‘the “I” of 
this “self” is necessarily apparent’, and always “goes with” in ‘the pure self-orientating’. This “I propose” 
which “accompanies” all representing’ is the ‘“I think”’, as an “I propose”—and always an “I think 
[something]”, e.g., ‘“I think substance”, “I think causality”—or rather, ‘always already [an] “it means”’. 533 
Thus ‘to the extent that in its preliminary self-orienting toward’, the “I” ‘brings’ the categories ‘to a 
point...from which, as represented, regulative unities, they can unify’, it is thus ‘the “vehicle” of the 
categories’.  As ‘a pre-forming of the horizon of unity’ which “represents from out of itself”’, ‘the pure 
understanding’ ‘does not bring forth’ these ‘pure schemata’ (which, as representations of unities, are rather, 
‘”a transcendental product of the imagination”’) but, rather, “works with them”’, and it is precisely in this 
‘working-with’, which, as ‘pure schematism...grounded in the transcendental power of imagination’, that 
constitutes ‘the original Being [-dependent] of the understanding’.  Thus it is, also, that ‘as representing 
which forms spontaneously, the apparent achievement of the pure understanding is a pure basic act of the 
transcendental power of imagination’. 534 
 
Now, if ‘this pure, self-orienting, self-relating-to’, is what is called ‘“our thought” [unseren Gedanken]’ by 
Kant, ‘then “this thought” [Gedankens] is no longer called judging, but is thinking in the sense of the free 
forming, and projecting (though not arbitrary) “conceiving” [Sichdenkens] of something’; and for 
Heidegger, such ‘original “thinking” is also pure imagining’.  
 
Even so, on the grounds of its essence as ‘the “I think”’, ‘the pure understanding...must [still] have the 
character of a “faculty of Ideas”, i.e. of reason’, without which we would have ‘“no coherent employment 
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of the understanding.”’ Since ‘Ideas “contain a certain completeness” [since] they represent the “form of a 
whole”’,  for Heidegger it is thus due to its character as a “faculty of Ideas”535 that ‘Kant calls the pure 
understanding a “closed unity.”’ Now, since Kant makes it very clear, in his ‘unfolding of the 
Transcendental Ideal, which “must serve...as rule and archetype”’ that it ‘acts completely differently’  with 
regards to ‘“creations of the power of imagination...of the kind which painters and physiognomists profess 
to have in their heads”’536, it might seem that the ‘connection between the Ideas of pure reason and those of 
the imagination has been expressly denied’. However, says Heidegger, what this essential determination of 
the Transcendental Ideal actually comes down to, is ‘simply’ that it “must always rest on determinate 
concepts,” and can be no arbitrary and blurred sketch of the empirical, productive power of imagination’, 
which determination in no way ‘rules out those “determinate concepts” possible only in the transcendental 
power of imagination’.  
 
Imagination/Pure Synthesis as Structural Possibility 
 Now, just as, ‘on the grounds of its purity’, pure, receptive intuition, having been shown to have ‘its 
essence in the transcendental power of imagination’, ‘the original unity of receptivity and spontaneity’, has 
thus also been shown, as such, to have been shown to have the character of spontaneity also, self-giving, as 
‘pure spontaneous receptivity’, by the transcendental power of imagination, that which it takes-in-stride; 
thus, continues Heidegger (for whom Kant’s equation of ‘the understanding and reason...with spontaneity’ 
can no more exclude ’a receptivity of understanding’ than his ‘equation of sensibility—finite intuition—
with receptivity’ turned out, ‘in the end’, to exclude ‘a corresponding spontaneity’ of intuition), surely if it, 
too, is to have its essence in the transcendental power of imagination, (‘the original unity of receptivity and 
spontaneity’, ibid.) pure spontaneous thinking must also surely be found to ‘exhibit the character of a pure 
receptivity.’ 537  And so it does, according to Heidegger, since  
If something, such as a ruling rule, is only there in the letting-be-ruled which 
takes things in stride, then the “Idea” as representation of the rule can only be 
represented in the manner of something which takes things in stride. In this 
sense, pure thinking itself, not after the fact, is capable of taking things in 
stride: i.e., it is pure intuition. This structural, coherent, receptive spontaneity 
must, accordingly, spring forth from the transcendental power of imagination 
in order to be what it is. 538  
 
Thus the essential receptivity of pure thinking, already belied as such by the earlier characterization of its 
productivity as a  “working with”, is found to lie in the “syn-” character of the transcendental power of 
imagination, the original unity, or root, in which both faculties, or “stems” originate, and which, ‘in its 
making possible of transcendence as the essence of the finite self’, ‘reveals itself more and more as 
structural possibility’. In this light, Heidegger finds that freedom, ‘insofar as this means placing oneself 
under a self-given necessity’, ’lies in the essence of pure understanding, i.e., [in]...pure theoretical reason’; 
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not because pure reason is spontaneous in character, but rather ‘because this spontaneity is a receptive 
spontaneity, i.e., because it is the transcendental imagination’. 539  
 
And since, according to Kant ‘“everything which is possible through freedom is practical”’540, Heidegger 
also finds the essence of practical reason to lie therein also, thus finding, in the Kantian “feeling”, of 
practical reason—which is after all always ‘having-a-feeling for’, and which therefore ‘feels itself 
herein’—an innate receptivity, e.g. in the “feeling” of ‘respect before the law’, which, as respect, for Kant, 
‘“is always directed towards persons, never toward things”’541, is therefore ‘respect before oneself’. If, in 
freedom, I ‘subordinate myself to the law’, the law is self-given; I freely receive the law from myself, and 
thus my respect before the law is submission ‘to myself as pure reason’. And this, writes Heidegger, this 
‘submitting, self-projecting onto the entire basic possibility of what authentically exists...is the essence of 
the acting Being-itself, i.e., of practical reason’—this is the authentic ‘Being-itself of the I’. 542  
 
The “Shrinking Back”  
Having come this far with his own interpretation, Heidegger now describes what he discerns as Kant’s  own 
“shrinking back”, in between the first and second editions of the Critique of Pure Reason, from his own 
further discovery of the “unknown root” of ‘the original, essential constitution of human kind [as] “rooted” 
in the transcendental power of the imagination’ (I note that here the imagination is clearly defined as that in 
which the “unknown root” is rooted, whereas earlier it has often rather been defined as the root itself). In 
the second edition, Heidegger finds Kant “thrusting” ‘the more original interpretation of the transcendental 
power of imagination’ that is to be found in the first edition aside, to offer, instead, ‘a new interpretation—
favouring the understanding’.543  
 
But for what reason?  
 
Heidegger’s best guess is that Kant suffered a bout of conservative vertigo at the brink of the “abyss” to 
which his original discovery of the “unknown root” had thus far been pushed to (as per its nature, since, as 
Heidegger, puts it, ‘the unknown is not that of which we simply know nothing. Rather it is what pushes 
against us [as] something disquieting in what is known’544), into which abyss, he feared that if ‘the primacy 
of Logic’ were to fall, ‘the lowest’ were ‘to take the place of the highest’, then  the whole ‘venerable 
tradition’ of metaphysics, must surely follow; not to mention the whole ‘architectonic’ of his Critique of 
Pure Reason, (i.e., its ‘division into Transcendental Aesthetic and Logic, etc) which would thus also have 
‘deprived itself of its own theme’.545 
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Some pages on Heidegger relents a little, finding Kant’s motivation to lie not only in said fear per se but 
also in his own increasing fondness for reason, which Heidegger finds to have drawn Kant increasingly 
‘under its spell’ (a strange way to describe the attraction of reason)546. Having thus outlined Kant’s 
“shrinking back”, Heidegger’s further comparative discussion of the two editions does not much concern us 
here, beyond that which Heidegger finds to be consistent between them, i.e., the fact that ‘the finitude of 
pure knowledge’ has ‘beset the problem from the beginning’, and inevitably so, as because ‘metaphysics’, 
as the ground-laying of the problem to which the Critique of Pure Reason refers, ‘belongs to “human 
nature”’, which is finite; thus human finitude is inevitably ‘decisive for the laying of the ground of 
metaphysics’.  
 
The real question here, for Heidegger, is whether ‘the previously laid ground’ of ‘the transcendental power 
of the imagination’ is ‘solid enough to determine originally, i.e., cohesively and as a whole, the finite 
essence’ of the subjectivity of the human subject?’ Without this question having being ‘decided’, he says, 
even ‘the more original interpretation’ of the first edition must remain ‘necessarily incomplete’—and thus 
he “picks up” where Kant left off, as follows. 
 
Finite-Being and Time 
As we have seen, says Heidegger, if ‘the transcendental power of imagination is to be the original ground 
[i.e., “root”, or origin] for the possibility of human subjectivity... it must make possible something like a 
pure, sensible reason’. Therefore, since the ‘universal meaning’ or metaphysical character of ‘pure 
sensibility’, (i.e., intuition) is time, and as pure reason is found to ‘stand in an original unity with pure 
sensibility, it stands to reason that the ‘“I think” of pure apperception’, should ‘stand in an original unity’ 
with time. Therefore, ‘the pure I’, which he says Kant is generally understood to have ‘placed outside of all 
temporality and all time’—should rather, in fact ‘be taken as “temporal”’. And, although it has not been 
seen in this light before, since pure sensibility has been found to have its origin in the transcendental 
imagination, time itself (as inner sense) is also ‘proven’ to thus ‘spring forth’.547  
 
Exactly how is time so “grounded”?  
 
As we have seen, for Kant, time is the pure, sequential succession of nows; self-given and taken-in-stride as 
such by pure intuition. As such, the taking-in-stride is not confined to that of the “now” which is present, 
since if it were, the pure intuition would intuit neither ‘the sequence of nows’ as a sequence, nor ‘the 
horizon formed’ of time’s sequentiality. And, insofar as the “look” of the now is necessarily intuited as 
having ‘an essentially continuous extension in its having-just-arrived and its coming-at-any minute’, neither 
is it is possible to “single out” any single now as such from the succession. Thus, it follows, for Heidegger, 
that what is intuited in pure intuition ‘is not related to something which is only a presence and is related 
least of all to a being which is at hand’. What with its ‘free moving character’, it must surely follow, he 
continues, that “at bottom”, pure intuition of, and as time ‘is the pure power of imagination’.  
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As we have seen, according to the “previously-laid ground,” ‘the forming [Bilden] of the “imagination” is 
in itself relative [i.e., receptive] to time’. As such, according to its character as spontaneous receptive unity, 
‘pure imagining’ must first of all form’ the ‘fabric [Gebilde]’ of time ‘from out of itself’. Heidegger now 
refers us to the ‘threefold, trinitarian character of forming in the imagining of the power of the imagination’ 
given by Kant in ‘his lectures on Metaphysics, namely in the Rational Psychology’, in which the faculty of 
forming, or ‘”forming power” [bildende Kraft]’ is divided into three further faculties:  
 
Facultus formandi, the faculty of “taking a likeness” [Abbildung], or representing the present time 
Facultus imaginandi, the faculty of reproduction [Nachbildung], as representation, of a past time 
Facultus praevidendi, the faculty of prefiguration, as representation, of a future time548 
 
The full concept of time given here, ‘for the first time’, by Heidegger, is that ‘Time as pure intuition is the 
forming intuiting of what it intuits in one’, i.e., at once. The forming of ‘the pure succession of the 
sequence of nows as such’ by the pure intuition is possible because the pure intuition is ‘in itself a likeness-
forming, prefiguring, and reproducing power of the imagination’. The ‘sequence of nows’, in itself, is 
therefore by no means ‘time in its originality’—original time is rather the ‘letting spring forth’ of time, as 
‘sequence of nows’—of the spontaneous, receptive power of transcendental imagination. Thus time, i.e., 
pure intuition i.e., the “inner sense”, is “within” us. Having so far “sifted” this ‘wide-ranging interpretation’ 
out from a ‘few intimations’549 of Kant’s found in another text, Heidegger now returns to the Critique of 
Pure Reason and sets about trying to ground this interpretation more securely, beginning with an enquiry 
into the inner temporal character of the transcendental imagination. Since Kant describes the power of 
imagination as that of ‘“synthesis in general”’550, Heidegger returns to the Transcendental Deduction, in 
which Kant elucidates the three “modes” of synthesis corresponding with the three elements of knowledge 
(pure intuition, pure imagination, and pure understanding), as follows: 
 
Synthesis as apprehending (which corresponds to intuition) 
Synthesis as reproducing (which corresponds to imagination) 
Synthesis as recognizinga (which corresponds to understanding)551 
 
For Kant, all of ‘our representations’—i.e., all that we apprehend, reproduce, recognize—are fundamentally 
‘subject to time’.552 In any ‘empirical intuition...of a “this here”, a manifold is always revealed’553, wherein 
it is only because our mind distinguishes time, by ‘saying constantly and in advance “now and now and 
now”’ that we are able to ‘encounter “now this” and “now that” and “now all this in particular”’. Thus 
intuition, as apprehension, is itself synthetic, in its “taking in” of the manifold as a repraesentio singularis, 
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and, at once, in its time-forming, from out of itself, the sequence of nows that it apprehends as such. Thus 
the faculty of pure intuition, as apprehending mode of synthesis, forms the now.  
 
As a mode, the second, reproductive mode of synthesis, [Einbildung], is not found to be identical with the 
transcendental power of imagination [tranzendentalen Einbildungskraft], the character of which is that of 
“synthesis in general” (and which the modes of synthesis are therefore modes of); 554 the second mode is 
rather the synthetic mode of empirical representing, in which the mind can re-present “the being” as object, 
with or without the actual presence of the being. And since, for Kant, says Heidegger, there is a certain 
ideality to such representations, i.e., since ‘Such imagination presupposes’ the possibility that the mind 
may, in ‘bringing forth again representationally the being represented earlier’, ‘represent it in a more actual 
unity with the being directly perceived from time to time’, in unifying, bringing forth which is only 
possible if the once-represented being is not “lost from thought”, i.e. forgotten. This not-losing-from 
thought, i.e., successful memory and recall, requires the mind to differentiate time in order to identify as 
such ‘the being experienced earlier’. The retention and unification of ‘the no longer now as such’ and its 
unifying with ‘the specific now’ which is required a priori ‘occurs in pure reproduction as a mode of pure 
synthesis of the pure power of imagination’.  
 
What is produced in this apparently “productive reproduction” (which for Heidegger makes as much sense 
as ‘a square circle’) of ‘pure synthesis in the mode of reproduction’, is ‘having-been-ness [Gewesenheit] as 
such’, i.e., ‘the horizon of the earlier’, which it ‘brings into view’ and ‘holds open as such in advance’; and, 
as such, is time forming. Thus, is called reproductive not because it attends to a being experienced earlier as 
such, but because, in doing so, it ‘forms the possibility of reproduction in general’. 555  
 
It thus follows, for Heidegger, that as the original unity of these modes, the transcendental power of 
imagination ‘can also be the origin of time (as unity of present and having-been-ness)’, without which 
original unity, ‘”the purest and first grounding representations of space and time could not spring forth even 
once”’.556 Kant’s presentation of the third mode of synthesis (in which we might reasonably except to find 
the time-forming of the future) begins with ‘a character of empirical recognition’,557 and, just as empirical 
recognition is the ‘synthesis of the same, i.e., the holding of the being before us as one which is the same,’ 
pure recognition is also unifying recognition, constitutive of the “sameness” of time, as that which beings 
are encountered as having ‘presence in sameness’—and hence as if being-present in the “sameness”, or 
“substance”, of time, almost as if in the “where” of now. Pure recognition thus gives the “manifold” of time 
its continuity, i.e., it gives the timeness of time, presently experienced as the now-here.  The importance of 
the third mode of synthesis lies, in Kant’s own words, in the fact that: 
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Without consciousness of the fact that what we are thinking is the same as what 
we thought in an instant before, all reproduction in the series of representations 
would be in vain.  558 
It thus emerges that the so-called “third” mode of synthesis is, in fact, the first and most original,  ‘which in 
the first place directs the other two’; occurring necessarily ‘in advance of them’, and whose “advance 
unifying recognition”,559 Kant calls a reconnoitering, a ‘watching out for’560. As reconnaissance, this mode 
of synthesis explores ‘the horizon of being-able-to-hold-something-before-us [Vorhaltbarkeit] in general’, 
and ‘as pure, its exploring is the original forming of this preliminary     [ potential for “fore-holding” b] i.e., 
the future’—which pure “fore-holding” is ‘an act of the pure power of the imagination’. 561  
 
And thus, for Heidegger, since ‘the most original essence of time' is developed from the fore-holding of the 
“same” of pure recognition, as a modal power of the pure synthesis of the transcendental imagination, it 
surely follows that ‘the transcendental power of imagination is original time’. 562 That is to say, time is 
pure, self-activating self-affection, and ‘only pure intuition to the extent that it prepares the look of 
succession from out of itself...as the formative taking in stride [and]... without the aid of experience.’ 
 
Finite-Being as Time 
Thus time, as self activating, self-affection is ‘precisely what in general forms something like the “from-
out-of-itself-toward-there”’ ‘so that the upon-which looks back and into the previously named toward-
there’, 563 and such, precisely that which ‘forms the essential structure of subjectivity’.564 The “it” against 
which the “turning-toward” of the taking-in-stride lets-stand-against in pure self affection is none other than 
the “I” of pure apperception, and it is in the letting-stand-against of pure self affection that ‘finite selfhood 
is formed in an original way...so that the self can be something like self consciousness.’ Thus, pure self-
affection ‘determines the innermost essence of transcendence’,565 and, as such is what characterises the 
finitude of knowledge, which is thus ‘drawn to centre stage’,566 as the ‘temporal character of finite 
selfhood’ is revealed’. Time is not ‘”in the mind” “along with” pure apperception’—rather it ‘already lies 
within pure apperception’ ‘as the grounds for the possibility of selfhood’, ‘and so it [is that which] first 
makes the mind into a mind’. What all this comes down to, for Heidegger, is that 
‘Time and the I think...are the same.’ 567 
Returning again to certain passages in the Transcendental Deduction and the Schematism, Heidegger now 
finds a striking similarity between Kant’s description of the I of pure apperception—as ‘fixed and 
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perduring...the correlate of all our representation’568—and his description of time—as ‘unchanging and 
perduring...Time does not elapse’569—in which similarity, says Heidegger, the ‘transcendental essence of 
time comes to light’. With regard to the I, however, says Heidegger, the question must arise of whether this 
correlative perdurance of the “pure I of apperception” does not indicate ‘that the I is not temporal?’  
 
On the contrary, for Heidegger, it is rather that ‘the I is so “temporal” that it is time itself, and that [it is] 
only as time itself, according to its ownmost essence’,570 that the I becomes possible. Thus Kant’s “fixed” 
and “perduring” are found not to be ‘ontic assertions about the I, but rather transcendental determinations’ 
according to which the I of pure apperception is the fixed “point” within ‘the horizon...within which what is 
objective becomes experienceable’, i.e. within the ‘horizon of selfhood’, which is formed in the fore-
holding—i.e. the letting-standing-against-itself—of ‘something like fixedness and perduring in general’. In 
no sense, for Heidegger, did Kant did mean that there was ‘something like a mental substance’, or that the I 
of apperception ‘in a certain sense is infinite and eternal’. 571  
 
No, for Heidegger, it is 
Precisely because in its innermost essence the self is originally time itself, the I 
cannot be grasped as” temporal”, i.e., as within time.  Pure sensibility (time) 
and pure reason are not just of the same type; rather they belong together in the 
unity of the same essence, which makes possible the finitude of human 
subjectivity in its wholeness’. 572 
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The Disputation at Davos  
 
Since Heidegger’s Kant and The Problem of Metaphysics  was written up in ‘three weeks of uninterrupted 
work’573, immediately following his ‘Davoser Hochschule  course (March 17-April 6, 1929), based on the 
preparatory work’ for those lectures574 and his  notorious disputation with Cassirer, it is only proper that for 
the fourth and final German edition of the Kant book, along with his own summary notes of three lectures 
he gave there, Heidegger also appended a transcript of the disputation, which is not word for word but 
rather, in Heidegger’s own words, ‘a ‘subsequent elaboration... compiled by O.F. Bollnow and J. Ritter 
who were participants in the Davos course...based on notes taken at the time.’575 It is Bollnow and Ritter’s 
“elaboration” I will discuss here.  
 
In opening the disputation, Ernst Cassirer asks Heidegger to clarify what it is exactly that he understands by 
neo-Kantianism, which appears—unfairly, to Cassirer—to have become ‘the whipping boy of the newer 
philosophy’.576  
 
Heidegger replies succinctly and in detail, naming names. The common origin of these neo-Kantianisms, 
for Heidegger, is their response to the predicament of philosophy ‘since about 1850’, wherein the ’totality 
of beings’, i.e., ‘the totality of what is knowable’,  had been ‘divided up’ between ‘the human and natural 
sciences’; the predicament thus being that of ‘what still remains of Philosophy’; i.e., of what sort of 
knowledge might be proper to it.  
 
The defining neo-Kantian response was to cast Kant, retrospectively, ‘as a theoretician of the mathematico-
physical theory of knowledge’—and in so doing, to align Kantian theory with the prevailing ideal of 
knowledge, in much the same way that, in the Kant book, Heidegger describes Kant himself as having 
aligned the methodology for his own metaphysics.577 For Heidegger, however,  that which ‘came to be 
extracted here as theory of [philosophy as] science was nonessential for Kant’.  What Kant really wanted to 
do, acc. Heidegger, was to ‘point out the problematic of metaphysics, which is to say the problematic of 
ontology’. Here then is the fundamental point of divergence between his own interpretation of the Critique 
of Pure Reason and those he characterizes as neo-Kantian, which he further differentiates by stating the 
need to apprehend ‘the problem of reason’ as a positive problem,  as per his own interpretation, rather than 
in the negative form in which in which it first appears in the Transcendental Logic, and in such a way that 
the way in which ‘appearance necessarily belongs to the nature of human beings’ may be grasped, i.e., 
taken hold of, ‘from the beginning’, rather than just stated as ‘ a matter of fact’.578   
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Cassirer responds by saying that while of course he himself recognizes ‘the position of mathematical 
natural science’, so ‘much else has emerged’, that it could only ‘serve as a paradigm and not as the whole 
of the problem’. He then goes on to what he identifies as ‘Heidegger’s basic systematic problem’579, i.e., 
that of the power of imagination in relation to human finitude, and the finitude of finite knowledge. Starting 
from what he says is their one point of agreement, i.e., that ‘the productive power of imagination appears in 
fact to have a central meaning for Kant’, Cassirer says that it was from this point which he himself was ‘led 
through’ his ‘work on the symbolic’, which thus cannot be “unravelled” ‘without referring it to the faculty 
of the productive power of imagination’ as ‘the connection of all thought to the intuition’, which Kant has 
named as ‘Synthesis Speciosa’. While Cassirer also grants his agreement that for Kant synthesis is indeed 
‘the basic power [Grundkraft] of pure thinking’, on which it depends, he wishes to add, however, that—as 
its Kant-given name implies—the synthesis upon which pure thinking ‘primarily’ depends is that which 
‘serves the species’. It is this ‘problem’ in particular, i.e., that of the “species” which is served by pure 
synthesis—which has lead Cassirer to what, for him, is ‘the core of the concept of image, the concept of 
symbol’, and thus toward his own philosophy of symbolic forms.  
 
For himself, however, Cassirer says he has always found ‘Kant’s main problem’ to be the problem of 
finitude and transcendence in relation to the ethical, wherein, according to the Kantian ethics [Ethik], the 
condition of the law set up according to the Categorical Imperative is that it must not be ‘valid by chance 
just for human beings, but for all rational entities [Vernunftwesen] in general’. Thus, he continues, with the 
‘falling away’ of ‘restrictedness to a determinate sphere’, a remarkable transition is effected whereby ‘the 
ethical [das Sittliche] as such leads beyond the world of appearances’. This “transition” is ‘so decisively 
metaphysical’, according to Cassirer, that what follows must be characterised as a ‘breakthrough’ to ‘the 
mundus intelligibilis’, wherein ‘an Absolute’ is ‘set in place’ which ‘cannot be illuminated historically’. 
That Kant characterised this transition as such a breakthrough is uncontestable, says Cassirer; and while, he 
says, he does not wish to deny that ‘Kant fled from Heidegger’s problem’, i.e., the “shrinking-back”; for 
himself, he would rather draw attention to this ethical Absolute, upon which ‘sphere’, he says, Kant 
continues to expand throughout the Critique of Pure Reason.  
 
For Cassirer, he says, the reason that Kant ‘forbids’ the schematising of the ethical, offering instead a Typic 
of Practical Reason,  is that  ‘our concepts of freedom, etc, are insights (not bits of knowledge) which no 
longer permit schematizing’; insights, it is implied, into the mundus intelligibilis, and which refer to the 
Absolutes, such as e.g., “Absolute Freedom”, which inhere therein. For Cassirer, this is where Heidegger’s 
interpretation starts to go all wrong, and continues to do so, as follows. For while Heidegger rightly 
emphasizes the finitude of human knowledge, and thus in due course the question of how a ‘finite creature 
in general’ may ‘come to have knowledge, to have reason, to have truth’, says Cassirer,  Heidegger’s own 
response to this question—paraphrased by Cassirer as being that ‘there can be no truths in themselves, nor 
can there be any external truths at all’, adding that ‘Rather, in so far as they occur in general, truths are 
relative to Dasein’—is, for Cassirer, to mistake or ignore the fact that for Kant, according to Cassirer, the 
problem was rather that of how, ‘without prejudice’ to human finitude ‘there can ‘nevertheless...be 
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necessary and universal truths’.580 ‘Does Heidegger’, he asks, ‘want to renounce’ entirely ‘this Objectivity, 
this form of absoluteness’?581  Does he really, implies Cassirer, wish to read Kant against Kant? 
 
Heidegger response is that, first of all, for Kant ‘the being of Nature’ ‘never signifies: object of 
mathematical natural science’, but rather ‘a being in the sense of what is at hand’. What Kant sought to give 
in the Doctrine of Principles, he says, was thus ‘a theory of beings in general, without assuming Objects 
[as]...given’, and ‘without assuming a determinate region of beings (either psychic or physical)’ —so much 
for the Objectivity of Absolute truth. As for the problem of ‘the power of imagination’ says Heidegger, 
‘Cassirer wants to show that finitude becomes transcendent in the ethical writings’. For Heidegger, he says, 
it is precisely ‘the concept of the Imperative as such’ which ‘shows the inner reference to a finite creature,’ 
wherein we are mistaken, according to Heidegger, if in our approach to the Kantian ethics ‘we orient 
ourselves too much towards ‘that to which ethical action conforms [i.e. serves] and see too little of the inner 
function of the law itself for Dasein’.  Heidegger adds the observation that in any case, for Kant, this 
‘going-beyond to something higher is always just a going-beyond to the finite creature, to one which is 
created (angel)’, and as such even ‘this transcendence still remains within the sphere of creatureliness and 
finitude’.582 While, says Heidegger,  he does not deny that ‘something which goes beyond sensibility lies 
before the law’, the question nevertheless remains, he says, of whether the ‘inner structure of Dasein itself’ 
is ‘finite or infinite’? Thus, even the question of human finitude is to be problematised, for Heidegger, and 
not just stated as a given. As far as ‘the possibility of finitude in general’ is concerned, he says, it can be 
‘formally argued simply’ that in order to ‘determine the finite as finite, I must already have an idea of 
infinitude’, which reasoning offers ‘this character of infinitude as [idea]...constituent of finitude’. Now 
reversing a syntactical device of Cassirer’s, Heidegger offers another interpretation of pure synthesis, i.e., 
the transcendental power of imagination as described by Kant in the Schematism as exhibito originaria, 
i.e., an ‘originality’ in which, however, as it is ‘an exhibito of the presentation of the free self-giving’, there 
nonetheless ‘lies a dependency upon a taking-in-stride’. Thus, while ‘in a certain sense this originality is 
indeed there as creative faculty’, and to this extent the human being as finite creature might be said to have 
‘a certain infinitude in the ontological’, its infinitude is never absolute, i.e. ontic; it is ontological, rather, ‘in 
the sense of the understanding of Being’. 
  
Thus for Heidegger; since, for Kant, ontological understanding is only possible ‘within the inner experience 
of beings’, the ‘infinitude of the ontological’ is so essentially bound to finite, ‘ontic experience’, even as 
‘the index of finitude’, that, for Heidegger, this infinitude which breaks out in the power of imagination is 
precisely the strongest argument for [the] finitude [of Dasein]’.583 Turning now to Cassirer’s ‘counter-
question with reference to the concept of truth’, which he finds to have now been ‘elevated in importance’, 
Heidegger states that ‘We are a being which holds itself in the unconcealedness of beings’. ‘To hold 
                                                           
580 This, for Cassirer, is the core of Kant’s problem:  How might 'synthetic a priori judgements...which are not simply finite in their 
content, but...necessarily universal’ be possible? And wherein, for Cassirer lies the reason for Kant’s exemplification of mathematics, 
which, as that in which ‘finite knowledge places itself in a relationship to truth which does not develop an “only”, might provide a 
model for how ‘this finite creature’ might ‘come to a determination of objects which as such are not bound to finitude’. In M. 
Heidegger, Appendix IV, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics p.195 
581 In M. Heidegger, Appendix IV, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics p.195 
582 M. Heidegger, Appendix IV, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics p.196 
583 In M. Heidegger, Appendix IV, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics p.197 
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oneself’ thus, Heidegger calls ‘Being-in-Truth’;  thus, for Heidegger, ‘truth itself is unified with the 
structure of transcendence on the most intimate level in order for Dasein to be a being open to others and to 
itself’. Here, again Heidegger’s approach is more inclined toward “the inner function of Truth itself for 
Dasein”, than to “that to which Truth conforms”, wherein the Truth is (only) “out there” to the extent to 
which to “Be-in-truth” is to  ‘hold oneself in the openness of beings’.d  This recalls Heidegger’s preference, 
in the Kant book, for the sense of “truth” as aleitheia, “unconcealedness”, over truth as adequatio.  
 
As for Cassirer’s last question, that of whether Heidegger would really be content to settle for what Cassirer 
has taken for an absolute relativism—in a bad sense—over absolute, universal, external truths, Heidegger 
replies that his statement that ‘truth is relative to Dasein...is no ontic assertion of the sort where I say: the 
true is always only what the individual human being thinks’.585 He continues ‘If Dasein does not exist, there 
is no truth, and then there is nothing at all. But with the existence of something like Dasein, truth first 
comes in Dasein itself’. For Heidegger, the ‘truth-content’ of knowledge, i.e., that which may be 
“redeemed” as “objective”, is that which has the character of saying ‘something about the being’, i.e., 
‘according to the respective, factical, individual existence’. Thus, for Heidegger it is a poor interpretation of 
the ‘peculiar validity of which [Kant] spoke’, i.e., of truth-value, ‘if we say: In contrast to the flow of 
experience there is a permanence, the eternal, the sense and concept’. What, after all, asks Heidegger, does 
‘the eternal actually mean here?’ What, and from where, do we know of it? Rather than something to be 
understood in contrast to experience, he asks, is ‘eternality not just that which is possible on the grounds of 
an inner transcendence of time itself’, in which ‘something like the permanence of the substance is 
constituted for the first time’? 
 
‘Since antiquity’ says Heidegger, ‘the problem of Being’ has been ‘interpreted on the basis of time in a 
wholly incomprehensible sense and that time always announced the subject’.  Thus, he continues, this 
clarification of ‘the temporality of Dasein’, has been necessary so that the ‘question concerning human 
Dasein’ might be ‘posed’ ‘in a wholly determined problematic’586—according to which we are not in time, 
or even eternity as “the subject”, but, rather, the very possibility of eternity is “grounded” in the inner 
transcendence of Dasein.  Thus if the possibility of the understanding of Being, and of transcendence, and 
of the ‘formative comporting toward beings and of the historical happening in the world history of man’ is 
to be possible, once ‘this possibility has been grounded in an understanding of Being, and if this ontological 
understanding has been oriented...with respect to time’—the task in hand is ‘to bring out the temporality of 
Dasein with reference to the possibility of the understanding of Being’.  
 
Heidegger adds that while he can see how, from his taking ‘the analytic of Dasein in Being in Time’ as ‘an 
investigation of man’, Cassirer could then come to ‘pose the question of how’ ‘the understanding of culture 
                                                           
d There is also, for that matter, a ‘Being-in-untruth,’ which also ‘belongs to the innermost core of the structure of Dasein’, and in 
which Heidegger believes ‘to have found for the first time the root upon which Kant’s metaphysical “appearance” is metaphysically 
grounded. M. Heidegger, Appendix IV, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics pp.197 
585 In M. Heidegger, Appendix IV, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics pp.197-8 
586 In M. Heidegger, Appendix IV, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics  p.198 
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and a cultural sphere is to be possible’ ‘on the grounds of this understanding of man’587, he continues that 
however ‘all of these questions are inadequate’ to his (Heidegger’s) ‘central problem’588.  
 
Heidegger then proceeds with an “adequate” laying out of the core of his analytic of Dasein, and, when he 
has done so, he poses three questions for Cassirer, as follows:  
 
1. What path does man have to infinitude? And what is the manner in which man can participate in 
infinity?  
2. Is infinitude to be attained as privative determination of finitude, or is infinitude a region in its 
own right?  
 
3. To what extent does philosophy have as its task to be allowed to become free from anxiety? Or 
does it not have as its task to surrender man, even radically, to anxiety?589 
 
As to the first question, Cassirer replies that man can participate in, and has access to infinity ‘in no way 
other than through’ the medium of form’; the ‘function’ of which, for Cassirer, being that through which, 
while “he” ‘changes the form of his Dasein’, “man” transposes ‘everything in him which is lived 
experience into some objective shape in which he [too] is objectified in such a way...that he does not 
thereby become radically free from the finitude of the point of departure’ (i.e., that of ‘his particular 
finitude’). For Cassirer is not that man may ‘make the leap from his own proper finitude’ into ‘a realistic 
infinitude’, but rather that, while remaining ‘connected to his ‘particular finitude’, man has, in the ‘function 
of form’, or forming, the “metabasis” which ‘leads finitude out into something new’—i.e., from ‘the 
immediacy of his existence’ into the ‘immanent infinitude’ of ‘the region of pure form’. This, for Cassirer, 
is the sole form in which man ‘possesses his infinity’, and from which ‘spiritual realm’, or “region”, 
‘infinity flows to him’. This is not, for Cassirer, ‘a metaphysical spiritual realm’, but rather ‘just the 
spiritual world created from himself. That he could create it is the seal of his infinitude’.   
 
2. To Heidegger’s second question, Cassirer replies that infinitude is ‘not just a private determination’. 
Neither is it ‘obtained in a purely negative way in addition to the finite’; ‘instead’, for Cassirer, it is an 
altogether stranger sphere’, and, ‘in a certain sense...just the totality, the fulfilment of finitude itself’—but 
which ‘fulfilment [itself] exactly constitutes infinitude’. Here, Cassirer quotes Goethe, saying ‘”If you want 
to step into infinitude, just go in all directions into the finite”’. Thus, he continues, ‘as it goes in all 
directions’, finitude ‘steps out into infinitude’, becoming ‘the opposite of privation...the perfect filling-out 
of finitude itself’. 590  
 
3. Cassirer finds Heidegger’s third question to be quite radical, and only answerable, he says, ‘with a kind 
of confession’. To the extent to which ‘man can just become free’,  says Cassirer, philosophy ‘frees man—
to be sure, in a certain radical sense—from anxiety as mere disposition’. ‘Freedom, he continues, ‘can 
properly be found along the path of progressive freeing’—an interpretation, he says, with which he believes 
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588 In M. Heidegger, Appendix IV, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics p.199-200 
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that Heidegger ‘can agree’, notwithstanding  ‘that the most difficult problem is to be found here’. Then, in 
what I take to be a further move toward reconciliation,  Cassirer adds that he ‘would like the sense, the 
goal, in fact the freeing, to be taken in this sense [again quoting Goethe]: “Anxiety throws the earthly from 
you.” That’, he says, ‘is the position of idealism which I have always been acquainted’591.  
 
The discussion is now punctuated by an interjection from Hendrik J. Pos (a Dutch philologist who, 
according to Peter Eli Gordon, had  ‘strong leanings toward Cassirer’592), who offers the ‘philological 
remark’ that as the two disputants speak completely different languages, the task falls to the audience of 
‘extracting something common’593. Cassirer having, in Pos view’, made his own attempt at “translation”, 
Pos requests that Heidegger acknowledge such translation to be possible.  
 
Heidegger, however, determined to maintain ‘rigour’ and the ‘clarity’ of the problem, is thus against any 
such ‘process of levelling’,594 adding that what he calls Dasein ‘does not allow translation into a concept of 
Cassirer’s.’ Cassirer replies that while he too is ‘opposed to levelling’, he nonetheless feels that ‘a common 
centre’ must be sought, and indeed may be found, in no other than ‘the primal phenomenon of language’, as 
that which allows individuals to communicate without, he says, ever superseding their difference, or 
overriding the fact that ‘each of us speaks his own language’. Just as for Heidegger, says Cassirer, there 
appears to be something transcendent like time, for Cassirer, ‘there is something like the language’,  i.e., 
‘something like a unity which is higher than the infinitude of the various ways of speaking’.  Thus, for 
Cassirer, translation is possible, through ‘the world of the objective [objektiven] spirit’, or ‘forms’; through 
which, and only through which, he says, is a ‘way from Dasein to Dasein’.  
 
 Cassirer continues that according to his understanding, ‘what Kant called the Copernican turn’ in no way 
“did away” with ‘the question of Being’,595but rather ushered in a new metaphysics in which Being is ‘no 
longer the Being of a substance’, as per, he says, ancient metaphysics, ‘but rather the Being which starts 
from a variety of functional determinations and meanings’; i.e., in each case, from the factum. What, he 
asks, makes ‘the language of the factum’ possible? How is ‘this, about which we are able to come to an 
understanding, thinkable from Dasein to Dasein in this medium?’596  
 
Heidegger, in response, says that while ‘Plato’s question’  (i.e., that of ‘what is the being?’)597‘must be 
retrieved’, ‘this cannot mean that we retreat to the Greeks’ answer’. For his part, he says, he is ‘anxious to 
establish’ the ‘sense of Being in general’ in order that, ‘based on the idea of Being’,  ‘the inner multiplicity 
of the ways of Being’ might be come to be understood.  His investigation has been concerned only with the 
need ‘to attain the horizon for the question concerning Being, its structure and multiplicity’. ‘Mere 
mediating’, for Heidegger, ‘will never amount to anything productive’, whereas while previously 
philosophy has been ‘confined within the finitude of human beings as something which is not a creative 
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human achievement’, once it is understood that ‘philosophy opens out onto the totality and what is highest 
in man, finitude must appear in philosophy in a completely radical way’. Finally—and one gets the distinct 
feeling that here Heidegger is addressing those ‘youngest’ amongst the audience, for whose ‘powers’ he 
holds such strong hopes598—Heidegger says that the one thing ‘you’ should take ‘with you from our 
debate’, is the feeling that ‘we are on the way toward once again getting down to business with the central 
question of metaphysics’—on top of which, he says, he would like to add that while the ‘freeing of itself 
[i.e., of philosophy] from the difference of positions and standpoints’, is essential ‘in the debate with the 
history of philosophy’, it is also essential, he concludes, to see ‘precisely how the differentiation of 
standpoints is the root of the philosophical endeavour’.599 
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Chapter Five: Corbin’s Imaginal 
 
The esoteric terrain described in Henry Corbin’s paper “Mundus Imaginalis, or the Imaginary and the 
Imaginal” is so extraordinary that it might appear remarkable to find, in the closing paragraph, a statement 
which so clearly identifies this “later Corbin” as the early translator of Heidegger; as he concludes that  
in the sense that they break the reciprocal isolation of consciousness and its 
object, of thought and being, phenomenology is now an ontology. 
Undoubtedly, this is the postulate implied in the teaching of our authors 
concerning the imaginal.600  
Yet upon close reading this is no incongruity, rather a tying-off of threads that run throughout the text, 
drawing their pattern into taut coherence.  
 
To begin, though, at the beginning, where Corbin states his intention to treat of ‘a precise order of reality 
corresponding to a precise mode of perception’: for which, in his vocation and profession as ‘interpreter of 
Arabic and Persian texts’601 he has, of necessity, coined the term imaginal, which, just as origo (from oriro, 
‘to rise’602) gives us original, is derived from the Latin imago. Corbin resorts here to Latin, he says, as ‘a 
technical and fixed point of reference’ by which the term and its ‘various more-or-less irresolute 
equivalents’ in ‘our modern Western languages’  may be compared. The term imaginal is most importantly 
defined against its close cousin, imaginary: of which Corbin states that regardless of the efforts of those 
‘trying together to reevaluate it in a positive sense’, ‘the term imaginary, in common usage that is not 
deliberate’ cannot be prevented ‘from being equivalent to signifying unreal, something that is and remains 
outside of existence—in brief, something utopian’,603 which inevitable signification Corbin diagnoses to 
‘contain the symptom of something’,604 and  against which term (utopia), Corbin’s Mundus Imaginalis, his 
newly minted Latin rendition of the Persian term Na-koja-Abad is defined: itself to the best of Corbin’s 
knowledge, a the 12th century coinage of Suhravardî, the ‘reviver of the theosophy of ancient Persia’.605 The 
very need for this Latin coinage—that of “Mundus Imaginalis”— may at first appear curious, says Corbin, 
since Na-koja-Abad, lit. “No-where land”, is the ‘linguistic calque’606 of Thomas More’s term utopia: 
coined, by More, ‘as an abstract noun to designate the absence of any localization, of any given situs in a 
space that is discoverable by the experience of our senses’607, i.e., somewhere unreal, and imaginary. 
Which is precisely where their signification differs, as the term Na-koja-Abad signifies, rather, an ‘order of 
reality’ perceived by the suprasensory “organ” of ‘the imaginative consciousness, the cognitive 
Imagination’608 (which “organ” we will come to examine): i.e., the imaginal. Hence, Mundus Imaginalis is 
to Utopia what imaginal is to imaginary. 
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[This differentiation] is even a matter of indispensable precision if we are to 
understand the meaning and the real implication of manifold information 
concerning the topographies explored in the visionary state, the state 
intermediate between waking and sleep—information that, for example, among 
the spiritual individuals of Shi’ite Islam, concerns the “land of the hidden 
Imam”.609  
By way of  illustration, Corbin now acquaints us with three tales, in which ‘the visionary’, upon 
encountering a ‘supernatural figure of great beauty’ , asks him “the question that must be asked”, i.e., that 
of ‘who he is and from where he comes’; a narrative schema which for Corbin describes ‘the experience of 
the gnostic, lived as the personal history of the Stranger, the captive who aspires to return home’.610 The 
first tale, as told by Suhravardî,  entitled “The Crimson Archangel”, tells of ‘the captive, who has just 
escaped the surveillance of his jailers’—that is, says Corbin, he ‘has temporarily left the world of sensory 
experience’—to find himself ‘in the desert’ in the presence of a beautiful, crimson-clothed youth. Upon 
hailing the youth: ‘“O Youth! where do you come from?” the Youth replies “What?  I am the first-born of 
the children of the Creator (in gnostic terms [notes Corbin], the Protoktistos, the First-Created) and you call 
me a youth?”’ The ‘mystery of the crimson colour that clothes his appearance’ is thus revealed by ‘this 
origin’ as ‘that of a being of pure Light whose splendour the sensory world reduces to the crimson of 
twilight’.611 Cf. Colossians 1:15-17:  
15 Who is the image of the invisible God, the firstborn [Gk. prototokos] of 
every creature: 16 For by him were all things created, that are in heaven, and 
that are in earth, visible and invisible, whether thrones, or dominions, or 
principalities, or powers: all things were created by him, and for him:      17 
And he is before all things, and by him all things consist.612 
If we bring the doctrine of the significatio passiva613 to bear on this encounter, we are, it would seem, in the 
presence of the  first Be!ing of Creation personified. As for his provenance, the Youth replies that he comes 
‘from beyond the mountain of Qaf’. As for how he has come to be there, and by what road, the Youth 
answers that ‘“No matter how long you walk, it is at the point of departure that you arrive there again”, 
[Corbin adds] like the point of the compass returning to the same place’.  And yet:  
Between the two, a great event will have changed everything; the self that is 
found there is the one that is beyond the mountain of Qaf a superior self, a self 
“in the second person.” It will have been necessary, like Khezr, (or Khadir, the 
mysterious prophet, the eternal wanderer, Elijah, or one like him) to bathe in 
the Spring of Life. [For] “He who has found the meaning of True Reality has 
arrived at that Spring.  When he has emerges from that Spring, he has achieved 
the Aptitude that makes him like a balm, a drop of which you distill in the 
hollow of your hand by holding it facing the sun, and which then passes 
through to the back of your hand. If you are Khezr, you also may pass without 
difficulty through the mountain of Qaf. 614 
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Curiouser, one might well say, and still curiouser, as by way of explication of this mystical tale, Corbin 
offers two more: firstly, “ The Rustling of Gabriel’s Wings,”’ in which the Youth, when asked ‘the question 
that must be asked’, names his provenance  ‘“beyond the mountain of Qaf”’ as Na-koja-Abad, and in so 
doing, for Corbin, ‘marks the transformation’ of the mountain of Qaf  ‘from [the] cosmic mountain’ in the 
“The Crimson Archangel”,  ‘constituted from summit to summit, valley to valley, by the celestial Spheres 
that are enclosed one inside the other’615, to ‘psychocosmic mountain’, in this second tale, marking ‘the 
transition of the physical cosmos to what constitutes the first level of the spiritual universe.’ And, when in 
the third tale ‘entitled “Vade Mecum of the Faithful in Love” (Mu’nis al-oshshaq)’, the “question that must 
be asked”, is asked, this time in the form of “What horizon did you penetrate to come here?”; it is answered 
in just the same way (this time by the persona of Sadness, as part of a ‘cosmogonic triad’ along with Beauty 
and Love): “I come from Na-koja-Abad” 616 —which place, says Corbin—albeit No-where-, Na-koja-, 
‘does not designate something like unextended being, in the dimensionless state’. 617 It is rather that, upon 
crossing its boundary, ‘the question “where?” (ubi, koja) loses its meaning, at least the meaning in which it 
is asked in the space of our sensory experience’.618  
Topographically [Suhravardî] states precisely that this region begins “on the 
convex surface” of the Ninth Sphere, the Sphere of Spheres, or the Sphere that 
includes the whole of the cosmos. this means that it begins at the exact moment 
when one leaves the supreme Sphere, which defines all possible orientation in 
our world...the “Sphere” to which the celestial cardinal points refer. 619  
As symbolised by the passage of the “drop of balm” in “The Crimson Archangel”, says Corbin, departing 
the “where” of the ‘supreme Sphere’, i.e., the ‘category of ubi’, for Na-koja-abad requires a ‘passing into 
the interior’ in order to find oneself ‘paradoxically, outside’, i.e., ‘“ on the convex surface” of the Ninth 
Sphere’; passing as from the realm of the exoteric, Arabic zahir, for the esoteric, batin;  whereupon this 
“interior” reality ‘is revealed to be enveloping, surrounding, containing what was first of all external and 
visible’. 620 As if—to attempt a spatial metaphor—upon penetrating such a sphere, its interior transforms 
into the surface of a torus.  
Henceforth, it is spiritual reality that envelops, surrounds the reality called 
material. That is why spiritual reality is not “in the where.” It is the “where that 
is in it. Or rather, it is itself the “where” of all things; ...it does not fall under 
the category ubi referring to a place in sensory space. Its place (its abad) in 
relation to this is Na-koja (No-where), because its ubi in relation to what is in 
sensory space is an ubique (everywhere). 621 
 
This “envelopment”, of the ubi by the ubique, and the corresponding, apparently paradoxical journey into 
and through the “inside” to the  “outside” conforms to ‘a schema on which all of our mystical theosophers 
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agree’622, says Corbin, at once cosmological and gnoseological, ‘that articulates three universes, or, rather, 
three categories of universe’, to which correspond ‘three organs of knowledge: the senses, the imagination 
and the intellect’ to which, in turn ‘corresponds the triad of anthropology: body, soul, spirit’,623 which 
‘regulates the triple growth of man, extending from this world to the resurrections in the other worlds’. 
Thus, albeit conducted in an entirely different register—that of “Oriental” theosophy,  whose strangeness 
often threatens to obscure—with the introduction of the “three organs of knowledge”, certain consonances 
with Heidegger, and the Kant book in particular, nonetheless begin to emerge in the text at hand.  
 
As for what is meant here by “resurrection”—‘from Old French, from late Latin resurrectio(n-), from the 
verb resurgere ‘rise again’’ (cf. “origin”, from  Latin oriri ‘to rise’)—624; all thoughts of fleshly 
resurrection, as per Stanley Spencer’s The Resurrection at Cookham (cf. p.119), e.g., should be put out of 
mind, in favour of e.g., any of the plates included Jean-Luc Nancy in his book Noli me Tangere,625 such as, 
e.g., Durer’s thirty-second woodblock from The Small Passion (cf. p.120).  Here Corbin, in the company of 
“our mystic theosophers”, diverges sharply from ecclesiastical Christian orthodoxy. In Mollâ Sadrâ, e.g., as 
‘a pure spiritual faculty’, the active Imagination, the “organ” that allows “penetration” into the imaginal, is 
considered ‘independent of the physical organism’, and ‘consequently able to subsist after the 
disappearance of the latter’. 626  The nature of this “organ”, after separation from the physical body—after 
physical death, i.e.—is as ‘a single synaisthesis (hiss moshtarik)’627; no longer dispersed ‘at the various 
thresholds’ of the five senses,  its ‘acts of posthumous imaginative perception’ are now like to ‘a sensory 
perception of the suprasensory’, wherein ‘consciousness and its object are here ontologically inseparable’, 
so that in perceiving ‘concrete objects’ it ‘eo ipso’ constitutes their ‘concrete existence’, thus ‘finally’ 
proving its ‘essential superiority over sensory perception’.628 Just as the active Imagination is understood to 
continue, changed—freed, as it were,—awoken—after the “disappearance” of the physical body, so the 
jism mithali, “imaginal body” which as ‘the “subtle body” that penetrates into the “eighth climate”, 
continues, awoken/arisen as the “resurrection body”. We are thus far indeed from the “being-toward-death” 
of Heidegger: we are, in fact, perpendicular. Human finitude may thus be inherent in this “world”; but for 
Corbin, after our “mystic theosophers” it is not absolute.  
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623 H. Corbin, Swedenborg and Esoteric Islam,  1999 p.8 
624 Oxford American English Dictionary, 2011 
625 which book suggests a fruitful comparative reading on this theme of the “resurrection body” as discussed in both this “Mundus 
Imaginalis” text, and Corbin’s book, Creative Imagination in the Sufism of Ibn ‘Arabi (ibid.) 
626 H. Corbin, Swedenborg and Esoteric Islam,  1999 p.15 
627 H. Corbin, Swedenborg and Esoteric Islam,  1999 p.16 
628 H. Corbin, Swedenborg and Esoteric Islam,  1999 p.15 
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Here, as Corbin acknowledges, if we are to exclude ‘the visionary perceptions of our spiritual individuals’, 
and indeed the resurrection of the “imaginal body”, from ‘everything that our modern vocabulary subsumes 
under the pejorative sense of creations, imaginings, even utopian madness’,629 a recognition of the reality 
of experiences “beyond the mountain of Qaf”, is dependent upon the availability of ‘a cosmology of such a 
kind’ as the ‘traditional cosmology’ of Islamic theosophy, whose 
worlds and interworlds ...beyond the physical universes, are arranged in levels 
intelligible only for an existence in which the act of being is in accordance with 
its presence in those worlds, for reciprocally, it is in accordance with this act of 
being that these worlds are present to it.  
This ‘act of being’, in other words, itself is—or is ‘to become in the course of its future rebirths’—‘the 
place of those worlds that are outside the place of our natural space’. Situated between ‘the physical 
sensory world...the world of phenomena (molk)’, to which correspond the senses and the body;  and ‘the 
world of abstract understanding’, which our theosophers understand as ‘the universe of pure archangelic 
Intelligences’630 and to which correspond intellect and spirit; mediating between thought and extension, 
mind and matter; the reasonable and the sensible—the intermediate, ‘suprasensory world  of the Soul or 
Angel-Souls, the Malakut...which (as before), begins “on the convex surface of the Ninth Sphere”’631,  and 
to which correspond the soul and the imagination: 
[This is the] ‘alam al-mithal, ‘the world of the image, mundus imaginalis: a 
world as  ontologically real as the world of the senses and the world of the 
intellect, a world that requires a faculty of perception belonging to it, a faculty 
that is a cognitive function, a noetic value, as fully real as the faculties of 
sensory perception or intellectual intuition. This faculty is the imaginative 
power [not to be confused with] the imagination that modern man identifies 
with “fantasy” and that, according to him, produces only the “imaginary”. 632 
Another technical definition of the mundus imaginalis offered  by ‘Suhravardî and his school’ is that of ‘the 
world of “Images in suspense”, (Arabic mothol mo’allaqa) by which is meant, says Corbin, ‘a mode of 
being proper to the realities of that intermediate world, which we designate as Imaginalia’, the ‘forms and 
shapes’ of which ‘do not subsist in the same manner as  empirical realities in the physical world’, such that 
‘anyone might perceive them’, but whose ‘ontological status’633 rather relies upon, i.e., is “bound 
together”634 in correlation with the ‘visionary spiritual experiences’635 in which they are perceived—cf. 
again, the integral significance of the French trait d’union, German bindestrich, Greek hyphen to Corbin’s 
réalité-humaine as representing precisely that which, as per my opening quotation from the “Mundus 
Imaginalis”, belies ‘the reciprocal isolation of consciousness and its object, of thought and being’ (ibid.) 
i.e., this too is a “correlationism.”  In this context, the correlation of the Imaginalia to ‘visionary spiritual 
experiences’ is thus precisely that which constitutes their ontological reality, as, if they were only to 
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630 H. Corbin, Swedenborg and Esoteric Islam,  1999 p.8 
631 H. Corbin, Swedenborg and Esoteric Islam,  1999 p.8 
632 H. Corbin, Swedenborg and Esoteric Islam,  1999 p.9 
633 H. Corbin, Swedenborg and Esoteric Islam,  1999 p.10 
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‘subsist in the pure intelligible world’, having ‘only our thought as a substratum’, that would make them 
‘unreal, nothing’.  As it is, continues Corbin, they rather possess that ‘extension and dimension’, that 
‘“immaterial materiality”’ that belongs to the ubique; ‘their own “corporeality” and spatiality,’636 for which, 
especially as it is set out in the work of the Persian Platonist Mollâ Sadrâ of Shiraz, Corbin suggests we 
might seek a Western equivalent  in the Cambridge Platonist Henry More’s term spissitudo637 spiritualis. In 
his book The Platonic Renaissance In England, Cassirer describes how for More it is precisely the self-
similarity, homogeneity, indestructibility, omnipresence and thus infinitude of space (so far very much as 
defined by Heidegger, after Kant, in the Kant book, though More adds the determination ‘uncreated’) 
which, as determinations, shared with space, of ‘the Godhead itself’ and certainly not attributable to ‘any 
sensible, material thing’, thus determine space, for More, as like to spiritual, and not ‘corporeal nature’. For 
More, this is grounds for strongest case against a purely mechanistic, Cartesian account of nature, divorced 
from ‘intelligible being’—in which account, writes Cassirer, as a casualty of Descartes’ failure to ‘draw a 
sufficiently sharp distinction’ between space as it is ‘presented to the imagination by the senses and the 
pure substance of space which we can grasp only in thought’, and Descartes’ exception of ‘thinking 
substances’ from the ‘absolutely general axiom’ that ‘all being is somewhere’, ‘spirit’ has no legitimate 
“place”, and  is thus ‘relegate[d] to a mere nowhere’—and for a ‘bond between nature and God’, 638since, 
for More, as ‘nature is to be found in space and is extended in space’, which for More is spiritual in nature.  
More goes further still, to claim, according to Cassirer, that ‘it is only through being in space that God can 
embrace and affect the being of all things.’639  
 
More also makes a comparative appearance in The Concept of Comparative Philosophy640 where, in 
relation to the Norman philosopher Nicholas Oresme’s ‘intuition of  genius’— wherein Oresme 
considers641 the corporeal quality as being made up of ‘a double corporeality’, one ‘resulting from the 
extension of the subject in the three dimensions of space’, and  
another which is only imaged (imaginée) and which results from the intensity 
of the quality multiplied by the multiplicity of surfaces which one can detect in 
the inner nature of a subject 
Corbin states that 
it is just this imaginal world of the subtle body which Henry More...designated 
as the quarto dimensio...[and] which the metaphysic of Imagination, 
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637 Spissitudo: ‘thickness, density, consistency’. (A Latin Dictionary Founded on Andrews' edition of Freund's Latin dictionary, 
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638 E. Cassirer, The Platonic Renaissance in England, pp. 148-9 
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640 H. Corbin, trans. Peter Russell, The Concept of Comparative Philosophy, Golgonooza Press Ipswich 1981 p.23  
641 Corbin notes that Oresme’s “intuition of genius” regarding  the doubling of corporeality was born out of an initial effort to 
represent a great number of qualitative intensifications geometrically, a project whose ‘point of departure’ was the theological 
question of ‘whether charity could increase or decrease in a man’, and which then passed just as “naturally” through such questions as 
‘Just what, qualitatively the intensification of a sound or a colour consisted in...whether the assent given to a proposition or a belief 
could be intensified or attenuated. What then did growth and diminution consist in?’ 
Thus Corbin remarks, rather wryly, that ‘theology...is thus to be found at the origin of a problem on which the “physicists” 
(physiciens) of the University of Paris exerted themselves throughout the XIV century’. (H. Corbin, The Concept of Comparative 
Philosophy ibid. p.23) I am reminded of the ‘beautiful mind’ of Corbin’s great friend the historian of science Alexandre Koyré, who 
Corbin says ‘many imagined’ to be ‘a great mystical theosopher’ (H. Corbin, “From Heidegger to Suhravardî”, ibid.).   
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transmuted in the thought of Mollâ Sadrâ of Shirâz into a purely spiritual 
faculty, postulates and explores. Here too Mollâ Sadrâ satisfies the same 
postulate of a corporeality which is not complete in the empirical world of the 
three-dimensional.642 
Here, Corbin offers the example of ‘an earthly temple’, whose “double corporeality”, according to ‘the 
motif of archetypal celestial temples’ (as developed in the work of the 12th century Iranian philosopher Qâzi 
Sa’id Qommî,  e.g.,)  entails that a temple’s construction in three-dimensional space’ can only be 
‘completed in its totality...in the invisible which one can only imagine,’ 643 cf.  More’s quarto dimensio. 
This doubling of the corporeal quality, into at once a three-dimensional, material body and a correlative, 
fourth-dimensional, subtle, intense, imaginal, body also implies, conversely, apropos of Corbin’s “earthly 
temple”, that Imaginalia may also take place i.e., be embodied, in the material world; in Corbin’s book on 
Ibn ‘Arabi, with the English surtitle Alone with the Alone644 we find that such “taking place” is indeed said 
to occur, by means of “symbolizing with”; though is only available as such to the symbolic perception of 
those whose mode of being is such that they are-there to it.  As such, the “law” of correlation that pertains 
to Imaginalia entails such “taking place” may just as well, or better be understood as a “making place”.  
 
Described variously by Corbin as both  “a world”, and ‘the place of those worlds that are outside the place 
of our natural space’(ibid.), the Mundus Imaginalis  is at once “a world” and “the world in which worlds 
world” (Cf. also Derrida’s term chora, taken from Plato’s Timaeus, to describe ‘the spacing that is the 
condition for everything to take place, for everything to be inscribed’ 645). Passage between the worlds, or 
levels, is effected by, and “in” the Active Imagination; by and “in” which, “worlds world”; according to the 
formula Talem eum vidi qualem capere potui.  This “worlding”, this very being-the-there, is surely our 
creative Be!ing in significatio passiva, to which Corbin draws our attention in “From Heidegger to 
Suhravardî”. This is why the Active Imagination is also called the theophanic imagination; and as we shall 
see, for Corbin, the ultimate form of theophany is an angelophany. The angel is at once that of God we can 
see, as ever according to the formula, Talem eum vidi qualem capere potui; and conversely, for “our 
philosophers”, the angel of one’s Be!ing is at once that God knows of God’ “self”, through and according to 
each being’s capacity:  as per the hadith: “Allâh said: "I was a Hidden Treasure, and I loved to be known.”  
As we have seen, the great importance of the existence of the mundus imaginalis, this intermediary “world” 
of ‘subtle bodies’ to which ‘the cognitive function of the imagination is ordered’, ‘whose ontological level 
is above the world of the senses and below the pure intelligible world’, for ‘all our mystic theosophers’646, 
lies in the fact that upon it depends  
 the validity of dreams, symbolic rituals, the reality of places formed by intense 
meditation, the reality of inspired imaginative visions, cosmogonies and 
theogonies, and thus, in the first place, the truth of the spiritual sense perceived 
in the imaginative data of prophetic revelations. 647 
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643 H. Corbin, trans. Peter Russell, The Concept of Comparative Philosophy, (ibid) p.24  
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Its existence, i.e., its ontological reality—which, as we have seen, is equally dependent upon its correlation 
to them, i.e., to the visionaries in question—is thus ‘indispensable’, says Corbin, ‘if one wishes to describe 
a link between the pure spirit and the material body’648, and in so doing, check  the ‘agnostic reflex’,649  
which Corbin diagnoses as having originated in ‘Western man[’s]’ consent ‘to the divorce between thought 
and being’650. Corbin’s term “agnostic” is no doubt employed here in its fullest and most precise sense here, 
signifying not only ‘a person who claims neither faith nor disbelief in God’,  but ‘a person who believes 
that nothing is known or can be known of the existence or nature of God or of anything beyond material 
phenomena’651. One who is therefore, by definition a-gnostic, and for whom “God” and “anything 
beyond...”, may just as well be nothing (although the same could be said, in sensu strictu, of our apophantic 
theosophers, as per my chapter “Corbin’s Debt to Heidegger”).652 This void, for Corbin, as for Nicolas of 
Cusa, may—and for Corbin, must—be bridged by the symbolic thinking that is proper to the imaginal, as 
per this extended passage on Cusa from Ernst Cassirer’s book The Platonic Renaissance in England, 
published in 1932, the year after Corbin attended Cassirer at the French National Library, and which I have 
reproduced in full here; in part because it is so elegantly put that any gloss would fail to do it justice; also as 
an opportunity to demonstrate why it was this area of Cassirer’s work that proved so influential upon 
Corbin, and which (or whom), as per the “Biographical Post-Scriptum”, he thus encountered with a sense 
of spiritual kinship, and “family reunion”; and also because it points the way toward Corbin’s book on Ibn 
‘Arabi.  
The view that all finite thought and understanding are by nature symbolical, 
that they move in the circle of mere names and signs, and that no name can 
comprehend divine essence, constitutes a new point of departure in religion.  It 
opens the way for that conception of faith which receives its finest and most 
universal expression in Cusa’s work De Pace Fidei.  Cusa does not infer the 
sheer importance of the symbol and symbolic knowledge from the fact that 
everything transitory is but a symbol. On the contrary, he endows the symbol 
with new content and value.  The symbol cannot be adequate for knowledge, 
for dogmatic ‘precision’; it is confined within the limits of ‘otherness’ and 
‘conjecture’. But, in so far as absolute being and absolute unity are knowable at 
all, it is in just this way that they can be truly known; ‘cognoscitur 
inattingibilis veritatis unitas is alteritate conjecturali’ (the unattainable unity 
of truth is known in conjectural otherness).  Since no name can apprehend the 
divine, or exhaust its meaning, it can therefore be conceded, on the other hand, 
that all names, in so far as they proceed from a genuine religious conviction 
and are conscious of their limit and mediate capacity, may be assured of a 
certain relationship to the divine.  Thus apparent scepticism first opens the way 
to variety, freedom and scope in moral and religious ways of life, and transfers 
the centre of religious ‘truth’ from dogma to the ways of life themselves.  
Henceforth, neither variety nor contradiction in religion need give offence. The 
danger of heterodoxy is not overcome by the establishment of one valid system 
of thought and doctrine binding for all, but by a fundamental insight into the 
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649 (to which my own baulking at the “reality” of Mollâ Sadrâ’s “resurrection body”, my instinct toward “psychologizing” the 
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limits of [Gk.] doxa (opinion) as such, into its necessary incommensurability 
with absolute being. 653 
In the “Mundus Imaginalis”, Corbin dates the point at which he says the Western imagination was loosed 
‘to wander and become profligate...to cease fulfilling its function, which is to perceive or generate symbols 
leading to the internal sense’— leading to the disappearance, in the West, of ‘the mundus imaginalis, the 
proper domain of the Malakut, the world of the Soul’—to ‘the time when Averroism rejected Avicennian 
cosmology, with its intermediate angelic hierarchy of the Animae or Angeli caelestes...below the Angeli 
intellectuales’, which had ‘the privilege of the imagination in its pure state’.654 Whereas ‘for a short time in 
the West, and in Iran down to our own day’, writes Corbin,  
Avicennism tended to be productive of mystical life, ... Latin Averroism 
culminated in the political Averroism of Jean de Jandun and Marsilio of Padua 
(fourteenth century CE). Viewed in this light, the names of Avicenna and 
Averroes could be taken as the symbols of the spiritual destinies which awaited 
the East and West respectively, without imputing their differences to 
Averroism alone. 655   
Certainly, in light of ‘Averroes asseveration “O men! I do not say that the knowledge which you call divine 
science is false; what I am saying is that I have knowledge of human science”’, of which, says Corbin,  it 
has been said that it ‘sums him up completely’, and that 'the new humanity that blossomed in the 
Renaissance had its origin in these words'; we might begin to see how Averroism may be said to have 
influenced ‘the metaphysical secularization which led to the separation of theology as such from 
philosophy’, albeit ‘this separation’—not known in Iran’, where, says Corbin, ‘philosophical meditation 
still had a long career before it’— ‘was effected in the West by Scholasticism itself.’  
 
For ‘our  philosophers’, however, continues Corbin—i.e., those of Eastern Islam, and especially Iran, less 
concerned with ‘an ethical conception arising out of a social norm [as per Latin political Averroism] than 
the idea of a spiritual perfection’, attainable by the individual ‘not by following the horizontal direction of 
political and social matters, but by following the vertical direction which connects him to the transcendent 
hierarchies, the supreme guarantors of his personal destiny’656—the ‘Image or Form’ of ‘the archetypal 
world’; ‘the world of “subtle bodies”’, i.e., ‘is itself its own “matter”’. As such, its mode of being or 
subsistence ‘is independent of any substratum in which it would be immanent in the manner of an accident’ 
(such as the way in which the colour black subsists in a black object, e.g.) and rather like to ‘the mode of 
appearance and subsistence of Images “in suspense” in a mirror’, wherein the ‘material substance of the 
mirror... is not the substance of the image’, but rather ‘simply the “place of its appearance”’657. Their 
‘preeminent mirror’ is the active imagination, ‘the epiphanic place of the Images of the archetypal world.’ 
The active imagination is thus at once a medium whose function, or activity is intermediary.  
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that is why the theory of the mundus imaginalis is bound up with a theory of 
imaginative knowledge and imaginative function—a function truly central and 
mediatory because of the median and mediatory position of the mundus 
imaginalis. It is a function that permits all the universes to symbolize with one 
another... It is the cognitive function of the Imagination that permits the 
establishment of a rigorous analogical knowledge, escaping the dilemma of 
current rationalism. 658 
We are thus no longer forced to choose, he continues, between ‘either “matter” or “spirit,”’ nor—in what 
for Corbin is a ‘no less fatal’ substitution, effected by ‘the “socialization” of consciousness’—between 
‘either “history” of “myth”’. 659  
 
What is meant here by a “rigorous analogical knowledge”?  Corbin writes that—against ‘the current 
attitude’, which ‘oppose[s] the real to the imaginary as though to the unreal, the utopian’, as it ‘confuse[s] 
symbol with allegory’—the ‘exegesis of the spiritual sense’660 must not be confused with ‘an allegorical 
interpretation; since while an allegory is ‘a sheathing, or rather, a disguising of something’ that may be 
known otherwise, 
the appearance of an Image having the quality of a symbol is a primary 
phenomenon (Urphänomenon), unconditional and irreducible, the appearance 
of something that cannot manifest itself otherwise to the world where we are’. 
661 
As for the manner of such manifestations, Corbin writes that just as 
The imagination is...firmly balanced between two other cognitive functions: its 
own world symbolizes with the world to which the two other functions (sensory 
knowledge and intellective knowledge) respectively correspond. 662  
Let us be very clear when we speak of this. It is the organ that permits the 
transmutation of internal spiritual states into external states, into vision-events 
symbolizing with those external states. 663 
Here it is necessary to stress the fact that, for Corbin,  as for “our mystic theosophers”, while such 
manifestations may appear to occur in the material, sensory world of phenomena, they actually take place 
“in” the active Imagination, the ‘preeminent mediator’,  ‘the organ that permits penetration into the mundus 
imaginalis’, as that “world” or “interworld” ‘at the boundary where there is an inversion of the relation of 
interiority expressed by the preposition in or within, “in the interior of”’,664 as following this inversion of 
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the relation of interiority, ‘Spiritual bodies or spiritual entities are no longer in a world...it is their world that 
is in them.’665  
 
By his own account, Ibn ‘Arabi personally encountered the great Aristotlean commentator Averroes on a 
total of three occasions, though only the first and the last of these meetings took place ‘in the sensible, 
physical world’666;  and the last was at Averroes’ own funeral. Within these threefold meetings, Corbin 
discerns ‘three exemplary elements or traits’, which, seeming ‘most eminently to attract and to constellate 
the very themes which it is necessary to interrelate’ here, assume for Corbin ‘the character of [three 
‘polarizing...’] symbols for the characterology of Ibn ‘Arabi’667: 
[He whom his] ‘disciples traditionally salute... as Muhyi’d-Din, “Animator of 
the Religion”, but whom so many doctors of the Law in Islam have attacked, 
diverting his honorific surname into its antithesis” Mahi’d-Din, “he who 
abolishes the religion,” or Mumituddin, “he who kills the religion”’.668  
The first ‘extraordinary episode’ of their ‘threefold meeting’669 was occasioned by Averroes,670  who upon 
hearing of ‘the revelations that God had accorded [the young Ibn ‘Arabi]’ and making ‘no secret of his 
astonishment at what he had been told’, Averroes, aslo a friend of Ibn ‘Arabi’s father, ‘expressed the desire 
to meet [the youth] personally’. Thus on the pretext of ‘some sort of errand’ or other, Ibn ‘Arabi, then ‘still 
a beardless youth’, was sent by his father to the home of ‘the master’ so that Averroes might ‘have a talk’671 
with him.  After embracing the youth, having received him with ‘signal marks of friendship and 
consideration’, Averroes initiated the following conversation, as recounted here with commentary by Ibn 
‘Arabi.  
Then he said ‘Yes.’ and I in turn said; ‘Yes.’ His joy was great at noting that I 
had understood.  But then taking cognizance of what had called forth his joy, I 
added: ‘No.’ Immediately Averroes winced, the colour went out of his cheeks, 
he seemed to doubt his own thought.  He asked me this question:  “What 
manner of solution have you found through divine illumination and 
inspiration? Is it identical with that which we obtain from speculative 
reflection?’ I replied: ‘Yes and no. Between the yes and the no, spirits take 
flight from their matter, and heads are separated from their bodies’. Averroes 
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personage(s) of Khidr/Elijah, but I suppose in this case it might result in a kind of unwanted doubling. In any case, I have no doubt 
that Corbin’s usage is entirely deliberate and considered. 
671 ibid. p.41 
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turned pale, I saw him tremble; he murmured the ritual phrase ‘There is no 
power save in God’—for he had understood my allusion.672  
From our reading of the “Mundus Imaginalis”, with reference to the History of Islamic Philosophy, we 
might already begin to guess at the “between” in question; though in accordance with Ibn ‘Arabi’s own 
teaching on how to ‘meditate the facts of his autobiography’—whereby life-events ‘take on the appearance 
of autobiographical data, charged with a transhistoric meaning’, in so far as they offer ‘exemplary elements 
or traits’ which assume the character of symbols and ‘function to throw an anticipatory light on that 
twofold dimension of the human person, of which the active Imagination, investing the person with his 
“theophanic function,” will subsequently give us a glimpse’673— we should note, however, that no entirely 
adequate explanation may be forthcoming, since for Corbin674: 
The symbol is both key and silence; it speaks and it does not speak.  It can 
never be explained once and for all.  It expands to the degree that each 
consciousness is progressively summoned by it to unfold—that is to say, to the 
degree that each consciousness makes the symbol the key to its own 
transmutation.675  
Thus, symbolic “meaning”, considered as a “truth”,  is thus not the truth of the adequatio as this is usually 
understood; here it is not the “object of truth” to which “the truth” must be adequate, in order to be true; 
rather, the extent of its revelation or “unconcealedness” depends, according to our favourite formula, upon 
the “subject’s” capacity to “see”, to “capture”. Symbolic truth is thus a truth of correlation; reminiscent of 
Corbin’s statement, in “From Heidegger to Suhravardî”, wherein: 
The phenomenon of meaning, that is fundamental in the metaphysics of Being 
and Time is the link between the signifier and the signified.  But what makes 
this link, without which signifier and signified would simply remain objects for 
theoretical consideration? 
 This link is the subject, and this subject is the presence, presence of the mode 
of being to the mode of understanding.  Pre-sence, Da-sein.676   
Rather than e.g., affixing precise significations to the “Yes”, “No”, and “...between”,  etc,  instead Corbin 
discerns here ‘the dominant trait of Ibn ‘Arabi’s character’; that which ‘made him not only, like most of the 
Sufis, a disciple of human masters, but above all and essentially the “disciple of Khidr”’677, ‘he who does 
not owe his knowledge of spiritual experience to human teaching, who bears witness’.678 Thus already, for 
Corbin, ‘with the symbol of Ibn ‘Arabi as the disciple of Khidr we have reached the center which 
dominates the co-ordinates of our spiritual topography’679.  
 
So what does it mean, to be a “disciple of Khidr”?  
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Before we elaborate further upon this “first and greatest” symbol of the characterology of Ibn ‘Arabi, 
however, for now let us  follow Corbin in completing his exposition of Ibn ‘Arabi’s characterological “all”, 
as it becomes apparent at the level of his three meetings with Averroes.   
 
The first of their encounters having been initiated at the desire of Averroes, the second occurs when, ‘by 
God’s Mercy’, Ibn ‘Arabi’s own wish ‘for another interview with Averroes’ is fulfilled by God’s causing 
Averroes to appear to Ibn ‘Arabi, in his own words: ‘in an ecstasy (waqi’a) in such a form that between his 
person and myself there was a light veil’, through which, while seen to be present, the vision of Averroes, 
absorbed in his own meditation, fails to see or acknowledge the presence of Ibn ‘Arabi, who thus concludes 
that ‘His thought does not guide him to the place where I myself am’.680 His thought, i.e., which for Corbin 
et al, is by the absence, nay, the destruction, and subsequent lack of ‘the Animae caelestes, the malakut’, 
i.e., ‘as the whole ishraqi tradition stresses—the world of autonomous Images perceived in their own right 
by the active Imagination.’681 Cf. also this definition of symbolic perception from Corbin’s History of 
Islamic Philosophy (in the context of Ismaili gnosis). 
Symbolic perception affects a transmutation of the immediate data (the sensible 
and literal data), and renders them transparent. In the absence of the 
transparency brought about in this manner, it is impossible to pass from one 
level to another.  Equally, without a plurality of universes rising above each 
other in an ascending perspective, symbolic exegesis perishes for lack of 
function and meaning. ... Such an exegesis therefore presupposes a theosophy 
in which the worlds symbolize with each other: the supra-sensible and spiritual 
universes, the macrocosm or Homo maximus (insan kabir) and the microcosm. 
682 
Here then for Corbin, in this second encounter, lies the characterological symbol of Ibn ‘Arabi as the 
‘author of the “Book of Theophanies”’; he who, unlike Averroes, ‘has full access to the intermediate 
supersensory world, alam mithal, where the Active Imagination perceives events, figures, presences 
directly, unaided by the senses’.683 Of Averroes, Corbin writes that, aiming ‘to reaffirm a cosmology in 
purely Aristotelian terms’: 
What motivates [Averroes’] critique of [‘Avicenna's triadic schema, which 
situated the Anima caelestis between the pure separate Intelligence and the 
celestial orb’]....is the adoption of an attitude which is fundamentally opposed 
to Avicennan emanationism—to the idea of a successive procession of 
Intelligence from the One—for the simple reason that the idea of emanation is 
still allied with the idea of creation. Such an idea of creation is unintelligible 
for a strict Peripatetic, for whom there is no creative cause. 684  
For Averroes, it is rather the case that “that which is understood” (intelligized) is the cause of “that which 
understands it”—that is to say, as the final [and not the creative] cause’. As such, it follows that each “final 
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cause” may be ‘the cause of several beings’; from which it further follows, for Averroes, that ‘the Primum 
movens can be such a cause’. ‘The strict principle of Ex Uno non fit nisi Unum which governs Avicenna's 
neo-Platonic schema’, is thus ‘abolished as superfluous’, thus the Avicennan ‘plurality of universes rising 
above each other in an ascending perspective’ (ibid.), which Corbin deems necessary for symbolic 
perception to occur, i.e.,  for symbolic exegesis to have ‘function and meaning’ (ibid.), are lost.  
Averroes [also] rejected the Avicennan idea of the active Intelligence as the 
Dator formarum. For him, forms are not ideal realities, extrinsic to their matter. 
They are not placed in matter by an agent; matter itself contains in potentiality 
its innumerable forms, which are inherent in it (a position which is 
diametrically opposed to that of al-Suhrawardi).685 
The omission of ‘the second hierarchy of Avicennan angelology, the hierarchy of the Angeli or Animae 
caelestes...the malakut’ 686 from Averroes cosmology  was thus inevitable. No surprise, then, that Averroes 
was not there for Ibn ‘Arabi’s second encounter with him, since for Averroes, there was no there to be. Of 
his third encounter with Averroes, Ibn ‘Arabi recalls: 
I had no further occasion to meet him until his death, which occurred in the 
year 595 of the Hegira [1198] in Marakesh.  His remains were taken to 
Cordova, where his tomb is.  When the coffin containing his ashes was loaded 
on the flank of a beast of burden, his works were placed on the other side to 
counterbalance it. 
The image was not lost on Ibn ‘Arabi and his friend Abu’l Hakkam, with whom Ibn ‘Arabi observed ‘On 
one side the master, on the other his works’, adding, ‘Ah! How I wish I knew whether his hopes have been 
fulfilled’.687 Cf. Corbin’s History of Islamic Philosophy in which he writes that while Averroes ‘rejected the 
idea that the potential human intelligence was a simple disposition connected with the organic constitution’ 
and ‘held to the idea of a separate Intelligence’, yet he also insisted that, ‘this potential human intelligence 
is still not that of the personal individual’.688  
Whereas, for example, Mulla Sadra Shirazi, an Avicennan ishraqi, 
demonstrated forcefully that the principle of individuation is present in form, 
Averroes accepts matter as the principle of individuation. Thus the individual is 
identified with the corruptible, and immortality can only be generic. All one 
can say is that there is eternity within the individual, but what is 'eternizable' in 
him belongs wholly to the active Intelligence alone, not to the individual. 689 
For Corbin, this is best explained via Averroes' ta'wil (roughly speaking, exegesis690) of the Quranic verse 
7:143691, ‘in which Moses asks God to reveal himself to him’. God replies: ‘You will never see Me. 
However, behold this mountain: if it remains firm in its place, then— only then—will you see Me.' The 
verse continues: ‘But when God revealed His glory to the mountain, He reduced it to dust; and Moses fell 
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down in a swoon'. Averroes interprets this verse as demonstrating that in order to perceive the active 
Intelligence, (i.e., as per the verse, to “see God”), ‘Man's hylic intellect ... must first become intellect in 
actu’.  
But in this union, finally [for Averroes], it is the active Intelligence which 
perceives itself by particularizing itself for a moment in a human soul, as light 
is particularized. This union marks the obliteration of the passive intellect (like 
Moses' mountain)—it is not the gage and guarantee of individual survival. This 
takes us very far from Avicennism, in which the inalienable guarantee of 
spiritual individuality is this very awareness of itself that it succeeds in 
attaining through union with the active Intelligence.692  
Thus, for Corbin, at the symbolic heart of this ‘last homage to the master whose essential work has been to 
restore integral Aristotelianism in all its purity’,693 is the fact that it should be none other than Ibn ‘Arabi—
in whom, even as he becomes a “pilgrim to the [spiritual] Orient at the call of his “Holy Spirit”’, 694 
according to the very ‘principle at the heart of Avicennan anthropology: the homology between the Anima 
caelestis and the anima humana’695—Corbin discerns ‘a living exemplification of Suhravardî’s “Recital of 
Occidental Exile”, who as ‘witness to Averroes’ funeral’ is moved here to this ‘melancholy question’. 696  
 
For Corbin, the question of what it means to be a disciple of Khidr, and that of who Khidr is—or, rather 
more pertinently and precisely, of who is Khidr—shed existential light upon one another.697   
 
Corbin writes that while Ibn ‘Arabi ‘had many and met many’ masters, ‘his numerous journeys and 
peregrinations’ having ‘brought him into contact with almost all the Sufi masters of his day’; yet 
‘essentially he never had more than one’, ‘an invisible master’ whose historical coordinates may not be 
established, nor may he be situated ‘at any particular moment in the succession of the human generations’; 
‘a mysterious prophet figure to whom a number of traditions, both significant and obscure, lend features 
which relate him, or tend to identify him with Elijah, with Saint George, and still others’,698 this “invisible 
master” is Khidr.  
 
While, he says, a ‘complete answer’ to the question ‘Who is Khidr?’ would require the compilation of ‘a 
very considerable mass of material from very divergent sources: prophetology, folklore, alchemy, etc;’ here 
Corbin advises that we ‘consider him essentially as the invisible spiritual master, reserved for those who are 
called to a direct unmediated relationship with the divine world’. We may thus ‘confine ourselves to certain 
essential points: his appearance in the Koran, the meaning of his name, his connection with the prophet 
Elijah, and in turn the connection between Elijah and the Imam of Shi’ism’. While a ‘thorough study’ of the 
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mysterious Koranic episode (Sura XVIII, vv. 59-81) in which Khidr figures as the initiatic guide of Moses 
‘would require an exhaustive confrontation with the earliest Koranic commentaries’, Corbin  finds it 
sufficient for our purposes here to summarize the episode in the following manner: 
He [Khidr is represented as Moses’ guide, who initiates Moses “into the 
science of predestination.” Thus he reveals himself to be the repository of an 
inspired divine science, superior to the law (shari’a); thus Khidr is superior to 
Moses in so far as Moses is a prophet invested with a mission of revealing a 
shari’a.  He reveals to Moses precisely the secret, mystic truth (haqiqa) that 
transcends the shari’a, and this explains why the spirituality inaugurated by 
Khidr is free from the servitude of the literal religion. 699 
Here Corbin also notes that although ‘according to certain traditions’, Khidr-Elijah is identified with the 
historical personage of a ‘descendant of Noah in the fifth generation’, an identification which would indeed 
appear to situate him at a ‘particular moment in the succession of the human generations’700 we are still ‘far 
from the chronological dimension of historical time’, since we ‘shall never find a rational justification of 
the Koranic episode in which Khidr-Elijah meets Moses as if they were contemporaries’—unless, that is, 
we are to ‘situate these events in the alam al-mithal.’ And, just as his being a disciple of Khidr is, for 
Corbin, the dominant symbolic trait of Ibn ‘Arabi’s character, Corbin, in turn, finds ‘the most characteristic 
episode of Khidr’s career’ to be his having ‘attained the source of life...drunk of the water of immortality’. 
Knowing ‘neither old age or death. He is the “Eternal Youth”’—which for Corbin renders ‘”objective” 
historical methods’ inapplicable here. For this same reason, Corbin prefers to follow his own professor, 
Louis Massignon, in discarding ‘the usual vocalizations of his name (Persian Khezr, Arabic Khidr), in 
favour of Khadir’701, which Massignon translates as ”the Verdant one”. Corbin adds that while Khidr ‘is 
indeed associated with every aspect of Nature’s greenness’, it would however be ‘meaningless’ to ‘interpret 
him as a “vegetation myth”...unless we presupposed the special mode of perception implied by the presence 
of Khadir,702’ i.e., the mode of symbolic perception, as of events occurring in the alam al-mithal. Indeed, 
Corbin continues, this special mode of perception is inevitably involved here, ‘bound up with the 
extraordinary pre-eminence...accorded to the color green in Islam’.703 Returning to the identification of 
Khidr with the biblical prophet Elijah, Corbin observes that at times these two are ‘associated to form a 
pair’, and at others, they are ‘associated [i.e., identified] with one another’. Of these traditional 
“associations”, the one which chiefly concerns Corbin here ‘in connection with the person of Khidr-Elijah 
as initiator of the mystic truth which emancipates one from literal religion, is the bond with the person of 
the Imam which these traditions establish’, 704 as in one of ‘the homilies attributed to the First Imam’, Ali 
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Ibn Abi Talib,705 in which ‘the Imam utters the names under which he has been successively known by all 
nations, those who have a revealed Book (ahl al-Kitab) and those who have none’ we discover that ‘To the 
Christians, he says: I am he whose  name in the Gospel is Elijah’.706 For Corbin, this amounts to nothing 
less than ‘Shi’ism in the person of the Imam proclaim[ing] itself to be the witness to the Transfiguration, 
the metamorphosis’707. Variously recounted in Matthew 17:1-9, Mark 9:2-8, Luke 9:28-36, the 
Transfiguration raises the question, amongst those disciples present, of what it means, exactly to be “risen 
from the dead”. The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church states that ‘some critics have suggested that 
it is a misplaced Resurrection appearance’708.  Here, Corbin identifies this ‘colloquy between Moses and 
Elijah (that is the Imam) on Mount Tabor’ as the biblical counterpart of ‘Moses’ meeting with Elijah as his 
initiand in the eighteenth sura’ of the Quran, as above. He continues: 
This typology is extremely eloquent as to the intentions of the Shi-ite 
mind...Ismailian esoterism has another homily in which the Imam proclaims: “I 
am the Christ who cures the blind and the lepers [i.e., the “second Christ”, we 
read in a gloss]709.  I am he and he is I”. And if elsewhere the Imam is 
designated as Melchizedek, we easily discern the connection between this 
imamology and the christology of the Melchezidekian Christians who saw in 
this supernatural person the true “Son of God”, the Holy Spirit’.710 
Extra to the Melchizedekian “heresy” that Melchizedek was Christ, The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian 
Church lists a number of further “heresies”, ‘condemned as such by the [Church] Fathers’, e.g., Saint 
Epiphanius’ claim that Melchizedek was ‘a power of God superior to Christ’;  St Ambrose’ claim that 
Melchizedek was the Holy Spirit, and the claim that Melchizedek was an incarnation of the Logos,  made 
by Mark the Hermit.711  
 
Ultimately for Corbin, ‘our only hope of a significant result’ in pursuit of an answer to the question of 
“Who is Khidr?”, ‘a Figure that dissolves so many associations and undergoes so many metamorphoses, 
lies in the phenomenological method’. 712 Thus, when considering Khidr as ‘the invisible spiritual master of 
a mystic [such as Ibn ‘Arabi],  subordinated to the teaching of no earthly master, and of no collectivity’, 
Corbin finds the equivalent question, phenomenologically speaking, to be ‘“What does it mean to be the 
disciple of Khidr?” To what act of self-awareness does the fact of recognizing oneself to be the disciple of 
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Khidr correspond?’713 Formulated as such, the question also frees us from being forced to choose between 
Khidr as archetype or as person; and happily so, for Corbin, since either answer taken alone would involve 
a great loss, neither being ‘adequate to the phenomenon of Khidr’s person’.  Taken as archetype only, as 
from ‘the standpoint of analytical psychology...he will seem to lose his reality and become a figment of the 
imagination, if not of the intellect’, whereas if Khidr is taken as ‘a real person’, it is made impossible ‘to 
characterise the difference in structure between Khidr’s relationship with his disciple and the relationship 
that any other shaikh on this earth can have with his’, as while ‘Khidr, numerically one faces a plurality of 
disciples in a relationship which is hardly compatible with the one consorting with the one’, it is precisely 
‘the fervent sentiment of the one consorting with the one’ with which this relationship is experienced by 
each of his disciples. that ‘In short’, continues Corbin, ‘these answers are not adequate to the phenomenon 
of Khidr’s person’. This being so, Corbin suggests that there is perhaps however ‘another path’ to ‘an 
understanding of the phenomenon as it occurs among our Sufis’, a path opened up by Suhrawardi ‘in an 
intention’ which Corbin finds ‘quite consonant with that of Ibn ‘Arabi’. 714 In The [Crimson] Archangel, 
where the angel urges the initiate to  “Put on the sandals of Khidr”,715 it is this assimilative act of self-
identification—whereby in “putting on the sandals of Khidr” one endeavours to be Khidr—which, for 
Corbin ‘suggests what it means to be the disciple of Khidr’.716 Corbin continues: 
[Suhrawardi’s] Recital of Occidental Exile describes the journey leading to the 
summit of Mount Qaf, at the foot of the emerald rock, the mystic Sinai, where 
resides the Holy Spirit, the Angel of mankind, whom the philosopher in this 
same recital identifies as the “Active Intelligence” and situates at the base of 
the hierarchy of the cherubic Intelligences. The essence of this answer is to be 
sought in the words: If you are Khidr. 717 
Thus, returning to the question of “Who is Khidr?”, Corbin now explains that as the presence of Khidr’s 
person ‘is experienced in a relationship which transforms it into an archetype’, phenomenologically 
speaking, ‘Khidr is experienced simultaneously as a person-archetype.’ As archetype, ‘the unity and 
identity of Khidr’s person is compatible with the plurality of his exemplifications in those [persons] who 
are by turn Khidr. ...Khidr is the master of all those who are masterless, because he shows all those whose 
master he is how to be what he himself is:  he who has attained the Spring of Life, the Eternal Youth...he 
who has attained haqiqa, the mystic, esoteric truth which dominates the Law and frees us from the literal 
religion’.718  Thus the disciples of Khidr are freed ‘from any legalistic or authoritarian servitude’719. Master 
of the masterless, Khidr’s ‘relationship with each one is the relationship of the exemplar or the exemplified 
with him who exemplifies it...he exemplifies himself as many times as he has disciples, and his role is to 
reveal each disciple to himself’, leading each disciple not ‘to one theophany identical for all’ but ‘to his 
own theophany’, that which ‘corresponds to his “ inner heaven, to the form of his own being, to his eternal 
individuality (ayn thabita)’, that ‘which, in Ibn ‘Arabi’s words, is that one of the divine Names which is 
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invested in him, the name by which he knows his God and by which his God knows him’. Thus  ‘is the 
interdependence between rabb and marbubb, between the lord of love and his vassal’. Thus attaining to 
‘the “Khidr of your being” is to attain to the “prophet of your being,”’ in which ‘inner depth springs the 
Water of Life at the foot of the mystic Sinai, pole of the microcosm, centre of the world, etc’.720 Thus ‘to 
become Khidr is to have attained an aptitude for theophanic vision...for the encounter with the divine Alter 
Ego, for the ineffable dialogue which the genius of Ibn ‘Arabi will nonetheless succeed in recounting’. 721  
 
Koranic revelation identifies ‘the Angel of knowledge and revelation, that is to say the Holy Spirit’ with 
‘the Angel Gabriel, the Angel of the Annunciation’, but whereas ‘just as every prophet perceives the spirit 
of his own prophecy in the form of an Angel Gabriel’, ‘every Spiritual hears the inspiration of his own Holy 
Spirit... in the voice of Khidr’. 722 ‘Each individual’s solution to this “problem” of the Angel thus ‘has 
existential implications...insofar as [it]...defines the status of his spirituality’, since to attain to “the Khidr of 
one’s being” is to attain ‘haqiqa, the mystic esoteric Truth which dominates the law and frees us from the 
literal religion’, from ‘any legalistic or authoritarian servitude’. We should hardly then be surprised, 
continues Corbin, by ‘the panic aroused by Latin Avicennism among the orthodox believers of the West by 
an Avicennan noetics and angelology which led to an exaltation of the angel which was utterly shocking to 
orthodox scholasticism’—once it is regarded in this context as “Fear of the Angel”, i.e., ‘fear of having to 
recognise the individual ministry of Khidr’,723 since as ‘“If you are Khidr....” you can indeed do what Khidr 
does,’ meaning, says Corbin, that ‘he...who is the disciple of Khidr possesses sufficient inner strength to 
seek freely the teachings of all masters’.724  
 
 Thus far from simply ‘a messenger transmitting orders, nor the usual “guardian angel...’, here the figure of 
“the angel” is rather ‘bound up with the idea that the Form under which each of the Spirituals knows God is 
also the form under which God reveals Himself to Himself in that man’. 725  
For Ibn ‘Arabi, the Angel represents the essential correlation between the form 
of a theophany and the form of him to whom it is disclosed. He is the “part 
allotted to each Spiritual, his absolute individuality the divine Name invested in 
him. He is the essential theophanism, every theophany has the form of an 
angelophany because it is determined by this correlation; and precisely in this 
essential determination without which the divine Being would remain unknown 
and inaccessible, lies the significance of the Angel. 726  
Corbin continues that once this is understood, ‘the way in which Ibn ‘Arabi as a disciple of Khidr [my 
emphasis]’ meditates the philoxeny of Abraham leads to the very heart of his theosophy and mystic 
experience, to a secret which is also that of the Cherubinic Wanderer of Angelus Silesius, which to the 
mystic means: to feed the Angel from one’s own substance’.727  
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725 H. Corbin, Alone with the Alone p.62 
726 H. Corbin, Alone with the Alone pp.62-3 
727 H. Corbin, Alone with the Alone pp.63 
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Cf Corbin’s conclusion of the “Mundus Imaginalis” text, with reference to what he calls ‘an extraordinary 
text’ by Villiers de L’Isle-Adam, L’Annonciateur; which has a great deal to “say”, here; and which brings 
us back around to that “point of the compass” where this chapter began, though I hope, quite transfigured.  
Angels”, he writes, “are not, in substance, except in the free sublimity of the 
absolute Heavens, where reality is unified with the ideal... They only 
externalize themselves in the ecstasy they cause and which forms a part of 
themselves.”  Those last words, an ecstasy. . . which forms part of themselves, 
seem to me to possess a prophetic clarity, for they have the quality of piercing 
even the granite of doubt, of paralyzing the “agnostic reflex,” in the sense that 
they break the reciprocal isolation of the consciousness and it’s object, of 
thought and being; phenomenology is now an ontology. Undoubtedly this is the 
postulate implied in the teaching of our authors concerning the imaginal. For 
there is no external criterion for the manifestation of the Angel, other than the 
manifestation itself. The Angel is itself the ekstasis, the “displacement” or the 
departure from ourselves that is a “change of state” from our state. That is why 
these words also suggest to us the secret of the supernatural being of the 
“Hidden Imam” and of his Appearances for the Shi’ite consciousness: the 
Imam is the ekstasis itself of that consciousness. One who is not in the same 
spiritual state cannot see him.  
This is what Suhravardî alluded to in his tale of “The Crimson Archangel” by 
his words that we cited at the beginning: “If you are Khezr, you also may pass 
without difficulty through the mountain of Qaf.” 728  
For Corbin, that which is manifest in the very phenomenon of Sufism itself, understood as ‘an esoteric 
interpretation of Islam’, is ‘the act of mystic consciousness disclosing to itself the inner hidden meaning of 
a prophetic revelation’. Moreover, ‘the characteristic situation of the mystic is a confrontation with a 
prophetic message and revelation’. 729  
 
With the proviso that ‘what we shall have to say here can be no more than a sketch’, ‘the phenomenology 
of Sufism, as such, in its essence’730 is now set forth. For Corbin,  the ‘interpenetration of mystic religion 
and prophetic religion’ so characteristic of Sufism is only conceivable ‘in an Ahl al-Kitab, a “people of the 
book...[i.e.,] whose religion is grounded on a book revealed by a prophet, for the existence of a celestial 
Book imposes the task of fathoming its true meaning’.731  
The conviction that to everything that is apparent, literal, external, exoteric 
(zahir) there corresponds something hidden, spiritual, internal, esoteric (batin) 
is the scriptural principle...at the very foundation of Shi’ism as a religious 
phenomenon. It is the central postulate of esoterism and of esoteric 
                                                           
728 H. Corbin, Swedenborg and Esoteric Islam,  1999 p.32  
729 Thus the image of the mausoleum and madrasa built over Ibn ‘Arabi’s tomb in Damascus, ‘the honours and popular cult devoted to 
this man whose disciples traditionally salute him as Muhyi-din – the Animator of the Religion’, yet whom ‘so many Doctors of the 
Law have attacked as Mahi-d Din “he who abolishes the religion’, or Mumituddin, he who kills the religion”’729, strikes Corbin as a 
‘paradoxical triumph’, akin to that of ‘Swedenborg’s tomb in the cathedral of Uppsala’, together forming  ‘a mental diptych attesting 
the existence of an Ecclesia spiritualis reuniting all its own in the triumphant force of a single paradox’ H. Corbin, Alone with the 
Alone p.78, p.76-7  
730 H. Corbin, Alone with the Alone p.77 
731 H. Corbin, Alone with the Alone p.78. For this reason, Corbin argues that such notable similarities as may be seen to exist between 
Sufism and Buddhism e.g., are really not so considerable when compared with those that exist between the mysticisms of the Ahl al-
Kitab. 
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hermeneutics (ta’wil)...[and, as such] the basis of the fundamental kinship 
between Shi’ism and Sufism’.732 
This is not to doubt that the prophet Muhammad is “the seal of prophets and of 
prophecy”; the cycle of prophetic religion is closed, no new shari’a, or 
religious Law is awaited. But the literal and apparent text of this ultimate 
Revelation offers something which is still a potency’, something which ‘calls 
for the actions of persons who will transform it into act.733  
This is the ‘initiatic mission’ of ‘the Imam and his companions’; ‘its function is to initiate into the ta’wil’, 
marking ‘spiritual birth’. Thus, while there is no doubt among the mystics that ‘prophetic Revelation is 
closed’, the ‘continued openness of prophetic hermeneutics, of the ta’wil, or intelligentia spiritualis’,734 that 
which ‘brings about the union’, or ‘interpenetration’ ‘between prophetic religion and mystic religion’, is 
assumed. 
 
From this ‘complex’, continues Corbin, ‘there derives a threefold preoccupation with the method, organ, 
and source of this hermeneutics’, ta’wil. 
The word ta’wil, together with the word tanzil, constitute a pair of terms and 
concepts which are complementary and contrasting.  Properly speaking, tanzil 
designates positive religion, the letter of the Revelation dictated by the Angel 
to the Prophet.  It means to cause this Revelation to descend from the higher 
world. Conversely, ta’wil means to cause to return, to lead back to the origin, 
and thus to return to the true and original meaning of a written text. ‘It is to 
cause something to arrive at its origin. He who practices ta’wil, therefore, is 
someone who diverts what is proclaimed from its external appearance (its 
exoteric aspect or zahir), and makes it revert to its truth, its haqiqah’ (cf. 
Kalam-i Pir). ...Exegesis of a text goes hand in hand with exegesis of the soul, 
a practice known in Ismaili gnosis as the science of the Balance (mizan).735 
Method. 
Corbin begins his consideration of the method of ta’wil by  ‘by drawing a careful distinction between 
symbol and allegory’,736 as follows:  
Allegory is a rational operation implying no transition either to a new plane of 
being or to a new depth of consciousness; it is a figuration, at an identical level 
of consciousness of what might very well be known in a different way, but 
calls for ever new execution.  The symbol announces a plane of consciousness 
distinct from that of rational evidence, it is the “cipher” of a mystery, the only 
means of saying something that cannot be apprehended in any other way; a 
symbol is never “explained” once and for all, but must be deciphered over and 
over again, just as a musical score is never deciphered once and for all, but 
calls for ever new execution. 737  
The method of the ta’wil, as ‘essential symbolic understanding’, is therefore ‘the transmutation of 
everything visible into symbols, the intuition of an essence or person in an Image which partakes neither of 
                                                           
732 H. Corbin, Alone with the Alone p.78 
733 H. Corbin, Alone with the Alone p.79 
734 H. Corbin, Alone with the Alone p.79 
735 History of Islamic Philosophy p.14. This technical discussion goes on at some length, and is extremely precise and beautiful.  
736 H. Corbin, Alone with the Alone p.79 
737 H. Corbin, Alone with the Alone p.149 
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universal logic nor of sense perception, and which is the only means of signifying what is to be 
signified’.738 
 
Organ   
Corbin begins  here by noting ‘the importance accorded to this organ by the Avicennans in their noetics’739 
— by “this organ”, meaning   
the contemplative intellect in its higher form, designated as holy intellect or 
holy spirit...the organ common to the perfect Sage and to the prophet740, the 
vehicle of a perception whose object is no longer the logical concept or 
universal, but presents itself in the form of a typification. 741    
Whereas ‘common knowledge’ is ‘effected by a penetration of the sense impressions of the outside world 
into the interior of the soul, writes Corbin, the work of prophetic inspiration’, is, vice versa, ‘a projection of 
the inner soul upon the outside world’. In guiding, anticipating, and moulding sense perception’, the active 
Imagination may thus ‘transmute[] sensory data into symbols’—cf. “symbolizing with”. For the Burning 
Bush to be more than any old burning bush to Moses, e.g.; ‘in short, in order that there may be a 
theophany—an organ of trans-sensory perception’742  (and, as above, projection), is called for, in order that 
the ‘thing’, or sensory datum, in this case the burning bush, may become a symbol ‘of the thing signified 
with which it symbolizes’743. This is none other than ‘the organ of the theophanic Imagination’, capable at 
all times ‘of transmuting sensory data into symbols and external events into symbolic histories’; all 
‘accomplished in the alam-al-mithal’. 744  
 
Source. 
Here, in order that we might ‘follow the connecting lines leading from Avicennan or Suhrawardian noetics 
to Shi’ite and Sufi esoterism’ with regard to ‘the figure of the Active Intelligence as Holy Spirit, Angel of 
knowledge and of Revelation’, as the source of the ta’wil, Corbin notes the following essential 
correspondences:  
[In Ismaili Gnosis] ‘the Imam is the terrestrial pole of the Tenth Intelligence,  
corresponding functionally to the Angel Holy-Spirit of the Avicennan or 
Suhrawardian philosophers.  
[While in Duodeciman Shi’ism] the “hidden Imam”, hidden between Heaven 
and earth in the alam-al-mithal, assumes a similar function, acting on what 
Mulla Sadra calls the treasure of celestial origin, the Imamate concealed within 
every being’ 745 
 
                                                           
738 H. Corbin, Alone with the Alone p.13 
739 H. Corbin, Alone with the Alone p.79.  
740 Note that while the organ of the ta’wil is identical with that of the tanzil, prophetic revelation. 
741 H. Corbin, Alone with the Alone p.80 
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743 History of Islamic Philosophy pp.12-3 
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He adds that ‘other parallels will shortly present themselves...notably in respect of the Holy Spirit, the 
divine Face of every being’. 746  
 
Going search of an equivalent phenomenon of esoterism in Christianity, Corbin finds that, while there are 
parallels indicated between e.g., those texts of Christian Gnosis which embody ‘the secret teachings which 
Jesus, in his body of light, dispensed to his disciples after his resurrection’ and ‘the Shi’ite idea of the 
esoteric meaning of Koranic revelation, whose initiator is the Imam’,  starting with ‘the condemnation of 
the Montanist movement in the second century, any possibility of a new prophetic revelation dispensed by 
the Angels, or of a prophetic hermeneutics was cut off, at least for and by the Great Church’, 747, which 
from that time on, ‘substituted itself for individual prophetic inspiration’, legitimizing ‘the existence of a 
dogmatic magistery’, whose dogma ‘states everything  that can or should be said’,  thus leaving no place 
for ‘“the disciples of Khidr”’, at least, within the church; for just as ‘the very phenomena of “orthodoxy” 
presupposes the end of prophecy...the coming of dogma puts an end to prophetism’. 
 
And ‘concomitant with the formation of a dogmatic consciousness’, writes Corbin,  ‘the coming of 
historical consciousness’, i.e., the conception of a latitudinal ‘expansion in  history’,  in relation to ‘the idea 
of a “past”, issuing from  the fundamental dogma of Christianity’, i.e., ‘that of the Incarnation’, according 
to ‘the official form given to it by the definitions of the Councils’: the ‘unique and irreversible fact’ that 
‘God in person was incarnated at a moment in history; [that] this happened within a set chronology’—this 
being, for Corbin,  ‘its most characteristic symptom’. 748 For once God has been with us, Incarnate,   
There is no more mystery, consequently esoterism is no longer necessary 
which is why all the resurrected Christ’s secret teachings to his disciples have 
been piously relegated to the Apocrypha along with the other Gnostic books; 
they had no connection with history. 
In contrast, continues Corbin, whereas ‘The Incarnate God, in person, in empirical history is unknown to 
the traditional Orient—and so too is the historical consciousness which goes with it’, divine 
anthropomorphosis, i.e., ‘a divine Manifestation in human form’—is known to esoterism in Islam, but not 
as earthly Incarnation; rather as taking place ‘”in heaven”, on the plane of the angelic universes’,  and 
“only” ‘manifested on earth in theophanic figures which draw his followers, those who recognise him, 
toward their celestial assumption.’ Thus, while certain traits suggest ‘an affinity between Imamology and a 
Christology of the Ebionite or Gnostic type’, those same traits underlie ‘its remoteness from every variety 
of Pauline Christology’. 749 ‘The theophanism of Ibn ‘Arabi will show us why no history, or philosophy of 
history can be made with theophanies’, and why ‘the fatidic cry “God is dead!”’ can never be regarded ‘as 
anything more than the pretension and delusion of people blind to the profound truth of the “docetism” that 
is so much ridiculed in our history books’.750*  
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* Docetism, which the OxDCC describes as ‘a tendency... In the early Church...rather than a formulated and unified doctrine’ toward 
the belief or opinion that the humanity’ of Christ, as the OXDCC has it, i.e., Christ in fleshly body Incarnate—and thus his ‘sufferings’ 
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Thus, while noting that ‘in both quarters’ there is to be found a discernible ‘hostility to the very postulate of 
esoterism’, as well as ‘minorities which adhere fervently to this same esoterism’, Corbin finds that Islamic 
and Christian esoterism differ in the following fundamental ways. While Islamic esoterism is situated ‘in 
relation to a pure prophetic religion, moving in the pure theophanic dimension (...in which Khidr-Elijah and 
Moses are contemporaries)’, Christian esoterism is situated rather ‘in relation to a religion of Incarnation 
involving all the implications of historical consciousness’.  In Islam, ‘the demands of the ta’wil shake the 
stability of the Law, through preserving the letter as the foundation of its symbols’, while in Christianity, 
however, ‘the same demands shake the authority of the magistery in bond with the historicity which it 
establishes and from which it derives justification’.  
 
 Even taking these profound differences into account,  Corbin finds that comparative phenomenological 
work may still be undertaken in order to discern what similarities there may be ‘between the implicit 
intentions expressed in both quarters by these positions’,  whether ‘from the standpoint of a radically 
hostile mind or...that of an adept’.751 Moreover, Corbin has great hopes for what such comparative work 
might yield.  
 
Here I would turn to Corbin’s own conclusion to the introduction of his unparalleled History of Islamic 
Philosophy, in which he sets forth his hope and conviction that, should this ‘type of prophetic philosophy’ 
be called, as a ‘witness, into the witness-box’, by ‘our histories of philosophy’: 
It could tell us why what happened in the West after the thirteenth century did 
not happen in Shi’ite Islam, even though it too is, as we pride ourselves on 
being, the product of the Bible and of Greek wisdom. A science which is 
capable of the unlimited conquest of the external world, but which exacts as a 
ransom the appalling crisis of all philosophy, the disappearance of the person 
and the acceptance of the void—can such a science, for this witness, weigh 
more heavily in the balance than 'a bundle of books balancing a corpse’?752  
 
 
                                                           
and crucifixion should be considered as ‘apparent rather than real’. (Cross and Livingstone, OxDCC  p.493). Docetism clearly also has 
profound ramifications for the professed resurrection of Christ, as for every Christian who lives and dies in the faithful hope of bodily 
resurrection, as in, ‘In my flesh shall I see God’ (Job 19:26). If the Incarnate body of Christ is “merely” apparent, or imaginal and not 
“real” as in fleshly-real, then what of the “second”, risen or resurrected Christ?  Which returns us to question of those disciples who 
witnessed the Transfiguration scene—that of what, exactly might it mean to be “risen”. 
751 H. Corbin, Alone with the Alone p.85 
 
752 H. Corbin, History of Islamic Philosophy, (ibid.) p.252 
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Conclusion 
 
Let us state once again that for Corbin as for Heidegger, the thrownness of Dasein, Dasein’s –there being, 
i.e., it’s being the there, is at once Dasein’s being-there-to. As symbolised by Corbin’s hyphen,  Dasein 
consists of the correlation of (the) being- and (the)-there. As for Heidegger, in agreement with Kant, every 
there, every reality, or horizon, is formed for Corbin by the faculty of imagination.  For Corbin however, as 
we have said, this is a theophanic faculty. It is theophanic be!ing, i.e., Creative Be!ing in significatio 
passiva: there are, it seems, potentially infinite, “ascending” theres to which being, as be!ing, as theophany, 
i.e., as Be!ing in significatio passiva, can be! present. As such, for Corbin, the hyphen may also be said to 
be the symbol of Dasein’s creative infinitude, precisely grace à its be!ing Be!ing in significatio passiva.  
For Heidegger, however it is the finitude intrinsic to Dasein which determines the horizon of finitude for 
Dasein as such. Thus for Heidegger, all that may be known of Being, i.e., ontological truth, is that which 
may be revealed within the horizon of finitude, including the very fact of being’s finitude. From a 
Corbinian perspective, all of this makes of it a very grim “there” to be. Thus Corbin: ‘ I could not avoid 
perceiving that beneath the sombre sky, the Da of Dasein was an isle of perdition, was precisely the Isle of 
“Occidental exile”’753.  As for the ‘so-called “creative” capacities of the finite human creature’,754 at once a 
‘going-out-to’, a turning-towards which in the ‘standing-out-from’ at once ‘forms and therein holds before 
itself—a horizon’755, the “ecstatic-horizonal” forming of transcendence that is at once the forming of the 
possibility of experience: how, then is it for Heidegger, that the finite creature does not ‘become infinite 
through this creative behaviour?’ For Kant, according to Heidegger, it absolutely does not,—not, at least, in 
the sense of intuitus originarius. Not only does ontological knowledge not create beings, it does not even 
‘relate itself at all, thematically or directly to the being’, but rather to what Kant variously refers to as ‘the 
nonempirical object = “X”’; a ‘Something = X of which we know nothing...’  and a ‘Nothing [which] 
means: not a being, but nevertheless “Something”’, which Nothing-thing Heidegger defines ‘according to 
its essence...[as] pure horizon’.756  
 
Thus for Heidegger the apparent “creativity” of ontological knowledge, which lies in its “forming” of 
transcendence, ‘is nothing other than the holding-open of the horizon within which the Being of the being 
becomes discernable in a preliminary way’.757 Thus, writes Heidegger ‘if knowledge means: apprehending 
of beings’, then ‘ontological knowledge is no knowledge’ at all. However, says Heidegger, if truth, as the 
second condition for finite knowledge (the first being the very possibility of experience758) be taken to 
mean ‘unconcealment of’ [aletheia], rather than, e.g., “adequacy to”, as in the adequatio759, then while the 
‘original truth’, or “unconcealment” of transcendence ‘must bifurcate into the unveiledness of Being and 
the openness [Offenbarkeit] of beings’ as above, since Kant has no other “use” here for ontological 
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knowledge beyond that it ‘serves for the making-possible of finite knowledge’, let it simply be said that the 
truth of ontological knowledge lies in its ‘letting the being be encountered within the horizon’. 
 
Nonetheless, for Heidegger: 
it must at least remain open as to whether this “creative” knowledge, which is 
always only ontological and never ontic, bursts the finitude of transcendence 
asunder, or whether it does not just “plant” the finite “subject” in its authentic 
finitude. 760 
Heidegger’s onward path leads him to “yes” here, Corbin’s to “(yes but) no”; this being the point of their 
divergence.  The “hermeneutic key” here for Corbin, that which opens his way, as he diverges from 
Heidegger’s path to radical finitude, is the significatio passiva. Cf. Heidegger’s qualification, at Davos that 
‘while the human being as finite creature might be said to have ‘a certain infinitude in the ontological’, its 
infinitude is never absolute, i.e. ontic; it is ontological, rather, ‘in the sense of the understanding of Being’. 
Thus, for Heidegger: since, for Kant, ontological understanding is only possible ‘within the inner 
experience of beings’, the ‘infinitude of the ontological’ is so essentially bound to finite, ‘ontic experience’, 
even as ‘the index of finitude’, that, for Heidegger, this infinitude which breaks out in the power of 
imagination is precisely the strongest argument for [the] finitude [of Dasein]’.761  For Corbin, on the 
contrary, this “infinitude of the ontological” constitutes the vertical axis of (and between) Be!ing and be!ing 
as symbolized by the significatio passiva, which at once intersects with, irrupts into, i.e., “opens” and 
encapsulates the finite horizonal Heideggerian Weltanschauung, the inner becoming the outer, as it were. 
 
For Corbin, the ontological knowledge that makes ontic knowledge, as finite thinking, or reasoning about 
beings as beings possible, is also that which makes them be! in a different mode of the same imperative-
Be!ing. As be!ing-revealing, i.e., the revealing-be!ing of human (or really any other kind of) be!ing, by 
which be!ings are (and thus Be!ing is) revealed, not as objects, but as be!ings-present.  This presential 
knowledge is creative, for Corbin; it is Creative Be!ing, (but) in the mode of the significatio passiva. Thus 
as the be!ing of Be!ing (the Be!ing of be!ings), be!ing is thus at once “horizontally” finite and “vertically” 
infinite, for Corbin.  Again, the significatio passiva is the key here. Each “utterance”, each iteration of 
be!ing—i.e., of the Be!ing of be!ings—is the intuitus originarius, manifested as and by the Creative 
Imperative, Be! in significatio passiva. The extent, or intensity, or degree of transparency of the revelation 
of Being, i.e., of the Be!ing of be!ings, depends upon be!ings’ capacity to be! according to our refrain, 
talem eum vidi qualem capere potui. This is then, in a “receptive creativity”. Since Be!ing and be!ing are 
modes of the same creative imperative, be!ing is! what it is receiving, in significatio passiva. So this 
receptivity, this “dependency” of be!ing on Be!ing is not a qualification of finitude,  at least, not in the 
“vertical” dimension, even though, the actual be!ing may be “horizontally finite”, and variously limited by 
and in its present capacity. 
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Thus, whereas Dasein is revealed in and by the truth of its finitude for Heidegger, by its very knowledge of 
Being and the dependent manner in which this truth is obtained, i.e., in its relation to the always already 
encountered; for Corbin the truth of Be!ing is revealed in and by the theophanic –theres of be!ings 
according to their capacity to receive/reveal. Each be!ing may aspire, as it were, to make the most “joyful 
noise” they are able.  Here too, is a ‘spontaneous receptivity’ like that of the Kant book; again, the 
Corbinian leitmotif of the significatio passiva  makes all the difference, vs. the dogmatic theology of creatio 
ex nihilo which informs the paradigm of traditional metaphysics, and thus both Kant and Heidegger in both 
his appropriation of Kant in the Kant book, and on his own account, in “What is Metaphysics?”, and even 
while, as we hope to have shown here, Heidegger’s proof of finitude in What is Metaphysics? sets about 
testing creatio ex nihilo to auto-destruction.  
 
The mutability of the “spontaneously receptive” capacity of be!ings for Be!ing, for Corbin, i.e., its 
potential-being for “refination”, toward further transparency, greater capacity, may also be understood in 
terms of i.e., of be!ings’ relatively ascendant proximity to Be!ing, i.e., to the Orient of (one’s) Being—the 
Esse as the transcendental “Unicity” or Oneness of Existence/Being, as that which actualizes beings 
(existents) ‘in their very act of being [and which] are essentially multiple’—and thus perhaps somehow 
closer, in some ineffable way to ‘the one and unique Divine Existent, ineffable in the depths of its mystery’, 
i.e., the Deus Absconditum of Ibn ‘Arabi’s apophantic theology,762 whose relation to Be!ing and be!ing is 
perhaps best summarized in the gnomic, gnostic hadith: “I was a hidden Treasure and I longed [or loved] to 
be known”. Though this knowing always (experientially and) mediately, through the theophanic mediation 
of Be!ing, and precisely according to one’s capacity.  
 
Just so, in what we might as regard as a kind of fractal iteration of the relation of be!ing to Be!ing, the 
masterless disciples of Khidr strive to increase their individual proximity to Khidr, in his great proximity to 
the Orient of his Being; their aim is to be! (as) Khidr. The initiation rite of “putting on the mantle of Khidr” 
models this ideal proximity; ultimately to be! (as) Khidr, as one who is truly alone with the Alone, going 
“home” via an esoteric, experiential way even as it offends against the dogmatic, book-learnt truths of even 
a Holy Book. We also find, in the person-archetype of Khidr, and the initiatic rites and aspirations of his 
masterless disciples, something very close to Kantian freedom, and freedom as defined by Heidegger in the 
Kant book, to wit: Freedom, ‘insofar as this means placing oneself under a self-given necessity’, ’lies in the 
essence of pure understanding, i.e., [in]...pure theoretical reason’; not because pure reason is spontaneous in 
character, but rather ‘because this spontaneity is a receptive spontaneity, i.e., because it is the 
transcendental imagination’. Further: ‘If, in freedom, I ‘subordinate myself to the law’, the law is self-
given; I freely receive the law from myself, and thus my respect before the law is submission ‘to myself as 
pure reason’. And this, writes Heidegger, this ‘submitting, self-projecting onto the entire basic possibility of 
what authentically exists...is the essence of the acting Being-itself, i.e., of practical reason’—this is the 
authentic ‘Being-itself of the I’.763 
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In mystical narratives such as Suhravardî’s The Crimson Archangel (ibid.), as “the question that must be 
asked” of archetypal personages encountered (since according to the the gnoseology of the Ishrâqîyûn, e.g., 
this is not a subjective, or objective, but a presential knowledge)764, the question of “Who...?” and the 
question “From where...?” form one question for Corbin: by the answer on receives there, one discovers 
one’s own cosmic orientation. Increasing proximity to the divine/”home” is symbolised by one’s ease of 
passage “beyond the Mountain of Qaf”, or in terms of spectral transparency, i.e., toward being as a drop of 
water.  
 
In the Crimson Archangel e.g., the “low” chromatic frequency of the Archangel’s crimson raiment—also 
the Protoktistos, the First-Created—reveals how far from home he  has come from his origin to appear on 
the sensory plane; thus also something of what there to which the youth encountering the Archangel is 
present, i.e., where he is at, and how far he still has to go, since, as we have seen, this for Corbin, such tales 
describe ‘the experience of the gnostic, lived as the personal history of the Stranger, the captive who aspires 
to return home’.765  This aspiration is characterized by a kind of gilded sadness, such as that of a lover for 
the Beloved, as in the  mystic poetry of Rumi.   
 
These symbolic narratives take place in the imaginal realm, which however also constitutes the most actual, 
and ubiquitous “there” for Corbin; what is distinct about the imaginal is that it is also that plane upon which 
symbolic meanings, considered as truths of revelation, may be revealed, according to each be!ing’s capacity 
to ‘see’, and thus to ‘capture’. According to one’s capacity, or proximity to the Orient of one’s Being, in the 
Avicennan cosmology, one’s “angel”, the archetype of one’s soul-species, there are many (perhaps 
infinite?) ascending “planes” of meaning, or realities.  As ‘that the Form under which each of the Spirituals 
knows God is also the form under which God reveals Himself to Himself in that man’, 766 each be!ing is 
thus alone with the Be!ing of their be!ing, as in the English surtitle of Corbin’s book on Ibn ‘Arabi, Alone 
with the Alone.  At once alone, and—according to the key of the significatio passiva—all-one.  
 
By comparison, for Corbin, Heidegger’s Dasein is trapped in exile; a being created from nothing, with no 
where to go, no home outside the horizon of finitude Dasein’s unheimlich state gives rise not to sadness so 
much as anxiety. Being ‘there discovered’,767 in truth,  Dasein is revealed in its radical finitude, its freedom 
for death only.  
 
As in “From Heidegger to Suhravardî” Corbin notes that ‘the Heideggerian hermeneutic gives the 
impression of a theology without theophany’. For Corbin, however—who states consistently that he has no 
problem with the Analytic of Dasein, only the Heideggerian Weltanschauung— according to his logic of 
Be!ing, and with the hermeneutic key of the significatio passiva in hand, the potential for theophany may 
be read “back” into Heidegger; with Being figured here as Be!ing, Creation manifesting via and as the 
Creative Imperative: not the Creative Being of creation ex nihilo, but as the Logos of an apophantic theos, 
                                                           
764 (ilm hozuri)’, which is ‘immediate presence, that by which the soul’s “act of presence” itself gives rise to the presence of things, 
and renders present to itself no longer objects but presences’764 
765 H. Corbin, Swedenborg and Esoteric Islam, 1999 p.2 
766 H. Corbin, Alone with the Alone p.62 
767 Corbin’s introduction to the 1938 Gallimard edition, ibid. 
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Deus Absconditum, the “God” that Is not, whose infinite longing to be known calls a knowing into be!ing, 
in its multiple (infinite?) iterations. And after all perhaps this is still a creation ex nihilo, sensu stricto, if the 
“God” that “speaks” “Is” not, i.e., is No being, No-thing; but of a very different creatio ex nihilo than that 
traditional, metaphysical doctrine that Heidegger throws into so much jeopardy in his “What is 
Metaphysics?”, even while his proof depends on it. An ontotheology in which Creation, and thus the 
infinite, as the unfinished,  n+1, rather appears to irrupt into the “sphere” of the finite, which however it 
surrounds, disrupting its absoluteness.  Here perhaps is something like the outline of one of Corbin’s 
hypothetical “right Heideggerianisms”.  Indeed, quite near to the end of his own life, Henry Corbin 
concludes the interview with Philippe Nemo, wondering:  
Only, would Heidegger have followed our lead in this operation that would 
tend to convert the Logos of his ontology into a theological Logos?  ... And 
firstly, who must the Theos be?  I have tried to express it.  But our uncertainty 
as to his possible response is merely secondary. A Heideggerian “orthodoxy” is 
out of the question, and we simply have to pursue our task as we understand it.  
Perhaps one day we will find - within the mass of his unpublished work, or in 
some recorded interview - the indication of an answer.  But it is also possible 
that he has taken his secret with him forever. That is why, today, I prefer 
simply to say, as we do in Arabic: Rahmat Allâh ‘alay-hi: May the divine 
Mercy be with him.768 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
768 From Heidegger to Suhravardî, (ibid.)  
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